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Summary 
When observing other people acting upon their environment, we are very 
proficient in understanding what they are doing, although we do not have 
direct access to their internal intentions. But still, we are able to infer their 
action goals and intentions, just from observing their body movements in a 
specific context. According to recent research, action understanding is 
guaranteed by a direct matching process which states that in observing 
others’ actions, people take advantage of the same action knowledge that 
enables them to perform the same actions.  
One possibility to investigate action understanding in the observer is to 
assess anticipatory eye movements. Anticipatory eye movements have 
previously been shown to occur during both action execution and action 
observation, and to be directly linked to the observer’s corresponding action 
plans. Hence, they can be taken as indicators of activated action knowledge 
during the observation of others’ actions. Another possibility to investigate 
action understanding is to measure pupil size changes following the 
observation of unexpected actions. Previous research has demonstrated that 
participants’ pupils dilated as a result of unexpected events. Hence, pupil 
size changes indicate the violation of expectations about action outcomes.  
In order to be able to predict others’ actions or to perceive an action 
outcome as unexpected, people need to possess action knowledge. 
According to the ideomotor theory, action knowledge is defined as an 
association between a body movement and its caused effects, established 
when individuals act upon objects in the environment. Hence, a connection 
between own action experience and the ability to understand others’ actions 
can be assumed. However, most studies investigating the impact of 
experience on action understanding concentrated on motor experts like 
athletes and musicians, whereas only few studies investigated whether 
action plans can be activated by short-term experience.  
Within this dissertation, we aimed to fill this gap by investigating the 
influence of a brief period of experience on the ability to understand others’ 
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actions in adults and children. To this end, we conducted three studies in 
which we employed a block stacking task in a pre-post eye tracking design. 
During pre- and posttest, participants watched short video clips showing an 
actor performing the block stacking task. Intermediately, participants either 
performed the same block stacking task or one of two control tasks (puzzles 
or pursuit rotor task). We assumed that short-term experience with the block 
stacking task should activate task-specific action plans supporting a direct 
matching process during the observation of posttest trials. Further, puzzles 
were applied as a first control task with the purpose to activate similar 
action plans comparable to those of the block stacking task, as both the 
block stacking task and puzzles shared several features. In the study with 
adults, a second control task – a pursuit rotor task – was employed, which 
required participants to follow a moving red dot on a circular track with 
their index finger. We assumed that experience with the pursuit rotor task 
would activate action plans different from those activated by the block 
stacking task and puzzles, hence, not having an influence on action 
understanding during the observation of posttest trials.  
Specifically, in the first and in the third study we questioned whether short-
term experience with the block stacking task would have a task-specific 
influence on the ability to predict the action goals of the same block 
stacking task during observation. Results of these two studies indeed 
indicated that participants who had performed the block stacking task 
directed their gaze significantly earlier towards the action goals of the block 
stacking task during post-test trials. However, this effect could only be 
found in participants older than 10 years of age. In accordance with the 
direct matching hypothesis, these two studies provide evidence that short-
term experience with the block stacking task activates task-specific action 
knowledge which enhances an improved prediction of the action goals 
during observation. 
Within the second study, we aimed to investigate whether short-term 
experience would also have a task-specific influence on the extent of 
surprise when participants observed unexpected action outcomes indicated 
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by pupil dilation. Results of this study revealed that participants’ 
expectations were violated when they observed unexpected action 
outcomes, indicated by a pronounced prediction error in form of pupil 
dilation after unexpected events. However, no influence of short-term 
experience on pupil dilation could be found. Hence, this study provides 
evidence that although action understanding can be investigated via pupil 
size changes, they rather reflect an evaluation process than a direct matching 
process.  
In sum, we were able to demonstrate that different measures of action 
understanding deliver specific types of information about action 
understanding. Moreover, we could show that own experience with an 
action only impacts predictive gaze behavior during the observation of the 
same action. Crucially, this effect emerges around the age of 11 years, 
indicating a developmental change during childhood. 
  
     V 
Table of Contents 
Danksagung I 
Summary II 
Table of Contents V 
List of Tables VII 
List of Figures VIII 
Introduction 11 
Chapter 1: Theoretical Background 15 
1 Definition of Action and Perception ..................................................... 15 
2 Theoretical Accounts of the Relationship between Action and 
Perception ............................................................................................. 17 
3 Measures of Action Understanding ...................................................... 27 
4 Empirical Evidence for Action Understanding in Adults ..................... 36 
5 Empirical Evidence for Action Understanding in Children ................. 53 
6 Outline of the Project ............................................................................ 68 
Chapter 2: Effects of short-term experience on anticipatory eye 
movements during action observation 73 
1 Research Questions & Hypotheses ....................................................... 73 
2 Methods ................................................................................................ 74 
3 Results .................................................................................................. 81 
4 Discussion ............................................................................................. 83 
Chapter 3: Pupil size changes during the observation of unexpected 
actions - The role of experience. 86 
VI        
1 Research Questions and Hypotheses .................................................... 86 
2 Methods ................................................................................................ 87 
3 Results .................................................................................................. 90 
4 Discussion ............................................................................................. 97 
Chapter 4: The role of experience on action understanding in 
children aged 4 – 14 years 101 
1 Research Questions and Hypotheses .................................................. 101 
2 Experiment 1: Preschoolers (4-6 years).............................................. 102 
3 Experiment 2: Children (8-10 years) .................................................. 113 
4 Experiment 3: Teenagers (11-14 years) .............................................. 118 
5 Discussion ........................................................................................... 124 
Chapter 5: General Discussion 128 
Chapter 6: Conclusion & Outlook 145 
References 146 
Appendix 178 
 
  
     VII 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Summary of means and standard deviations for gaze latencies .... 81 
Table 2. Summary of means and standard deviations of pupil dilation values 
for NC3 ........................................................................................................ 96 
Table 3. Summary of means and standard deviations for gaze latencies .. 109 
Table 4. Mean percentage of anticipatory saccades during pre- and posttest
 ................................................................................................................... 110 
Table 5. Mean percentage of anticipatory saccades during pre- and posttest
 ................................................................................................................... 116 
Table 6. Summary of means and standard deviations for gaze latencies .. 121 
Table 7. Mean percentage of anticipatory saccades during pre and posttest
 ................................................................................................................... 121 
  
VIII        
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Relationship between action and perception according to the 
common coding approach. Broken lines in the top part indicate common 
representational medium of action and perception. Adapted  from 
“Perception and action planning” by Prinz, 1997. European Journal of 
Cognitive Psychology, 9(2), p. 130. .............................................................21 
Figure 2. Example of stimulus presentation. Adapted from “Actions seen 
through babies’ eyes: A dissociation between looking time an predictive 
gaze,” by Daum et al., 2012, Frontiers in Psychology, 3, p.3. Copyright 
2012 by Daum, Attig, Gunawan, Prinz and Gredebäck. Adapted with 
permission. ....................................................................................................34 
Figure 3. Video stimuli showing actor performing a block stacking task. a. 
Starting position (White rectangle shows AOI position. AOI was not visible 
for participants.), b. Goal position of grasping movement 1, c. Goal position 
of grasping movement 2, d. Goal position of grasping movement 3, e. Goal 
position of grasping movement 4, f. Goal position of grasping movement 3 
in non-completion trial. ................................................................................76 
Figure 4. Illustration of participant performing a block stacking task in a 
forehand movement. Black dots indicate starting and goal positions. .........78 
Figure 5. Pre-post differences of mean gaze latencies averaged over 
grasping movements (except grasping movement 1) for each experimental 
condition. BST = Block Stacking Task, PR = Pursuit Rotor Task. Vertical 
bars indicate standard errors. **p < 0.01. .....................................................83 
Figure 6. Grasping offsets and baseline values for each condition. Time 0 
represents onset of the block stacking task. Vertical bars indicate grasping 
offsets of interest. Grey-scaled areas indicate baseline time periods (500 ms) 
for each condition. NC = non-completion trial; TT = test trial; GM = 
grasping movement.......................................................................................89 
Figure 7 .Baseline-corrected dilation-by-time plot for non-completion trials 
and test trials during pre- and posttest (Baseline = 1000 ms interval prior to 
     IX 
stimulus onset). Time 0 represents stimulus onset. Vertical bars indicate 
grasping offsets of interest of non-completion trials. Black lines indicate 
pupil dilation over time in test trials; red line indicates pupil dilation over 
time in non-completion trial 2; blue lines indicate pupil dilation over time in 
non-completion trial 3; green line indicates pupil dilation over time in non-
completion trial 4. TT = test trial, NC = non-completion trial, N = 98. ...... 90 
Figure 8. Mean pupil dilation values of test trials and non-completion trials 
for pretest and posttest. TT = Test trial, NC = Non-completion trial. Vertical 
bars indicate standard errors. ***p < .001. .................................................. 92 
Figure 9. a) Mean pupil dilation values of test trials and non-completion 
trials during pretest separately for each experimental group. b) Mean pupil 
dilation values of test trials and non-completion trials during posttest 
separately for each experimental group. TT = Test trial, NC = Non-
completion trial, GM = Grasping Movement, BST = Block Stacking Task, 
PR = Pursuit Rotor Task. Grey areas indicate time interval of interest. ...... 95 
Figure 10. Video stimuli showing agent performing a block stacking task in 
new non-completion trials. a. Starting position of grasping movement 4, b. 
Goal position of grasping movement 4; block 3 disappeared, c. Starting 
position of grasping movement 3, d. Goal position of grasping movement 3; 
block 2 disappeared. .................................................................................. 103 
Figure 11. Mean gaze latencies for pre- and posttest averaged over grasping 
movements (except grasping movement 1) for both experimental conditions. 
BST = Block Stacking Task. Vertical bars indicate standard errors. *p < 
0.05. n.s. = p > .05. .................................................................................... 122 
 
 
X        
This dissertation contains text passages, figures and tables of scientific papers 
of which I am the first author. These parts are not explicitly highlighted in the 
manuscript. 
 
The dissertation is partly based on the following publication: 
Möller, C., Zimmer, H. D., & Aschersleben, G. (2015). Effects of short-term 
experience on anticipatory eye movements during action observation. 
Experimental Brain Research, 233(1), 69–77. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-014-4091-x 
 
 
 
     11 
 “I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand.” 
Confucius – Chinese Philosopher 
Introduction
Imagine you are driving your car when you suddenly notice a person standing 
at the roadside next to a damaged car waving her hands in your direction. By 
watching this gesture within this context, you will immediately know that this 
person most likely had an accident and asks for your help. In other words, you 
understand the action of this person. Understanding others’ actions is a crucial 
human ability which ensures an adequate interaction with other individuals. If 
we would not be able to understand the intentions or goals of other people in 
our environment, we would constantly be dependent on asking our counterparts 
what they are doing and for what purpose. This is difficult to imagine, since we 
are used to a convenient, fluent and apparently automatic interaction with other 
people. But how is action understanding enabled and what are influential 
factors on the ability to understand others’ actions? 
Prediction. In order to understand others’ actions correctly and to initialize 
appropriate reactions, the prediction of future aspects of others’ actions is 
essential. Only, if we are able to anticipate what a person will do in the next 
moment, we can reliably plan according reactions. In the example above, you 
would probably immediately predict that the person is in need for help and as a 
result you would most likely stop by, offer your help and give an emergency 
call. However, it might become obvious from the example that the prediction 
of others’ actions can be more or less deficient from time to time. In this 
example, it could also be possible that the person next to the damaged car is 
setting up a crime and trying to lure a victim. Admittedly, the second 
possibility is rather unlikely and reminds of a bad horror movie, but still this 
scenario illustrates well that the prediction of actions is influenced by prior 
knowledge and expectations of the observer, and can therefore end up in a 
prediction error when expectations are violated (as it would be the case in the 
crime scenario).  
Moreover, in order to reliably anticipate the intention of someone when 
observing his/her actions, it is necessary that new information is integrated in 
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the prediction process. For instance, in our example you could notice that the 
person next to the car does not wave at you but instead at a fireman who is 
already approaching the person. In this case, you would understand that the 
gesture was not meant for you but for another person and that help is already at 
place. This would mean that you probably would not stop by, thus, your 
reactions towards the observed gesture would change due to updated 
information. Basically, this means, that contextual information as well as new 
aspects of the observed action itself need to be integrated in the prediction 
process in order to unambiguously understand others’ action goals. 
Experience. As already mentioned above, the observer usually possesses prior 
knowledge about observed actions. This implies that the observer must have 
been confronted with the same action before and this implies that the ability to 
predict others’ action goals is strongly dependent on one’s own experience 
with an action.  
 
 
This proverb stated by the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551 - 479 BC) 
illustrates intuitively that it is not sufficient enough to just listen to a 
description of an action or to passively observe someone else performing an 
action but that it is rather essential to have active experience with an action in 
order to gain a deep understanding. These principles are easily illustrated when 
you imagine that you would be asked to handwrite the proverb above in 
Chinese letters (presumed that you have no experience with Chinese language). 
By never having written Chinese letters it would be very difficult for you to do 
so by merely listening to someone describing the letters to you or by just 
observing someone else writing the letters once and you are asked to remember 
them by heart. But by having written the letters on your own before, your 
performance in writing this proverb will be most likely much better. Yet, given 
this example it is not clear how much and what type of experience you need to 
recognize the letters or to predict which letter will be written next by another 
person. Thus, this raises the question which amount of experience is required to 
我听见我忘记.我看见我记住.我做我了解. 
(I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand.) 
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understand others’ actions. To date we know that experts have an improved 
ability to understand actions of their trained domain, but much less is known 
about non-experts, or how sparse experience changes action understanding.  
Development. In order to investigate the influence of experience on action 
understanding, it is reasonable to start with individuals that do not possess 
manifold experience in a broad variety of domains – children. Since the 
development from childhood to adulthood is associated with a continuous gain 
of experience, adults are more likely able to draw on their prior knowledge to 
understand others’ actions, whereas children probably have problems to 
understand several observed actions. Moreover, to date it is well established in 
this research area that action understanding is guaranteed by neural structures 
that respond to both when an action is executed and when an action is 
observed. But how does this interface develop and when is its function 
comparable to adults? And moreover, can this connection be influenced by 
experience? 
______________ 
 
The present thesis aims to enlighten the interface between action execution and 
action understanding with regard to the influence of experience. We intend to 
investigate whether a relatively short amount of experience improves action 
understanding in both adults and children. Moreover, we plan to determine 
whether children are equally likely to benefit from experience as adults or if 
there are fundamental differences between children and adults.  
In the first chapter of this thesis, a summary of traditional and contemporary 
theoretical accounts describing the relationship between action and perception 
will be given first, followed by the description of two methods how action 
understanding is measured within this thesis. Subsequently, empirical findings 
about the interface of action and perception as well as influential factors on 
action understanding and its development throughout childhood are reviewed.  
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In the following three chapters, three studies conducted within this research 
project will be described and discussed. The first study deals with the influence 
of short-term experience on action understanding in adult participants 
measured via predictive eye movements. In the second study, we present how 
pupil dilation is related to action understanding and whether it can be 
influenced by action experience. In the third study we report how short-term 
experience influences action understanding (measured via predictive gaze) in 
children of different age-groups.  
In chapter 5 and 6, we summarize and discuss our findings in the light of 
previous research findings and propose suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Background
In this chapter, a general definition of the concepts of action and (action) 
perception is initially given, followed by a summary of traditional and 
contemporary theoretical accounts describing the relationship between action 
and perception. Traditionally, both concepts were considered to be independent 
and incommensurate, hence, a distinct definition of both concepts is suitable in 
order to highlight specific features of action and perception. However, 
contemporary theoretical accounts emphasize the interface between action 
execution and action perception and throughout this chapter, it will become 
obvious that action and action perception are strongly interrelated and cannot 
be considered independently of each other, especially in terms of action 
understanding. 
After the description of central theoretical accounts, we shed light on how 
action understanding is measured within this thesis and report recent empirical 
evidence concerning the interface of action and perception as well as 
influential factors on action understanding and its development throughout 
childhood.   
1 Definition of Action and Perception 
In order to specify the relationship between action and perception in the next 
section, the terms action and perception will be disentangled separately first.  
1.1 Action 
While awake, people are usually engaged in doing something, e.g., answering 
an e-mail, drinking tea or reading a book. All of these activities have in 
common that a person makes use of certain body movements in order to 
accomplish a final state (e.g., grasping a cup in order to drink tea). Thus, an 
volitional action in its simplest form consists of two main components – a 
movement and a goal (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 
1997). However, actions are often more complex and require more than one 
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movement to reach a certain goal (e.g., typing various letters on a keyboard in 
order to finish an e-mail). Hence, an action can be defined as the number of 
movements of an activity which converge in a common goal (Prinz, 2014).  
 
The aforementioned definition implicitly indicates that an agent has to plan and 
execute appropriate movements prospectively in order to accomplish his goal. 
This is ensured on the basis of internal mental representations, so called ‘motor 
programs’ (Keele, 1968; Morris, Summers, Matyas, & Iansek, 1994) or ‘action 
plans’ (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Rotman, 2006) that include information 
about the action goal besides information about the movement (Hommel et al., 
2001). Thus, executing an action involves the prospective internal anticipation 
of the action goal, in order to initiate appropriate movements.   
 
Furthermore, people do often engage in several activities at a time (e.g., 
drinking a cup of tea while reading the newspaper), illustrating that actions are 
frequently executed more or less simultaneously. Moreover, actions can 
comprise both goals that lie in the far future (e.g., doing sports in order to stay 
healthy in the future) and immediate goals (e.g., lifting a weight at the gym). 
From this example it becomes obvious that goals are organized in a 
hierarchical manner – from overarching goals, that usually last for a long time 
period, to sub-goals which can be achieved easily by simple motor acts in a 
short time period. Typically, overarching goals are abstract and complex (e.g., 
being a good person), whereas sub-goals are concrete and well-defined (Prinz, 
2014a). 
1.2 Perception 
Generally, perception can be defined as ‘the process by which we organize and 
interpret information about the world that has been collected by our sensory 
receptors’ (Pomerantz, 2003). When interacting with the physical environment, 
people are confronted with external stimuli (e.g., light or sound) stimulating 
their sensory receptors. During the process of perception, these basic sensations 
are integrated and transformed into coherent mental representations resulting in 
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a meaningful perception of external stimuli (Schacter, Gilbert, & Wegner, 
2009).  
For the present work, the general definition of perception has to be adapted to 
the special case of action perception. In contrast to perception in the sense of 
basic physiological processes, the term action perception already suggests that 
it encompasses more than just the mere perception of observed sensations. It 
rather implies an understanding of the intentions underlying observed actions, 
sometimes referred to as ‘grasping the sense of an observed action’ (Gallese, 
2006). According to Keitel (2013, p.5), action perception is “the observation of 
actions performed by others and the obtainment of a mental representation of 
this action including the action goal.” Hence, an observer perceives an action 
performed by another person by integrating observed sensations of the action 
(e.g., single movements of the agent, objects, action effects) into a meaningful 
mental representation of this action.  
Moreover, the term action understanding is often used synonymously to action 
perception, intuitively illustrating that an observer understands the intentions 
and goals of an agent (Gallese, 2009).  
For the present work, the terms action perception and action understanding are 
used synonymously, following the operational definition by Keitel (2013).  
2 Theoretical Accounts of the Relationship between 
Action and Perception 
When observing others’ we are most of the time able to understand what they 
are doing, although we do not have direct access to their internal intentions. 
But still, we are able to infer action goals and intentions from observing others’ 
body movements in a specific context. There are a number of theoretical 
accounts that address the foundation of action understanding. In this chapter, 
the most prominent approaches about the relationship between action and 
perception and their explanation of action understanding will be described.  
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2.1 Traditional Accounts 
Traditional accounts of action and perception considered both concepts to be 
independent domains in human cognition (cf. Hommel & Nattkemper, 2011). 
Descartes’ (1664) assumed that information of external stimuli (afferent 
signals) was transferred to the brain which in return transmitted signals to the 
muscles (efferent signals). At this point, action and perception were considered 
to be independent and incommensurate, hence, not influencing each other. 
Rather, actions were considered to be the result of perception only, meaning 
that actions occur as a reaction towards the perception of a certain event (cf. 
Prinz, 2014). This so-called sensorimotor approach became an influential 
conception throughout the following centuries of research on action and 
perception. 
About 200 years later, Donders (1868) described this process further by 
dividing the processing between afferent and efferent signals into twelve 
separate steps (starting with a certain stimulus input and resulting in a certain 
motor output) with the first six steps concerning perceptive operations and the 
latter six steps concerning motor operations. The intention behind this idea was 
to determine the amount of time each single processing step requires in order to 
measure and describe the processing chain of human cognition. This view was 
highly influential for later behavioral scientists and cognitive psychologists 
who typically adapted Donders’ approach by studying simple stimulus-reaction 
associations and explaining human behavior as being a consequence of an 
external stimulus (cf. Hommel & Nattkemper, 2011). Importantly, these 
researchers still emphasized the incommensurability between afferent and 
efferent signals which led to a framework often referred to as separate coding. 
Separate coding might be best illustrated by a simple reaction time experiment 
in which participants should press one of two keys with either the left or the 
right hand in response to a low or high pitched sound. In this case, the afferent 
codes represent the two different sounds and the efferent codes represent the 
two different hands. In order to allow the participant to press the key with the 
correct hand according to the presented sound the afferent codes need to be 
translated into efferent codes – metaphorically, sounds have to be translated 
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into hands. Hence, separate coding fulfills the purpose to explain how afferent 
and efferent signals can “talk” to each other in spite of their 
incommensurability. By proposing a translation mechanism (Welford, 1960) 
the two separate codes (efferent and afferent signals) are enabled to 
communicate, and by doing so, the gap between perception and action is 
overcome (cf. Prinz, 1990, 1997).  
2.2 Ideomotor Theory  
In the middle of the 19th century, traditional behavioral and cognitive theories 
of action and perception were challenged from time to time by studies 
demonstrating an interface between action and perception (see Stock & Stock, 
2004 for a review). For example, Laycock (1845) described the influence of 
perception and imagination on the behavior of patients infected with rabies. 
Within his observational studies he demonstrated that typical behavioral 
symptoms, like convulsions of the face, trunk or limbs did occur when the 
patient was visually confronted with a cup of water or even by the mere 
imagination of water or drinking. As a consequence, he reasoned that perceived 
or imagined situations somehow directly elicit the action associated with these 
situations.  
In the following, further theoretical consideration emerged, which were based 
on the question why people are able to perform voluntary, goal-directed actions 
but at the same time do nothing know about how they perform these actions – a 
phenomenon referred to as executive ignorance (Lotze, 1852). For instance, 
when asking people how they perform a certain action (e.g., opening a bottle) 
they would typically start to imagine themselves performing this action and 
subsequently describe what they ‘perceived’ (cf. Hommel & Nattkemper, 
2011).  
These considerations finally converged into the ideomotor theory, proposed by 
Lotze (1852) and James (1890), who stated that “every mental representation 
of a movement awakens to some degree the actual movement which is its 
object”. In contrast to traditional accounts, this approach argues that external 
events are caused by actions, not vice versa, and even more important, that 
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actions are exclusively represented in terms of their sensory effects (Prinz, 
1990), referred to as action knowledge. 
According to the ideomotor theory, action knowledge is the crucial aspect 
which allows the agent to either predict the effects of his actions, or to select an 
appropriate movement in order to achieve an intended goal. Action knowledge 
is considered to be based on associative learning between movements and their 
caused effects (cf. Prinz, 2014). For example, if a child is confronted with a 
new toy with a button which elicits a sound when pressed and starts to explore 
its functions, it will at some point touch the button which will elicit the sound. 
Crucially, this action causes three types of sensory effects: side effects (a 
specific hand position in order to press the button), near effects (the button 
moves downwards) and far effects (the sound), which will be consistently 
associated with the execution of this specific action (cf. Prinz, 2014). As a 
result an associative network which contains representations of the specific 
body movements and their caused near and far effects will be established.  
Once this associative network is constituted it can be used by the agent in two 
ways – as a forward model which allows the prediction of action effects caused 
by specific body movements, and as an inverse model which allows the 
planning of body movements in order to realize intended effects (cf. Prinz, 
2014). Further information about the acquisition and function of these 
associative networks can be found at Elsner and Hommel (2001). 
2.3 Common Coding Approach 
Based on the assumptions of the ideomotor theory, the common coding 
approach (Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1990, 1997) intents to explain the 
interface between action and perception. Basically, this approach supposes that 
planned actions and perceived events share the same format, referred to as the 
“common code” (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Relationship between action and perception according to the common coding 
approach. Broken lines in the top part indicate common representational medium of action and 
perception. Adapted  from “Perception and action planning” by Prinz, 1997. European Journal 
of Cognitive Psychology, 9(2), p. 130. 
This common code is neither perception-specific nor action-specific – rather, 
representations of action and of perception are stored and processed within a 
high-level representational medium (Prinz, 1997). Due to this shared 
representational medium, a direct exchange of information is enabled, thus, 
action and perception being commensurate. Hence, a bidirectional influence 
between action and perception should be enabled, indicating that action 
perception should at some point facilitate or interfere with action execution and 
vice versa, depending on their similarity. Several behavioral studies employing 
induction or interference paradigms have indeed supported this assumption by 
showing that action execution can influence action perception and vice versa 
(Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 
2000; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Kilner, Paulignan, & 
Blakemore, 2003; Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Schubö, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 
2004).  
For example, Müsseler and Hommel (1997) investigated whether the 
perception of a stimulus had an impact on a simultaneously performed task. In 
this experiment, participants were initially shown an arrow directed either to 
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the left or the right. The task required that participants should first double-press 
a certain key and subsequently either press a left or a right key according to the 
direction of the arrow. The moment participants performed the double-press 
action, a masked arrow occurred and the participants’ task was to identify its 
direction by a corresponding key press. Critically, the masked arrow occurred 
exactly at that moment when the response to the first arrow was being 
prepared. Assuming that common codes are recruited for current perception 
and ongoing action planning, the authors hypothesized that the identification 
accuracy of the masked arrow should be lower when its direction was 
corresponding to the direction of the first arrow. The results indeed showed this 
pattern, which was interpreted as evidence that the ongoing planned action 
already recruited the same codes which were also required by (but not available 
for) the perception of the masked arrow, hence, resulting in a lower 
identification accuracy.  
Concerning action understanding the common coding approach proposes that 
due to the shared representational format it is guaranteed that observers are 
able to identify the agent’s intended actions goals. This is ensured by an 
internal simulation process which activates the perceived action within the 
observer (Prinz, 1990). Hence, the observer is able to predict the action goals 
and intentions of the observed action and therefore, obtains action 
understanding. 
However, while both the ideomotor theory and the common coding approach 
are theoretical frameworks that include specific predictions about the 
relationship between action and perception in a variety of experiments, the 
exact nature of their shared representational codes is unknown (cf. Keitel, 
2013). 
2.4  Direct Matching Principle 
An approach about how action execution and action perception are linked in 
the brain is the direct matching principle (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & 
Rizzolatti, 1996;  Gallese, 2009; Jeannerod, 1994, 2001; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), which supposes that 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND     23 
an observed or imagined action is mapped onto the same motor representations, 
which are activated when the same action is executed. This mapping process 
allows the observer to run internal real-time simulations of the agent’s 
movements, goals and intentions (Gallese, 2009) and as a consequence, the 
observer is able to understand the meaning of the agent’s action (Gallese, 
Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004). Thus, action understanding is guaranteed by the 
mere motor simulation of an observed action, without the necessity of overt 
movement from the observer (Cross, Hamilton, & Grafton, 2006; Jeannerod, 
2001a). Moreover, the simulation process is initiated at the moment the 
observed action starts, and therefore, enables the observer to predict the future 
course of the observed action (Cattaneo, Maule, Barchiesi, & Rizzolatti, 2013; 
Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009).  
Crucially, according to the direct matching principle, action understanding 
strongly relies on the ability to perform the observed actions (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998). Several studies supported this assumption by emphasizing the 
importance of own experience in order to understand the intentions and goals 
of others’ actions (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 
2005; Casile & Giese, 2006; Mulligan & Hodges, 2013). Nevertheless, it is not 
entirely clear whether the ability to perform actions or the ability to understand 
others’ actions develops first in infancy. To date,  there is some evidence that 
infants are usually able to understand others’ actions about the same time when 
they can perform the same actions themselves (e.g., Jovanovic et al., 2007; 
Király, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003), whereas other 
authors clearly state that own experience with actions is a presumption in order 
to understand others’ actions (e.g., Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Loucks & 
Sommerville, 2012). 
Mirror neurons have been discussed to be the neural substrate underlying the 
direct matching principle (Buccino, Binkofski, & Riggio, 2004; Gallese et al., 
1996; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) and 
the prediction of other people’s behavior during social interactions (Bonini & 
Ferrari, 2011). Mirror neurons were first discovered in the premotor cortex of 
macaque monkeys and have been demonstrated to fire both when the monkey 
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executed a specific action and when it observed another individual executing 
the same action (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996).  
Subsequent research provided growing evidence that a mirror neuron system, 
similar to that found in monkeys, also existed in humans (Molnar-Szakacs, 
Kaplan, Greenfield, & Iacoboni, 2006; Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, 
& Fried, 2010; Urgesi, Candidi, Fabbro, Romani, & Aglioti, 2006). To date, 
areas in the premotor, primary motor and parietal cortices have been identified 
to contribute to a direct matching process (Dushanova & Donoghue, 2010; 
Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese et al., 1996; Nelissen, Luppino, Vanduffel, 
Rizzolatti, & Orban, 2005). Studies investigating what aspects of others’ 
actions were ‘mirrored’ in the observer’s motor system reported that 
movements as well as the goals of these movements are coded within the MNS 
(Alaerts, Heremans, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2009; Cattaneo et al., 2013; 
Engel, Burke, Fiehler, Bien, & Rösler, 2008; Lago & Fernandez-del-Olmo, 
2011; Urgesi et al., 2006). 
2.5 Predictive Coding Framework 
The predictive coding framework (Kilner et al., 2007; Neal & Kilner, 2010) 
addresses the functional role of the MNS and its predictive nature in action 
understanding. The foundation of this approach is the assumption that actions 
can be described at four levels:  (1) the intention level, which defines the long-
term goal of an action, (2) the goal level, which contains short-term goals that 
are required to achieve the long-term goal, (3) the kinematic level, which 
describes specific body movements, and (4) the muscle level, which describes 
the pattern of muscular activity (Hamilton & Grafton, 2007). In order to 
understand an action the observer must be able to represent the intention or 
goal level, although he has only access to the kinematic level via visual 
information. Whereas the direct matching approach merely assumes that the 
same neurons of the MNS are activated during both action execution and action 
observation the predictive coding framework intends to explain how visual 
information is transformed along the MNS and finally results in action 
understanding in the observer. For this purpose, it is assumed that the MNS is 
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functionally organized in a hierarchical manner corresponding to the different 
levels of actions1 (Kilner et al., 2007). Thus, visual information of an action is 
transformed along the MNS by forward connections up to the intention level 
which allows action understanding. This assumption is supported by studies 
showing consecutive patterns of activation in the human MNS during action 
observation (Nishitani & Hari, 2000, 2002). 
However, the problem of a mere feedforward model is that it is entirely based 
on bottom-up processes – thus, congruent visual information of two distinct 
actions (e.g., waving arm as a greeting vs. waving arm for hailing a taxi) could 
not be understood unambiguously. Hence, the predictive coding framework 
proposes reciprocal connections between anatomical structures of the MNS 
which guarantee top-down processes to have an influence on action 
understanding, and which ensure predictions on all hierarchal action levels.  
For instance, when observing an action, the observer forms expectations about 
the intentions or goals of that action deriving from contextual or situational 
constraints. This predicted intention leads to a simulation process in the 
observer’s own motor system in order to generate a prediction of how he would 
perform the same action (Neal & Kilner, 2010). By doing so, the observer 
predicts specific body movements which should be elicited by the agent in 
order to achieve his intention. Critically, the predicted movements are 
compared with the actual observed movements, and as a consequence a 
prediction error can emerge, with its size depending on the discrepancy 
between the observed and the predicted movements. By updating the 
predictions on all hierarchal levels according to the prediction error, it can be 
minimized, and as a consequence the observer is able to infer the most likely 
intention of that action, hence, action understanding is realized.  
                                                 
1
 Three cortical areas are considered to constitute the MNS and have been shown to be 
reciprocally connected: area F5 of the premotor cortex, the inferior parietal lobule and the 
superior temporal sulcus (see Keysers & Perrett, 2004 for further information).  
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2.6 Teleological Stance Theory 
A further approach of action understanding is described within the teleological 
stance theory (e.g., Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995; Gergely, 2003; 
Gergely & Csibra, 2003). This approach was originally developed to explain 
why infants can understand some observed actions without having motor 
experience with those actions and without inferring intentions from the agent.  
Basically, the teleological stance theory describes that in cases where no prior 
motor experience exists action understanding is guaranteed by the fact that the 
observer expects the agent to act rationally and efficiently. This idea is based 
on the principle of rationality which describes that every action always serves 
to achieve a certain goal (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). Hence, observers expect 
other people to act goal-directed and in a rational manner (Eshuis, Coventry, & 
Vulchanova, 2009).   
A process referred to as teleological reasoning enables the observer to interpret 
an action as goal-directed and rational – meaning that an agent should approach 
a goal in an efficient way in the given situation (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). For 
example, teleological reasoning in 12-months-old infants was demonstrated in 
a prominent study by Gergely and colleagues (1995) who presented infants 
with a computer-animated task: infants should observe a small circle jumping 
over a barrier in order to reach a large circle. After several habituation trials, 
test trials were presented in which the barrier was removed and the small circle 
either performed the same jumping action (irrational) or a straight path 
movement (rational) towards the large circle. The results demonstrated that 
infants showed significantly more dishabituation behavior when confronted 
with the irrational jumping action compared to the rational straight path 
movement during test trials, meaning that infants were able to infer the most 
rational movement the circle would perform to achieve its goal. Hence, 
children were able to identify the circle as an agent and moreover, inferred that 
its behavior would follow rational principles.  
Teleological reasoning was mostly investigated in infants and it could be 
repeatedly shown that they are able to evaluate the rationality of actions 
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performed by human agents (Sodian, Schoeppner, & Metz, 2004), robots (e.g., 
Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005) or even objects with 
ambiguous agency (e.g., Csibra, Gergely, Bı ́ró, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999). 
Moreover, recent findings emphasize the occurrence of teleological reasoning 
in adults as well as in infants, especially in cases where motor simulation or 
direct matching processes are insufficient, like in unusual or novel situations 
(Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010, 
2011).  
2.7 Interim Conclusion 
Taken together, the modern approaches outlined above emphasize the interface 
between action and perception and its role in action understanding. However, 
each approach differs in some ways from the others by explaining action 
understanding slightly different or by concentrating on different aspects of 
action understanding. Nevertheless, the aim of this thesis is not to verify or 
falsify the distinct accounts. Rather, the accounts are considered to be the 
conceptual framework for the present thesis, and moreover, they consistently 
provide two key aspects that are relevant for the present work: (1) that action 
and perception are directly linked, and (2) that anticipatory processes are 
involved in action understanding.  
These two premises allow us to investigate the influence of experience with an 
action on action understanding during the observation of the same action. In 
the following section we will elaborate on how action understanding is 
measured within the present work.  
3 Measures of Action Understanding 
For the present work, we will focus on two indicators of action understanding: 
anticipatory eye movements and pupil size changes. In the following two 
subsections we provide definitions for both measures and review important 
research findings about the relation between these measures and action 
understanding.  
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3.1 Anticipatory Eye Movements 
As outlined in Chapter 2, one crucial part of action execution and action 
perception is anticipatory processing (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Kilner et al., 
2007; Prinz, 1997). This means on the one hand that the agent has to be able to 
plan his actions in advance in order to execute them, and on the other hand that 
the observer must be able to predict future goals of ongoing perceived actions 
in order to understand the agent’s intentions. One possibility how these 
anticipatory processes can be measured in the agent or in the observer is by 
means of anticipatory eye movements.  
Anticipatory eye movements are often referred to as “look-ahead fixations” 
(Morgante, Haddad, & Keen, 2008) or “goal-directed gaze shifts” (Henrichs, 
Elsner, Elsner, & Gredebäck, 2012; Henrichs, Elsner, Elsner, Wilkinson, & 
Gredebäck, 2014) – terms which intuitively illustrate that these eye movements 
are directed towards a specific object or sub-goal of an action prior to its 
manipulation or accomplishment (Land & Furneaux, 1997). For example, when 
an agent intends to drink, his gaze will be directed towards the cup prior to the 
arrival of his hand. Anticipatory eye movements have been shown for agents 
during the performance of everyday actions like tea-making (Land & Hayhoe, 
2001; Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 1999) and in experimental contexts 
(Johansson, Westling, Bäckström, & Flanagan, 2001). Taken together, these 
studies have argued that eye movements are predictive in order to plan and 
monitor the execution of an ongoing action (Johansson et al., 2001), thus, 
emphasizing their function in anticipatory processing during action execution.  
Within their seminal study, Flanagan and Johansson (2003) were able to 
demonstrate that not only agents, but also observers show anticipatory gaze 
when they observe others’ actions. Within that study the authors applied a 
block stacking task which was alternately performed or observed by two 
persons in an eye-tracking design. The presumption of the study was that eye 
movements are an inherent part of an action program, thus, whenever an agent 
is engaged in an action, corresponding eye movements guiding that action 
would occur. Following this assumption, the authors proposed that in case a 
direct matching process would occur during action observation, eye 
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movements should be similar for the agent as well as the observer. Indeed, eye 
movements were found to be highly similar for agents and observers, and this 
was taken as evidence that action understanding is based on a direct matching 
process and moreover, that eye movements can be taken as indicators of action 
understanding during observation. Consecutively, several studies have shown 
that adults (Ambrosini, Costantini, & Sinigaglia, 2011; Costantini, Ambrosini, 
& Sinigaglia, 2012; Gesierich, Bruzzo, Ottoboni, & Finos, 2008) as well as 
infants (Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006; Gredebäck, Stasiewicz, 
Falck-Ytter, von Hofsten, & Rosander, 2009; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 
2010) elicit predictive gaze behavior when observing ongoing actions.  
A recent study using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and eye tracking 
provides further support for the assumption that anticipatory eye movements 
depend on the recruitment of corresponding action plans in the observer’s 
motor system. While participants observed point-light grasping actions, TMS 
pulses were either delivered to the hand area or the leg area in half of the trials. 
When the TMS pulse occurred over the hand area, anticipatory eye movements 
were delayed compared to no TMS. The results provide strong evidence that 
the ability to predict observed actions is realized by a direct matching process 
located in the observer’s mirror neuron system (Elsner, D’Ausilio, Gredebäck, 
Falck-Ytter, & Fadiga, 2013). In line with this, the ability to perceive and 
anticipate action goals has been shown for both adults and children to be 
strongly dependent on their own extent of motor experience with the same 
action (Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010; Rosalie & Müller, 2014) 
underpinning the assumption that anticipatory eye movements are causally 
related to the observer’s motor system. 
According to these findings, we assume that anticipatory eye movements can 
be taken as indicators of action understanding in the observer. Moreover, for 
the present thesis it is of particular relevance that own (motor) experience with 
an action was found to facilitate the prediction during the observation of the 
same action. Accordingly, we propose that short-term experience with an 
action should have a direct impact on anticipatory eye movements during the 
observation of the same action. Therefore, we aim to investigate whether a 
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systematic manipulation of own experience will cause specific changes in gaze 
latencies during the observation of an action. 
3.2 Pupil Size Changes 
In contrast to anticipatory eye movements, pupil size changes are typically 
applied as a post-hoc measure providing information about the individuals’ 
expectations in a certain situation, specifically when expectations are violated. 
Traditionally, pupillary responses to light have been studied extensively for 
many years, but about 50 years ago, pupil size changes have been demonstrated 
to not only occur in response to a varying amount of light reaching the retina 
(the so called papillary light reflex) but moreover also as a consequence of 
arousal (Hess & Polt, 1960) or cognitive effort (Hess & Polt, 1964; Kahneman 
& Beatty, 1966). Importantly, changes in pupil size in response to cognitive 
activity have been reported to be rarely greater than half a millimeter (Beatty & 
Lucero-Wagoner, 2000) which is slightly moderate compared to changes in 
pupil size caused by illumination (MacLachlan & Howland, 2002; Wyatt, 
1995). Nevertheless, since the discovery that pupillary changes occur 
dependent on mental activity, several studies have reported and replicated the 
finding that changes in pupil diameter can be described as a function of the 
level of cognitive effort – with higher cognitive activity leading to an increased 
pupil diameter being found (Ahern & Beatty, 1979; Hess & Polt, 1964; Hyönä, 
Tommola, & Alaja, 1995). A well accepted explanation for this correlation is 
that cognitive effort or mental activity in general lead to an increased arousal in 
the individual, which becomes openly apparent in pupil size changes. This 
view is supported by robust findings of several neuropsychological studies 
(Koss, 1986; Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Aston-Jones, 1993), demonstrating that 
pupillary responses are directly linked to an activation of the noradrenergic 
system, specifically the locus coeruleus (LC), which is considered as the main 
cortical structure regulating the neuro-transmitter norepinephrine (Aston-Jones 
& Cohen, 2005), and which is activated by stress (Sterpenich et al., 2006). 
Hence, a higher arousal in the individual caused by higher cognitive effort 
leads to an increased activation of the LC, and as a result to an increased pupil 
diameter.  
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For the present thesis, studies investigating the violations of expectations 
(‘prediction errors’) on pupil size changes are of particular relevance. Several 
recent studies have addressed this issue by using a broad variety of methods. 
Results mainly indicated that violations of expectations indeed result in 
increased pupil diameters (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Morita et al., 2012; 
Preuschoff, ’t Hart, & Einhäuser, 2011; Raisig, Welke, Hagendorf, & van der 
Meer, 2010; Scheepers, Mohr, Fischer, & Roberts, 2013). For instance, one 
study questioned whether pupil dilation would occur in response to prediction 
errors in an auditory gambling task. The presumption of this study was on the 
one hand that the activation of the noradrenergic system is directly linked to 
pupillary responses, and on the other hand that the activation of the 
noradrenergic system might signal surprise in the participant. Hence, the 
authors assumed that prediction errors in a gambling task should result in a 
form of surprise in the participant which should be assessable via pupil 
dilation. Results effectively showed that pupil dilation was strongly correlated 
with prediction errors, indicating that pupil size changes can indeed signal 
surprise in an individual (Preuschoff et al., 2011).  
Regarding the perception of body movements, a further study reported that 
adults, but not nine to 12 months old infants, showed an increased pupil size 
when watching animations of impossible human body movements (e.g. arms 
bending backwards) compared to possible body movements (e.g. arms bending 
upwards). The authors discussed this finding in the sense that adults possessed 
expectations about possible human body movements which were violated by 
the demonstration of biomechanically impossible body movements and 
therefore led to a higher arousal in the observers. This interpretation was 
supported by participants’ self-reports stating that impossible human body 
movements prompted unpleasantness and discomfort (Morita et al., 2012).  
Concerning the perception of social interactions, a study conducted by 
Gredebäck and Melinder (2010) used pupil size measures to investigate 
infants’ responses to unusual social interactions. In this study, six and 12 
months old infants were presented with rational (a spoon was moved to the 
interaction partner’s mouth) and irrational (a spoon was moved to interaction 
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partner’s hand) feeding actions. Both age groups dilated their pupils when 
observing the irrational feeding actions compared to rational feeding actions. 
This finding was discussed in such ways that infants expect agents to act 
rationally and efficiently. When being confronted with an irrational action in 
which the agents violated this expectation, infants became surprised which 
caused a higher arousal, and therefore resulted in an increase in pupil size.  
Taken together, these findings indicate that the violation of existing 
expectations leads to a state of surprise in an individual which is measurable 
via pupil dilation. For the present work this implies that the observation of 
unexpected action outcomes should lead to an increase in pupil diameter in the 
observer. However, the influence of own experience on pupillary responses in 
association with unexpected action outcomes is still unknown. To date, 
pupillary responses are considered to occur spontaneously, and not being able 
to be influenced voluntarily (Loewenfeld & Lowestein, 1993). Nevertheless, 
experience with an action might have an impact on the latency or amplitude of 
pupil dilation since own experience might modify or even improve predictions 
about action outcomes. Hence, a modified prediction error assessable via pupil 
size changes could be the result. In the present thesis, we aim to investigate 
whether a systematic manipulation of own experience might result in specific 
changes in pupillary response measures. 
3.3 Dissociation between Online and Post-Hoc Measures 
Anticipatory eye movements and pupil dilation can both be used as indicators 
of action understanding. However, both measures differ in such ways that 
anticipatory gaze is measured online while the observed action is ongoing, 
whereas pupil dilation is usually applied as a post-hoc measure in response to a 
completed action (Daum, Attig, Gunawan, Prinz, & Gredebäck, 2012).  
In principal, both online measures and post-hoc measures provide information 
about the observer’s expectations. However, online measures (such as 
anticipatory eye movements) indicate expectations about upcoming events in 
the ongoing action, whereas post-hoc measures (such as pupil dilation) provide 
information about the evaluation of the observer’s expectations after the action 
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is completed. Thus, these two measures mainly differ in the amount of 
information available for the observer at the time of data collection – when 
measuring post-hoc, the observer already possesses the full information about 
the observed action, hence, what we measure is the observer’s expectations 
being compared to the actual action outcome. In contrast, when measuring 
online, the observer only possesses part of the information about an action 
available, thus, we measure expectations about upcoming events in the 
observed action (Daum et al., 2012).  
To analyze how online and post-hoc measures (in this case predictive gaze and 
looking times, respectively) are related to each other, and whether they reflect 
different processes underlying action understanding, a study with nine-months-
old infants conducted by Daum et al. (2012) addressed these issues by applying 
a habituation task: During familiarization trials an animated agent (fish) 
repeatedly moved toward one of two objects. During the test phase, the 
locations of the two objects were switched, and two scenarios were randomly 
presented to the infants: The agent either took the same path as before, but 
reached a new object (old path/new object), or the agent took a new path in 
order to reach the old object (new path/old object). Moreover, in order to 
trigger predictive gaze behavior, the agent disappeared behind an occluder that 
was added in the center of the screen and reappeared at either the left or right 
side, corresponding to the object intended to reach (see Figure 2). Infants’ 
action expectations were measured via looking times (post-hoc) and via 
predictive gaze (online). The results showed that infants looked longer at trials 
in which the agent moved toward a new object (via the old path) compared to 
trials in which the agent moved toward the old object (via the new path), 
indicating that infants did not expect the agent to approach a new object (see 
Woodward 1998 for further information on this paradigm). Thus, at the age of 
nine months post-hoc measures such as looking time most likely indicate 
expectations about the identity of an object rather than about the location the 
agent might approach. Concerning predictive gaze, nine-months-old infants 
directed their gaze significantly more often toward the old location, 
irrespective of the object at this location, which indicates that infants expected 
the agent to continuously take the same path. 
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Figure 2. Example of stimulus presentation. Graphic from “Actions seen through babies’ eyes: 
A dissociation between looking time an predictive gaze,” by Daum et al., 2012, Frontiers in 
Psychology, 3, p.3, http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00370, published 
under Creative Commons, Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0), 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/. 
Hence, online measures such as predictive gaze most likely reflect expectations 
about the location the agent might approach. In a second experiment, the 
authors investigated whether this dissociation would persist throughout the first 
years of life up to adulthood, and found this dissociation to disappear after the 
age of three years. From this age on children’s expectations about object 
identity could also be measured online (Daum et al., 2012), meaning that 
children directed their gaze toward the old object instead of the old location.  
The authors discussed these findings in terms of two different explanations: 
First, they supposed that a temporally successive processing chain might be 
responsible for the dissociation between online and post-hoc measures, 
meaning that the expectation about a location is processed relatively early 
during action observation (e.g., indicated by predictive gaze behavior), 
followed by the processing of identity-related expectations (e.g., indicated by 
looking time). A second possible explanation the authors discuss is that there 
might be different mechanisms involved in the processing of expectations 
about an object’s location and its identity. This assumption finds support in 
neuropsychological studies reporting two visual pathways (Goodale & Milner, 
1992), which are supposed to be responsible for a distinct processing of object 
identity and location. However, from an age of three years on, children seem to 
be able to integrate both processes since identity-related expectations are 
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measurable via online measures, whereas young infants seem to rely on 
expectations about the location first (indicated by online measures), and only 
with sufficient information about an action they are able to build expectations 
about the identity of objects (indicated by post-hoc measures). Taken together, 
both interpretations can explain why younger infants distinctly process 
expectations about object identity and location. However, it cannot be ruled out 
from this study which one is actually true or if an interaction of both 
interpretations is underlying the aforementioned findings.  
For the present work, we intend to measure observers’ expectations about an 
ongoing action via online measures (predictive gaze), and further, we will 
apply post-hoc measures (pupil dilation) in order to investigate the violation of 
observers’ expectations about the action outcome. Specifically, we aim to 
investigate the influence of own experience on both online and post-hoc 
measures. According to the two possible interpretations outlined above, both 
online and post-hoc measures should be integrated in adults and children older 
than three years of age. This leads to the assumption that own experience might 
have an equally strong influence on both measures. However, we need to be 
careful in assuming this, since our study differs in several aspects from the 
study conducted by Daum and colleagues (2012). First, we only assess 
participants’ expectations about the location of objects, whereas the identity of 
objects never changes, and second, we will apply different types of stimuli 
when measuring action understanding online and post-hoc. Hence, a 
dissociation of both measures might occur only because of different stimulus 
material. Therefore, in the present thesis, we cannot entirely disentangle 
whether both measures are fully integrated in adults or remain partly 
independent, at least not in the same way as described in the study by Daum et 
al. (2012). Nevertheless, we intend to disentangle the influence of own 
experience on online and post-hoc measures and will be able to add some 
valuable information about the dissociation between different measures of 
action understanding from this perspective. 
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4 Empirical Evidence for Action Understanding in Adults 
In the following section, empirical findings concerning the relationship 
between action execution and action perception and the impact of experience 
on action understanding will be outlined.  
4.1 Relationship between Action Execution & Action Perception 
As already outlined in Section 2, contemporary theoretical accounts propose a 
tight link between action execution and action perception. To date, a large body 
of evidence supports these accounts by demonstrating that action execution can 
influence action perception and vice versa (e.g., Brass et al., 2001; Hamilton, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 2004; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Schütz-
Bosbach & Prinz, 2007).  
4.1.1 The Influence of Action Perception on Action Execution 
It has previously been shown that the perception of an event can automatically 
trigger a related action in the perceiver, a phenomenon referred to as ideomotor 
action (cf. Herwig, 2014). Importantly, two types of ideomotor actions can 
occur when perceiving an external event – perceptually induced actions and 
intentionally induced actions. The following example will help to illustrate 
these two types of ideomotor action: A person observes someone on a ladder 
who bends backwards and is about to fall off the ladder. As a consequence, the 
observer might automatically elicit an ideomotor action, which could either be 
to bend slightly backwards (perceptually induced) or to bend slightly forward 
(intentionally induced). Hence, the perceptually induced action occurs in 
accordance with the observed movements (to bend backwards) whereas the 
intentionally induced action occurs in relation to the intended goal of the 
observed person (in this case to bend forwards to not fall off the ladder). 
Ideomotor actions were systematically investigated in a study conducted by 
Knuf et al. (2001). Participants were asked to observe a ball approaching a 
target stimulus, which it was about to miss narrowly. In order to let the ball hit 
the target stimulus, participants were allowed to intervene and could either 
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influence the trajectory of the ball or adjust the position of the target stimulus 
by using a joystick. Crucially, the function of the joystick was disabled after a 
while and from that moment on, ideomotor actions (even of body parts that did 
not play a role in guiding the ball, like the head) could be observed. 
Importantly, the hands predominantly showed intentionally induced actions (in 
accordance with the intended direction toward the target stimulus), whereas the 
head also showed perceptually induced actions (in accordance with the 
perceived direction of the moving ball). This result indicates that the perception 
of an external event can automatically induce related actions in the observer, 
thus, provides again evidence for the commensurability between action and 
perception. 
In order to investigate the influence of perceived body movements on the 
initiation of compatible or incompatible body movements, Brass and 
colleagues (2001) conducted a study in which participants were asked to 
perform simple finger movements in response to video stimuli which showed 
similar finger movements. In one block, participants were instructed to lift the 
index finger and in the other block, participants were instructed to tap on the 
table with the index finger. During both blocks, participants watched short 
video clips in which the index finger moved randomly either up or down. 
Hence, in one block, the lifting of the index finger was compatible with the 
video clip which showed the upward movement, and in the other block the 
tapping on the table was compatible with the downwards movement of the 
finger in the video clip. The results showed that the participants’ response 
(lifting or tapping) was significantly faster in compatible trials compared to 
incompatible trials. Hence, the perception of an action compatible with the own 
planned action led to a quicker initiation of the same. In subsequent 
experiments within this study, it could be demonstrated, that the reaction time 
advantage disappeared when the degree of similarity between the observed and 
executed actions decreased (Brass et al., 2001). These findings are again in line 
with the idea that perceived actions and executed actions draw back on shared 
representations. But does action execution also influence how we perceive 
certain events?  
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4.1.2 The Influence of Action Execution on Action Perception 
Illustrative examples of how action can influence perception are described 
within several classical experiments conducted by Helmholtz (1866) and 
Stratton (1896, 1897) – within these experiments, a person wore glasses 
bearing prisms that displaced or inverted the visual field. Hence, the person 
perceived the actual environment displaced or upside down. Importantly, when 
the person intended to interact with the environment, he/she failed to perform 
goal-directed actions on objects because the person guided his/her hands to the 
perceived location of the object. However, after several days of wearing the 
prism glasses and interacting with the environment, the person was able to 
adapt and to coordinate his/her movements according to the ‘new’ perception. 
Thus, he/she was again able to reliably grasp objects and to confidently move 
through his/her environment. Moreover, Stratton (1896) reported that his 
perception of a displaced or inverted environment disappeared after five days 
of wearing the prism glasses, indicating that after several days of exploring and 
interacting with the environment, an adapted association between the perceived 
location of an object and the actual location where the object could be 
manipulated was formed (see Redding & Wallace, 2006 for more details). 
Interestingly, similar experiments have been conducted with subjects being 
seated in a wheelchair and passively moved around in an environment. 
Although these subjects had a comparable visual experience to other subjects 
who walked themselves, no adaptation to the prism glasses occurred (Held & 
Freedman, 1963). Taken together, these experiments illustrate well how action 
can influence the perception of an environment.  
In more recent studies, the influence of action on perception was further 
investigated and it was again demonstrated that the execution of actions can 
modulate what a person perceives (see Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007 for  a 
review). For example, Repp and Knoblich (2007) presented pianists pairs of 
tones in a tritone interval. Some listeners perceive this tone sequence as an 
ascending melody while others perceive a descending melody. The pianists 
were asked to produce left-to-right or right-to-left key presses on a piano while 
listening to the tritone pairs. When producing left-to-right key presses (which 
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cause an ascending melody on the piano), the pianists perceived significantly 
more often an ascending tritone interval, whereas right-to-left key presses 
caused the perception of a descending tritone interval. Hence, the auditory 
perception of tones could be influenced by concurrent executed actions.  
Furthermore, effects of action on perception could also be found in the domain 
of visual perception (Blaesi & Wilson, 2010; Hamilton et al., 2004; Miall et al., 
2006; Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Schubö et al., 2004). For example, Hamilton 
et al. (2004) asked participants to lift a box of varying weight (heavy to light) 
while they simultaneously watched a video in which a person lifted an 
identical-looking box with varying weight (heavy to light). Subsequently, 
participants were asked to estimate the weight of the box lifted in the video. 
The results indicated that participants tended to overestimate the weight of the 
box lifted in the video when they simultaneously had lifted a light box, whereas 
they underestimated the weight of the box lifted in the video when they 
themselves had lifted a heavy box. Thus, again the execution of an action 
affects the perception of concurrently perceived similar actions.  
A further study conducted by Miall et al. (2006) demonstrated how action 
execution can improve or impair the perception of incongruent or congruent 
hand actions, respectively. To this end, the authors presented participants a 
sequence of hand images while they were asked to produce specific hand 
movements. The participants’ task was to identify an oddball image that 
differed from the other pictures in the sequence. The oddball image was 
identified faster when the participants produced hand movements that were 
congruent to those shown in the remaining images of the sequence. This result 
seems rather unexpected in the first place, since we would expect that specific 
actions should facilitate the perception of identical actions. However, it has 
been repeatedly shown in further studies that planned and/or executed actions 
can impair or improve the perception of similar actions (Hamilton et al., 2004; 
Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Zwickel, Grosjean, & Prinz, 2010), referred to as 
assimilation or contrast effects. 
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4.1.3 Assimilation and Contrast Effects 
Influential effects of action and perception have been systematically studied in 
experiments implementing dual tasks. Traditionally, the performance costs of  
either two (or more) simultaneously executed action tasks or perception tasks 
have been investigated, and it was consistently reported that the performance in 
such dual tasks was significantly impaired compared to separately executed 
actions or perception tasks (see Müsseler, 1999 for an overview). In order to 
investigate whether action and perception are also influencing each other in 
dual tasks, paradigms consisting of an action task and a perception task were 
designed (Hamilton et al., 2004; Miall et al., 2006; Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; 
Schubö et al., 2004; Wykowska, Schubö, & Hommel, 2009). Typically, two 
effects can be found in such dual task paradigms – on the one hand that action 
and perception inhibit each other, referred to as contrast effects. On the other 
hand, that action and perception enhance each other, referred to as assimilation 
effects. Contrast effects are considered to emerge when the time interval 
between the perceptual processing and action execution is minimized, hence 
both simultaneously compete for their shared representations, whereas 
assimilation effects typically occur when the time interval between the 
perceptual processing and action production is increased (Schubö et al., 2004; 
Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). Crucially, both contrast and assimilation 
effects occur more likely the higher the similarity between the executed and the 
perceived action is (e.g., Springer et al., 2011). Moreover, the interaction of 
action and perception is bi-directional, meaning that contrast and assimilation 
effects should occur both either when an action influences perception or vice 
versa (Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). Thus, contrast effects as well as 
assimilation effects seem to emerge as a consequence of the tight relationship 
between action execution and action perception. 
The above described phenomena and findings indicate that action and 
perception are tightly linked. Thus, they provide evidence for modern 
theoretical approaches that suppose shared underlying representations for 
action and perception.  
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4.2 Action Understanding  
As already discussed in Section 1.2 the term action understanding goes beyond 
the mere perception of simple stimuli (cf. Keitel, 2013). Rather, it describes the 
understanding of the intention or goal of an observed action. However, the 
linkage between action execution and action perception is considered to be the 
fundamental basis underlying the ability to understand others’ goals and 
intentions. It is now widely accepted that this link is realized by the mirror 
neuron system which allows a direct mapping of observed actions onto own 
motor programs (Buccino et al., 2004; Hari et al., 1998; Hickok, 2013; 
Rizzolatti et al., 1996;  Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Hence, whenever a 
person observes another person performing an action, specific motor programs 
of the observer are activated and simulate the observed action. As a 
consequence, the observer is enabled to understand what the other person is 
doing (Chaminade, Meary, Orliaguet, & Decety, 2001; Jeannerod, 2001).  
When investigating action understanding, participants are typically presented 
with live or video demonstrations of fully or partly executed actions or action 
sequences. The task of the participants is mostly to passively observe (e.g., 
Ambrosini et al., 2011) the action (sequences) or to judge the outcome of a 
specific action sequence (e.g., Mulligan & Hodges, 2013). To date, various 
methods (neurophysiologic and neuroimaging methods like EEG or fMRI, eye 
tracking, behavioral measures) are applied in order to measure action 
understanding in the observer. Behavioral measures of action understanding 
typically comprise judgement tasks requiring participants to indicate how an 
action outcome will be. This method is often used in the domain of sports 
science, especially when groups with different degrees of expertise are studied 
(e.g., Cañal-Bruland, van der Kamp, & van Kesteren, 2010; Moore & Müller, 
2013). According studies using behavioral measures will be reported in Section 
4.3 when the relationship between experience with an action and action 
understanding will be disentangled. Here, we will concentrate on studies 
applying neurophysiological and neuroimaging methods due to their crucial 
role in investigating the human mirror neuron system, followed by studies 
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applying eye tracking methods that are of particular relevance for the present 
thesis.  
4.2.1 Empirical Evidence from Studies applying Neurophysiological and 
Neuroimaging Methods 
Since the discovery of mirror neurons in the premotor cortex of macaque 
monkeys (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996), an increasing number of 
studies implemented neurophysiological and neuroimaging methods with the 
purpose to identify a similar mirror neuron system in humans. 
First evidence for a neural connection between action execution and action 
perception was provided already in the early 1950s within EEG studies that 
demonstrated a desynchronization of the so-called µ-rhythm (8-13 Hz) over 
central electrodes when participants performed actions and when they observed 
others’ actions (e.g., Gastaut & Bert, 1954). These findings were validated by 
several further EEG studies repeatedly demonstrating µ-rhythm 
desynchronization over premotor areas during action execution and action 
observation (Braadbaart et al., 2013; Cochin, Barthelemy, Lejeune, Roux, & 
Martineau, 1998; Cochin, Barthelemy, Roux, & Martineau, 1999; Pineda, 
2005). Further studies investigating functional aspects of the µ-rhythm 
indicated that µ-oscillations specifically respond to object-related actions 
(Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 2004) and to animate stimuli 
(Altschuler, Vankov, Wang, Ramachandran, & Pineda, 1997). To date, various 
studies draw back on µ-oscillations when investigating action understanding in 
infants (see Marshall & Meltzoff, 2011 for a review) or in individuals with 
autism spectrum disorders who seem to be affected by a dysfunctional mirror 
neuron system (e.g., Oberman et al., 2005). 
Studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have been 
conducted in order to determine more precisely which brain areas are involved 
when observing others’ actions (e.g., Buccino et al., 2001; Calvo-Merino et al., 
2005; Shmuelof & Zohary, 2006; Vingerhoets et al., 2012). For example, 
Buccino et al. (2001) intended to determine brain areas that were activated 
during the observation of videos of object-directed and non-object-directed 
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actions executed by different parts of the body (mouth, hand, foot), e.g., biting 
an apple vs. chewing, or kicking a ball and mimicking to do so. Results 
indicated an activation of the premotor cortex in a somatotopically manner for 
both conditions, which the authors interpreted as a mirror process that matched 
the observed action onto own motor representations. Moreover, when 
observing object-directed actions an additional activation of the posterior 
parietal lobe was found and interpreted as an object-related analysis.  
Studies comparing typical cortical activity (measured by fMRI) during action 
observation and desynchronization of the µ-rhythm (measured by EEG) while 
observing others’ actions reported a correspondence between both measures 
(Braadbaart et al., 2013; Perry & Bentin, 2009). For example, Braadbaart et al. 
(2013) sequentially recorded EEG and fMRI measures in a within-subject 
design in which participants were asked to imitate or observe manual actions. 
Results indicated that µ-suppression was correlated with BOLD responses in 
brain areas that are involved in action perception and action planning. Hence, 
both measures have been demonstrated to be sensitive to the observation of 
others’ actions. 
Taken together, studies applying neurophysiological and neuroimaging 
methods (including MEG and TMS) provide evidence for a human mirror 
neuron system which enables a direct matching process of observed actions on 
own motor programs and thus, seems to play a crucial role in action 
understanding. 
4.2.2 Empirical Evidence from Studies applying Eye Tracking Methods 
When acting upon objects in everyday actions, people show goal-directed 
saccadic eye movements (Land & Hayhoe, 2001; Land, 2009; Land et al., 
1999), which have been demonstrated to be predictive in order to plan and 
monitor the execution of an ongoing action (Johansson et al., 2001) and to 
acquire information about objects for future manipulation (Mennie, Hayhoe, & 
Sullivan, 2007). For example, Land et al. (1999) recorded participants’ eye 
movements while making tea in a natural environment. By analyzing scene and 
gaze data frame-by-frame the authors were able to precisely describe 
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participants’ gaze behavior. The results indicated that participants 
predominantly fixated on objects that were relevant for the task (e.g., the cup) 
and moreover, that participants predictively directed their gaze to objects being 
manipulated in the next step of the action sequence. The authors concluded that 
even in highly automatic actions the gaze guides and monitors the ongoing 
action by predictively fixating on objects that are crucial for upcoming action 
steps.  
Interestingly, people also produce highly similar, predictive eye movements 
when observing, rather than performing, manual actions (Flanagan & 
Johansson, 2003; Gesierich et al., 2008; Rotman, 2006). As already described 
in detail in Section 3.1, anticipatory eye movements have been demonstrated to 
be indicators of a direct matching process (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). 
Flanagan and Johansson (2003) assumed, in accordance with the direct 
matching hypothesis (see Section 2.4 for further details), that eye movements 
should be highly similar during both action execution and action observation. 
By applying a block stacking task in an eye tracking design, the authors were 
able to show that participants’ eye movements during observation were 
predictive and indeed highly similar to those during action execution. These 
results provide evidence that action understanding is based on a direct 
matching process and that eye movements can be taken as indicators of 
activated action knowledge. In a recent study applying transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) and eye tracking this finding was further supported by 
demonstrating that predictive eye movements indeed depend on the action-
specific activation of the mirror neuron system (Elsner, D’Ausilio, Gredebäck, 
Falck-Ytter, & Fadiga, 2013) . 
Since the study of Flanagan and Johansson (2003), predictive, goal-directed 
eye movements have been measured in various studies that intended to 
disentangle the relationship between human gaze behavior and action 
understanding in adults as well as children (Causer, McCormick, & Holmes, 
2013; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Gesierich et al., 2008; Kochukhova & 
Gredebäck, 2010). For example, Gesierich et al. (2008) replicated the findings 
of Flanagan and Johansson (2003) by applying an animated block stacking 
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task. Participants either performed a block stacking task on a computer screen 
by using a mouse, or they passively observed different conditions of the 
construction of a block stacking task on the screen. Crucially, by applying an 
animated version of the block stacking task, no direct interaction of the hand 
and the blocks was visible which might have affected the occurrence of 
anticipatory saccades due to the artificial context. However, the overall results 
of this study were congruent with those found by Flanagan and Johansson 
(2003), with the only difference that participants in this study showed 
individual differences in their gaze behavior during action observation. More 
precisely, about half of the participants elicited predictive saccades comparable 
to those produced when constructing the block stacking task themselves, 
whereas the other half rather tracked the ongoing action by closely following 
the blocks with their eyes. This finding was explained due to the artificial 
context in which the block stacking task was observed, which is in line with 
similar findings obtained by Falck-Ytter and colleagues (2006). 
More recent studies aimed to further investigate anticipatory eye movements 
during action understanding and determined contextual, spatial or action-
related constraints that affect anticipatory eye movements (Ambrosini, Pezzulo, 
& Costantini, 2015; Ambrosini et al., 2011; Costantini et al., 2012). For 
example, Costantini et al. (2012) recorded eye movements while participants 
observed video stimuli in which an agent tried to grasp either a small 
(strawberry) or a big (apple) object with a pre-shaped hand movement. A 
control group of participants observed similar actions with the difference that 
the agent did not produce pre-shaped hand movements but only touched the 
object with an open hand. Moreover, the objects in both conditions were 
located either within or outside the reach of the agent. Results showed that 
participants produced significantly more predictive gaze shifts toward the 
target object in the pre-shape condition compared to the control condition, 
indicating that people take pre-shape-cues into account when anticipating goal-
directed actions. Furthermore, predictive gaze shifts were significantly affected 
when the target objects were out of the agent’s reach. The authors discussed 
this finding in such ways that the observer possesses a representation about 
his/her own interpersonal body space. When observing someone else 
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performing an action, the reaching space of this person is automatically 
mapped onto the observer’s own body space representation, and as a result 
enables the observer to predict whether a target is reachable or not. Hence, in 
the case, that the target is within the reach of the agent, the action is considered 
to be goal-directed and as a consequence, predictive saccades toward the target 
are elicited.  
In a further study, Ambrosini et al. (2015) investigated the impact of several 
sources of information (agent’s gaze, pre-shape, arm trajectory, uncertain 
timing) on anticipatory gaze shifts. The authors intended to determine how 
every type of cue affects the participants’ gaze behavior during the observation 
of grasping actions. The results indicate that participants’ predictions were 
affected by the agent’s gaze direction as long as no pre-shape cue was 
available. Thus, pre-shaping the hand was again found to be a strong cue that 
affects people’s predictions about target objects in grasping actions. Moreover, 
participants relied increasingly on the trajectory of the arm when the action 
progressed over time. These findings indicate that people make use of and 
integrate several cues to predict the outcome of an observed action. 
Overall, according to previous research, anticipatory eye movements seem to 
be a reliable measure to investigate action understanding during the 
observation of others’ actions. 
A second possibility to investigate action understanding via eye tracking is to 
measure pupil dilation. As already outlined in further detail in Section 3.2, 
pupil size changes predominantly occur when expectations about action 
outcomes are violated. Hence, studies applying this method usually intend to 
determine whether individuals identify surprising or uncommon action 
outcomes (e.g., Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). In a recent study, pupil dilation 
has been demonstrated to predict goal-directed eye movements (Mathôt, 
Siebold, Donk, & Vitu, 2015). The authors explained this finding in terms of 
mental effort that is necessary to guide the eyes toward relevant objects in a 
visual scene. Hence, pupil dilation does not only reflect surprise or prediction 
errors when applied as a post-hoc measure, but rather it can also be 
implemented as an online measure to investigate goal-directed behavior.  
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Taken together, neurophysiological, neuroimaging and eye-tracking measures 
provide different possibilities to measure action understanding. Recently, a 
number of studies dedicated their interest to the influence of own experience on 
action understanding. In the following section, according studies are described 
in further detail.  
4.3 Influence of Experience on Action Understanding 
A relation between one’s own experience with an action and the ability to 
predict action goals of the same action during observation has been proposed in 
several studies (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008; Calvo-Merino et al., 
2005; Wöllner & Cañal-Bruland, 2010). The main assumption in this research 
area is that the extent to which an action can be understood is positively related 
to an individual’s experience with that action. Typically, this approach has 
been investigated by comparing groups of individuals who have varying 
degrees of task-relevant experience with specific actions. Results of these 
studies indicate that strong effects of expertise on prediction are especially 
obvious in motor experts such as athletes (Abernethy, Schorer, Jackson, & 
Hagemann, 2012; Aglioti et al., 2008; Moore & Müller, 2013; Tomasino, 
Guatto, Rumiati, & Fabbro, 2012; Williams, Ward, Knowles, & Smeeton, 
2002) or musicians (Wöllner & Cañal-Bruland, 2010). For example, 
Abernethy, Zawi and Jackson (2008) investigated expert and non-expert 
badminton players’ ability to predict the depth of opponents’ badminton 
strokes by presenting them temporally and/or spatially occluded video stimuli 
or point light figure displays. As expected, the ability to anticipate opponents’ 
stroke depth was superior for expert players over non-experts in such ways that 
experts were more able to use kinematic information from the opponent’s body 
movements to predict future states in both video stimuli and point light figure 
displays.  
However, when taking studies investigating experts and non-experts into 
account it remains unclear whether experts’ advantages in understanding 
specific actions can be explained due to their motor experience, visual 
experience or an interaction between both. According to the literature, two 
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accounts have been proposed how experience affects action understanding: On 
the one hand, a motor experience account was supposed which states that the 
observer’s pre-existing own motor repertoire allows the understanding of 
observed actions (e.g., Sebanz & Shiffrar, 2009). On the other hand, a 
perceptual experience account has been suggested which states that visual 
familiarity with others’ actions facilitates the recognition of observed actions 
(Jackson, Warren, & Abernethy, 2006). Yet, the particular influence of both 
types of experiences cannot be distinguished within experiments not 
manipulating the degree of visual and motor experience. To overcome this 
issue, a few studies (Aglioti et al., 2008; Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Calvo-
Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Cañal-Bruland, van 
der Kamp, & van Kesteren, 2010) intended to disentangle this dissociation by 
investigating visuo-motor experts (e.g., athletes) on the one hand and visual 
experts without motor expertise (e.g., journalists or coaches) on the other. One 
prominent study in this field was conducted by Aglioti and colleagues (2008) 
who asked professional basketball players, expert watchers (journalists and 
coaches) and novices to judge whether free basket shots (video recorded) 
would score or miss the basket. Crucially, the professional basketball players 
were able to predict the outcome of free shots earlier and more accurately than 
visual experts and novices. Moreover, visual experts and novices seemed to 
rather predict the outcome of the shot from the trajectory of the ball in contrast 
to motor experts who mainly relied on the player’s body kinematics. These 
results can be interpreted in such ways that own motor experience with 
basketball led to an improved ability to perceive and predict actions from this 
discipline.  
The influence of own motor experience on action understanding could also be 
demonstrated in an fMRI study conducted by Calvo-Merino et al. (2006). Here, 
it was questioned whether the activation of the mirror neuron system during 
action observation changes as a function of own motor experience with that 
specific action. To this end, the authors compared the brain activity of male 
and female expert ballet dancers during the observation of gender-specific 
ballet moves. It was assumed that female dancers exclusively possess motor 
experience with typical female dance figures whereas they solely have visual 
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experience with male dance figures. For male dancers the opposite pattern was 
supposed. Results have shown that activation of the mirror neuron system was 
higher when observing dance movements of the own motor repertoire 
(performed by a dancer of the same gender) compared to observing visually 
familiar movements (performed by a dancer of the opposite gender). Hence, 
the response of the mirror neuron system seems to be not so much dependent 
on prior visual experience with the action but rather appears to be influenced 
by previous motor experience when performing the same action.  
Some studies, however, emphasize that both motor and visual experience have 
an impact on action understanding. For instance, Cañal-Bruland et al. (2010) 
showed that expert handball field players and expert goal keepers were equally 
able to interpret deceptive behavior of penalty-takers (true vs. fake shots), 
although having different degrees of motor experience with performing penalty 
shots. Moreover, both expert groups outperformed novices indicating that 
experience in general contributes to the successful perception of observed 
actions, although this study could not clearly distinguish between the impact of 
visual and motor experience. 
In order to clearly disentangle the role of motor and visual experience in action 
understanding, experimental studies manipulating the degree of visual and 
motor experience are required. To our knowledge, less than a handful of 
studies have recently dealt with this issue (e.g., Cannon et al., 2014; Mulligan 
& Hodges, 2013). For example, Mulligan and Hodges (2013) manipulated the 
amount of visual experience in a training study, in which participants were 
trained to throw darts towards specific areas of a dartboard. Before and after 
the training, participants should predict landing positions of dart throws on 
temporally-occluded video stimuli. Participants in the motor training condition 
were trained in two groups – either blindfolded or with vision. Furthermore, 
two passive groups did not receive a motor training, but one group was able to 
observe someone else throwing a dart (visual training) whereas one group did 
not receive any training at all (passive control group). Results have shown that 
both motor training groups significantly improved to predict the landing 
position of dart throws during the post-test with no difference between them, 
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whereas the visual training group and the passive control group did not 
improve at all, indicating that visual experience had no impact on the ability to 
predict the goal positions of the dart throws.  
A second training study conducted by Cannon et al. (2014) hypothesized that 
the magnitude of µ-rhythm desynchronization should be dependent on prior 
motor experience with an action during observation. To this end, one group of 
participants was trained to pick up a toy using a claw-like tool in order to 
implement motor experience with this relatively novel action. A second group 
consisted of trained video coders who had a high amount of visual experience 
with the specific action but no motor experience, and a third group did not have 
any visual or motor experience with the action. Subsequently, EEG data was 
collected and results revealed that participants in the active training group 
showed the greatest µ-rhythm desynchronization compared to the two other 
groups, indicating that the mirror neuron system was mostly activated for 
participants who had own motor experience with the observed action. Taken 
together, the two studies outlined above were able to show that active motor 
experience has a superior impact on action understanding during observation 
whereas visual experience did not affect the perception of actions.  
Besides this finding, which has already been reported for motor experts (e.g., 
Aglioti, 2008), it is important to emphasize that even short amounts of 
experience affected behavioral and neurophysiological measures of action 
understanding. This result is of particular relevance for our study since we 
indented to investigate whether a brief period of experience would have an 
impact on action understanding. Only a small number of studies with non-
experts indicate that short-term experience indeed affects the ability to 
recognize and predict actions during observation (Casile & Giese, 2006; 
Marshall, Bouquet, Shipley, & Young, 2009; Quandt, Marshall, Bouquet, 
Young, & Shipley, 2011; Taya, Windridge, & Osman, 2013).  
For example, Casile and Giese (2006) trained blindfolded participants to 
perform novel and unusual upper-body movements by verbal and haptic 
feedback only. Prior to the training, all participants engaged in a visual 
discrimination task in which point light figures were presented. Specifically, 
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three types of point light figures were used as prototype stimuli – one with a 
normal human gait pattern, which is characterized by a phase difference of 
180° between the two opposite arms and legs, and two further ones with 
manipulated phase differences of 225° and 270°. During the visual 
discrimination task, participants were repeatedly presented with two point light 
figures – one of the prototype stimuli (180°, 225°, or 270°), and a second point 
light figure which was either the identical prototype figure in 50% of trials or a 
similar point light figure with a slightly different phase difference in 50% of 
trials. Participants’ task was to report whether the two presented point light 
figures were identical or not. During training, participants were blindfolded and 
learned to perform the arm movements corresponding to the point light figure 
with a phase difference of 270°. Subsequently, participants were asked to 
perform the same visual discrimination task as initially applied. The results 
indicated that participants showed improved recognition of those actions 
learned during the training (270° phase difference). Furthermore, the 
recognition performance was strongly correlated with the performance 
accuracy of the learned movements. These results demonstrate that novel 
acquired action knowledge has a direct and highly selective impact on visual 
action perception, independent of visual feedback during the learning period.  
In a further study, Marshall et al. (2009) investigated whether brief experience 
with novel drawing actions would have an influence on µ-rhythm 
desynchronization during observation of the same actions. To this end, 
participants were presented with videos showing unfamiliar drawing actions, 
half of which have been imitated by participants. Results indeed showed a 
desynchronization in the upper alpha band (11 – 13 Hz) at mid-frontal regions 
during action observation for imitated drawing actions only. Additionally, 
higher accuracy in imitation was significantly correlated with stronger bilateral 
desynchronization of the lower µ band (8-10 Hz). In a similar study, Quandt et 
al. (2011) replicated these findings, showing stronger frontal µ-rhythm 
desynchronization for trained drawing actions compared to novel drawing 
actions. Furthermore, participants’ imitation performance was better for trained 
movements compared to novel movements.  
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Taken together, these results indicate that even a brief period of training, and 
therefore only sparse experience, affects the perception of actions and 
underlying neurophysiological processes. Since we intend to measure action 
understanding via predictive eye movements, studies investigating the impact 
of short-term experience on eye movements would be of particular relevance. 
However, little is known so far whether brief motor experience has an impact 
on gaze behavior during action observation. One study which sheds some light 
on this question was conducted by Taya and colleagues (2013). Here, it was 
investigated whether the degree of experience in tennis would modulate 
anticipatory gaze behavior when passively observing video-recorded tennis 
scenes. To this end, participants answered a questionnaire about their 
knowledge and experience with tennis and their scores were correlated with 
several measures of gaze behavior. It was found that participants with a higher 
experience score showed more accurate anticipatory eye-movements during the 
observation of tennis scenes, especially in uncertain situations. This indicates 
that own experience with an action can modulate gaze behavior during the 
observation of the specific action. However, although participants in this study 
have not been experts in the field of tennis, they still might have had an 
extensive amount of experience with playing tennis. Hence, it still remains 
unclear whether even brief periods of own experience would also affect 
anticipatory gaze behavior during action observation. 
In conclusion, studies investigating the relationship between own experience 
with an action and the ability to understand this action during observation 
indicate that the degree of experience is positively related to the ability to 
predict the outcome of the same action when it is being observed. To date, the 
question how visual and motor experience exactly contribute to this 
relationship still remains unclear, although numerous studies argue that active 
motor experience has a more beneficial impact on action understanding than 
visual experience. This is in line with modern accounts of action perception 
that mostly suppose that actions are understood in terms of their activated 
motor programs or by motor simulation processes (see Chapter 2). However, in 
most studies, visual experience and motor experience have been confounded 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND     53 
and within this work we do not intend to dissociate between these two types of 
experience. 
For the present study it is rather important that even a brief period of 
experience affects the ability to understand actions during observation. 
Moreover, there is evidence that predictive gaze behavior can be influenced by 
own experience, although, to our knowledge, no study has systematically 
investigated the impact of short-term experience on anticipatory eye 
movements so far.  
5 Empirical Evidence for Action Understanding in 
Children 
In the previous sections, we mainly presented empirical evidence for action 
understanding in adults. However, in the last decades a growing number of 
researchers dedicated their interest to the investigation of action understanding 
in children. The main research questions in this area are from which age on 
children are able to understand others’ actions, how the mirror neuron system 
contributes to action understanding in childhood, and whether action 
understanding is enabled and/or improved due to own experience. 
Whereas most studies in this field concentrate on infants and toddlers, only a 
handful studies take preschoolers, school children or adolescents into account. 
Thus, most studies reviewed in the following section will report empirical 
evidence of action understanding in infancy. As in studies with adults, various 
methods measuring action understanding are implemented in studies with 
infants as well. Classically, studies applying behavioral measures (especially 
looking times in habituation paradigms) have been conducted to determine 
whether an infant understands goal-directed actions and is surprised by an 
unexpected action outcome or an irrational action (e.g., Gergely et al., 1995; 
Woodward, 1998). More recent studies increasingly draw back on eye tracking 
and neurophysiological methods with the purpose to identify whether direct 
matching processes comparable to those in adults are already present in infancy 
(e.g., Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Marshall, Young, & Meltzoff, 2011). 
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In this section, we will first review empirical findings for the development of 
action understanding in infancy, followed by evidence for an action-perception 
matching process already present in infants, and finally we intend to shed some 
light on the importance of infants’ own motor experience for the ability to 
understand observed actions. 
5.1 The Development of Action Understanding in Infancy 
Studies have shown that infants as young as five to six months are able to 
understand others’ actions as goal-directed (e.g., Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Woodward, 1998, 1999). For example, in a study conducted by Woodward 
(1998) infants observed how an agent repeatedly grasped one of two toys. 
Following this habituation phase, the positions of the toys were switched and 
the agent now either grasped the old toy at the new position or the new toy at 
the old position. The crucial idea behind this paradigm was that if infants were 
able to represent the observed grasping movement as goal-directed they should 
understand that the agent intended to grasp one specific toy. Hence, infants 
should be more surprised in test trials in which the agent grasped the new toy 
compared to test events in which the agent grasped the old toy. Thus, infants 
should look longer at new-toy/old-location trials compared to old-toy/new-
location trials. The results indeed showed this pattern – infants were more 
surprised when the agent grasped the new toy and as a result they looked 
longer at these trials. This indicates that infants as young as six months were 
able to represent the observed actions as goal-directed rather than just having a 
representation about the position of the agent’s arm. In a second control 
experiment, the impact of a non-human agent was investigated and results 
indicated that infants did not discriminate between the two types of test events 
when a mechanical claw performed the grasping actions. This indicates that 
human agency might play a crucial role in infants’ action understanding. 
In a further study, Woodward (1999) investigated purposeful and non-
purposeful actions in a similar habituation paradigm. Here, infants either 
observed an agent grasping one of two toys or touching the toy with the back 
of the hand. Results indicated that 5-months-old and 9-month-old infants only 
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looked significantly longer to new-toy/old-location trials in the grasping 
condition, whereas their looking times were comparable for both test events in 
the back-of-hand condition. This indicates that infants as young as five months 
are also able to interpret an action as purposeful and non-purposeful.  
Subsequent experiments applying modified versions of the classical Woodward 
paradigm (1998) further investigated influential factors on infants’ 
interpretation of goal-directed actions. Results indicated for example that 
infants were able to consider the agent’s intentions to interpret actions as 
meaningful (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007), that salient action effects facilitated 
their interpretation of goal-directed actions (e.g., Jovanovic et al., 2007; Király, 
Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003), and moreover that infants 
as young as six months were able to interpret actions with salient action effects 
as goal-directed, even when they were presented on a video-screen (Hofer, 
Hauf, & Aschersleben, 2007).  
One aspect that is controversially discussed in the literature is infants’ 
interpretation of goal-directed actions performed by non-human agents. 
Whereas some researchers emphasize the importance of a human agent for 
infants’ action understanding (e.g., Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; Meltzoff, 1995; 
Woodward, 1998), others state that even young infants are able to interpret 
actions of non-human agents as goal-directed (e.g., Gergely et al., 1995; 
Kamewari et al., 2005; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). According to the first view, 
infants’ ability to interpret others’ actions as goal-directed is assumed to 
develop as a result of their early interaction with human agents. Hence, infants 
are supposed to first attribute goals to human agents, and then gradually extend 
to other agents. In contrast, the latter view supposes that infants attribute goals 
to both human and non-human agents whenever they identify them as agents. 
In accordance with this idea, crucial features (e.g., self-propulsion) have been 
determined that seem to indicate agency, and which enable infants to identify 
even simple physical shapes (e.g., a circle) as agents (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). 
A study conducted by Luo and Baillargeon (2005) intended to shed light on 
this issue by investigating 5-months-old infants with a modified version of the 
Woodward paradigm (1998). Here, the agent was a box that moved across the 
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floor of an apparatus in a self-propelled manner (agency cue) prior to 
habituation trials. During habituation trials, a cylinder and a cone were placed 
on the left and right sides of the apparatus and the box repeatedly moved 
towards the cone. During test trials the positions of the cylinder and cone were 
switched and the box moved either toward the cylinder (new goal) or to the 
cone (old goal). Results indicated that infants looked significantly longer when 
the box approached the cylinder, suggesting that they were able to identify the 
box as a non-human agent that acted in a goal-directed manner. Hence, by 
providing sufficient agency cues, infants as young as five months are able to 
attribute goal-directedness to both human and non-human agents.  
Throughout the first year of life, infants’ action understanding rapidly 
improves in such ways that nine- to 11-months-old infants are able to subdivide 
action sequences into meaningful action steps (D. A. Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & 
Clark, 2001), indicating that they are able to represent action structures of 
increasing complexity. Moreover, by the end of the first year of life, infants 
take social cues (e.g., gaze or pointing) into account in order to interpret others’ 
intentions (Phillips, Wellman, & Spelke, 2002; Tomasello, Carpenter, & 
Liszkowski, 2007). Even more strikingly, infants as young as 12-months have 
been demonstrated to show an early mentalistic understanding of others’ 
actions in an imitation study. Although observing the agent failing to reach the 
intended goal during the presentation phase, infants were able to correctly infer 
the agent’s intentions and imitated the action in a successful manner (Nielsen, 
2009). This is in line with an earlier imitation study conducted by Carpenter, 
Akhtar and Tomasello (1998) demonstrating that infants between 12 and 15 
months are able to discriminate between actions that were intentionally or 
accidentally executed (indicated by verbal cues of confidence (“There!) or 
surprise (“Whoops!”)). Moreover, by the age of 14 months infants selectively 
imitate actions dependent on the perceived rationality during presentation 
(Gergely et al., 2002). Thus, infants in the second year of life are able to 
integrate information about the agent (e.g., human vs. non-human), social cues 
(e.g., gaze) and the rationality of actions in order to infer others’ actions goals.  
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Nevertheless, although it is evident, that infants are able to understand the 
intentional and goal-directed structure of actions early in life, it is still more or 
less unclear how this ability emerges and what the origins of this ability are. To 
date, attempts to answer these questions range from nativist positions that 
suppose an inherent ability to understand others’ goal-directed actions (e.g., 
György Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Király et al., 2003) to positions that 
emphasize the role of own experience for the ability to understand others’ 
actions (e.g., Gerson & Woodward, 2010; Meltzoff, 2005). Since studies in 
favor of these views are rarely longitudinal it is almost impossible to 
disentangle developmental changes, which makes it difficult to determine 
whether the ability to understand others’ actions is inhered or caused by own 
experience. However, analogous to findings in adults (e.g., Aglioti et al., 
2008), own experience with an action is considered to be related to action 
understanding in infants as well. This notion emerged due to an apparent 
connection between the development of infants’ action competencies and their 
ability to understand these actions performed by others at about the same age. 
For instance, infants begin to produce goal-directed grasps between four to five 
months (e.g., Bertenthal & Clifton, 1998), and are able to understand goal-
directed grasping actions at around the same age (Woodward, 1998). The same 
relation exists between the emerging ability to engage in joint attention 
between nine and 12 months (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998), and the 
ability to interpret gaze and pointing as goal-directed (e.g., Woodward, 2003). 
Moreover, both the ability to produce goal-directed action sequences (Bates, 
Carlson-Luden, & Bretherton, 1980) and the ability to subdivide action 
sequences into meaningful action steps (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2001) develop 
between nine to 12 months of age. Overall, these findings suggest a strong link 
between infants’ own action competencies and their ability to understand 
others’ actions. Before we further elaborate on the impact of own experience 
on action understanding in children in Section 5.3, we will review current 
findings of studies applying neurophysiological or eye tracking methods in 
order to shed light on action understanding in the developing child.  
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5.2 Action Understanding  
As we have already outlined in previous sections of this work, contemporary 
theoretical accounts as well as empirical findings in adults propose a tight link 
between action execution and action perception in adults (see Schütz-Bosbach 
& Prinz, 2007 for a review). Accordingly, some researchers suggested that both 
action execution and action observation are already intrinsically linked in the 
developing child (Baldwin, 1897; Piaget, 1953). With growing evidence for the 
coupling between action execution and the understanding of others’ actions in 
adults, researchers increasingly started to conduct congruent studies with 
infants and toddlers. A well-known and broadly investigated field in which the 
link between action perception and action execution becomes obvious in young 
children is imitation (cf. Herwig, 2014). Imitation is defined as the acquisition 
of new behavior due to the mere observation of a model demonstrating this 
behavior (cf. Daum & Aschersleben, 2014). Meltzoff (2005) claims that 
imitative behavior occurs because of an innate coupling between action and 
perception that allows even newborns to imitate facial gestures of adults 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). In a study conducted by Meltzoff (1988) 14-
months-old infants’ delayed imitation was investigated. To this end, six actions 
were demonstrated by an adult model and after a one-week delay the infants’ 
imitation of these actions was tested. The results indicated that infants in the 
imitation condition produced significantly more target actions compared to 
infants in a control group who were not exposed to the target actions. Hence, 
the mere observation of an action performed by someone else resulted in the 
production of the same action in 14-months-old infants. Accordingly, it was 
concluded, that action and action perception are already tightly linked in 
infancy. This led to the idea that measures of action understanding which are 
usually applied in studies with adults (see Section 4.2 for further information), 
should also provide information about action understanding in the developing 
child. As a consequence, methods like EEG, fMRI, or eye tracking were 
increasingly applied in studies with infants and toddlers in order to investigate 
their ability to understand others’ actions. The underlying assumption beyond 
these experiments is that the link between action execution and action 
understanding is realized by a direct matching process guaranteed by the 
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human mirror neuron system (e.g., Gallese et al., 1996). In the following 
subsections, according studies that provide evidence for a direct matching 
process in children are reviewed. 
5.2.1 Empirical Evidence from Studies applying Neurophysiological 
Methods 
The presence of a mirror neuron system from birth on was recently discussed 
(see Lepage & Théoret, 2007 for a review), and several studies provide 
evidence for the existence of a direct matching process in infants. For instance, 
neurophysiological studies demonstrated that infants as young as six months 
showed µ-rhythm suppression and significantly higher cortical activation in 
motor areas when they observed others’ goal-directed actions (Nyström, 2008; 
Shimada & Hiraki, 2006). Shimada and Hiraki (2006) were first to show that 
infants’ brain activity during action observation was comparable to their brain 
activity during action production. By applying near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIRS), the authors identified infants’ motor areas while they were playing 
with a toy. Subsequently, they either observed an adult playing with the toy or 
the toy moving on its own. Results indicated that infants’ brain activity during 
observation was comparable to that during their own playing actions. Crucially, 
motor areas were selectively activated when infants observed someone else 
manipulating a toy, whereas a self-propelled toy did not cause an activation in 
the same brain regions. This study supports the assumption that observed 
actions are directly mapped on own motor representations, even in infancy. 
Further studies replicated these findings with nine- to 16-month-old infants 
(Lepage & Théoret, 2006; Marshall et al., 2011; Southgate, Johnson, Osborne, 
& Csibra, 2009; Stapel, Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 2010; van Elk, van 
Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & Bekkering, 2008). For instance, Southgate et al. 
(2009) investigated 9-months-old infants’ µ-rhythm desynchronization during 
the execution and observation of reaching actions. Results revealed a µ-rhythm 
desynchronization for both executing and observing grasping actions. Marshall 
et al. (2011) replicated this finding in a further EEG study, and additionally 
reported that the magnitude of µ-rhythm desynchronization during action 
execution and action observation is smaller for infants than for adults, 
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indicating a developmental change in this measure. Further studies (e.g., 
Stroganova, Orekhova, & Posikera, 1999) have shown that not only the 
magnitude of the µ-rhythm changes over development, but moreover, that the 
frequency range of the µ-rhythm is lower (6-9 Hz) in infants than in adults (8-
13 Hz). For further information about developmental changes of the µ-rhythm 
in infancy, see Marshall and Meltzoff (2011).  
Beyond infancy, much less research investigating action understanding via 
neurophysiological methods has been conducted. To our knowledge, only one 
study (Meyer, Hunnius, Elk, Ede, & Bekkering, 2011) investigated 3-year-old 
preschoolers’ µ-rhythm desynchronization during a joint action game. 
Somehow not surprising, the results found were equivalent to those found in 
studies with infants and adults – namely, a desynchronization of the µ-rhythm 
during both being actively engaged in the game and observing the interaction 
partner being engaged in the game.  
Kilner and Blakemore (2007) discussed the development of the mirror neuron 
system in a broader age range – from infancy to adolescence. The authors 
suggest that pruning processes might modulate the functionality of the mirror 
neuron system far beyond early childhood, and that especially the connectivity 
between the mirror neuron system and other brain regions might develop in 
adolescence. Nevertheless, to date, no study has systematically investigated the 
development of the mirror neuron system so far, so it remains unclear whether, 
when, and how quantitative and qualitative changes occur. Moreover, while 
some authors proposed that a mirror neuron system is already established at 
birth by addressing imitative abilities of newborns (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983), 
no studies with human or primate newborns have been conducted to support 
this assumption so far. 
Taken together, the studies outlined above indicate that a mirror neuron system 
is already present in early infancy and thus, a direct matching process is 
assumed to be functional from as early as six months after birth. Moreover, 
developmental changes of the mirror neuron system up to adolescence are 
assumed, although tangible evidence is missing so far. 
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5.2.2 Empirical Evidence from Studies applying Eye Tracking  
Since the finding that anticipatory eye movements can be taken as indicators of 
a direct matching process (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003) was published, a 
number of infant studies intended to disentangle the relationship between 
anticipatory eye movements and action understanding in infancy. A first study 
in this field investigated 6- and 12-months-old infants’ and adults’ anticipatory 
eye movements during the observation of video-recorded transportation 
actions. Here, an actor moved three toys from one side of the screen into a 
bucket on the other side of the screen. Moreover, a “self-propelled” and a 
“mechanical” control condition were implemented for 12-months-old infants 
and adults, in which the toys moved to the bucket themselves, either in a 
natural motion trajectory or in a smooth-curved motion trajectory, respectively. 
Results revealed that in the human agent condition 12-months-old infants and 
adults directed their gaze predictively toward the action goal (the bucket), 
whereas 6-months-old infants’ gaze was rather reactive. Moreover, in the two 
control conditions, infants’ gaze was rather reactive, indicating that the 
interaction between a hand and the object was necessary for them to understand 
the action goals (Falck-Ytter et al., 2006). This result is in contrast with 
looking time studies indicating that infants are able to attribute goal-
directedness to non-human agents in the same age range (e.g., Gergely et al., 
1995;  Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). However, this dissociation again 
demonstrates that different measures of action understanding might reflect 
different processes underlying the ability to infer others’ goals. Nevertheless, 
the study by Falck-Ytter et al. (2006) provided first evidence that infants’ 
predictive gaze behavior is related to their ability to understand others’ actions, 
and thus indicates that a direct matching process is already present in infants.  
A further study extended these results by investigating 10- to 11-months-old 
infants and adults. Here, both eye movements and hand movements were 
assessed and results indicated that eye movements preceded hand movements 
during both own actions and observing someone else performing a grasping 
action. However, during observation trials, adults were significantly faster in 
anticipating the action goal compared to infants. The authors explained this 
62     THEORETICAL BACKGROUND      
finding as evidence that the ability to perform own actions develops ahead of 
the ability to understand others’ actions in infancy (Rosander & von Hofsten, 
2011).   
Recently, influential factors that might affect infants’ anticipatory eye 
movements during action observation have been identified (Henrichs et al., 
2012; Henrichs et al., 2014). Henrichs et al. (2012) were able to show that 12-
months-old infants’ anticipatory gaze shifts were significantly earlier when the 
observed agent reached for a large object compared to reaching for a small 
object. It was concluded that salient action goals facilitated infants’ 
understanding of goal-directed actions. Moreover, a further study revealed that 
infants’ were more accurate in anticipating an action goal during the 
observation of actions when the same goal was repeatedly approached by the 
agent’s hand, compared to actions in which the agent reached for different 
action goals across trials. Hence, infants’ understanding of others’ actions is 
affected by the goal certainty of observed actions. A certain goal facilitates 
infants’ ability to predict the action outcome (Henrichs et al., 2014).  
Like neurophysiological studies, eye tracking studies investigating 
preschoolers’, school children’s or adolescents’ action understanding are rare. 
One study ventured an attempt by comparing 4-year-old children’s and adults’ 
predictive eye movements during the observation of how a person prepared a 
snack. Results revealed no significant differences between adults’ and 
preschoolers’ predictive eye movements. Hence, no developmental changes 
could be identified within this study (Morgante et al., 2008). A further study 
considered developmental changes of saccadic eye movements by investigating 
6- to 15-year-old children within several paradigms. In contrast to the study 
outlined above, developmental changes in the latency of saccadic eye 
movements became apparent. With increasing age up until 12 years, children’s 
latencies of saccadic eye movements became shorter, whereas the peak 
velocity of saccades remained constant over all age groups (Bucci & Seassau, 
2012). To our knowledge, this was the only study investigating developmental 
changes in saccadic eye movements over a broad age range. Nevertheless, the 
results of this study provide important evidence that the control of saccadic eye 
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movements develops up to early adolescence. However, further studies are 
required to disentangle the relationship between anticipatory eye movements 
and action understanding across development.  
5.3 Impact of Experience on Action Understanding 
To date, several researchers claim that own experience with an action provides 
infants with knowledge about these actions and their caused effects, which 
should facilitate their ability to understand these actions performed by others 
(Gerson & Woodward, 2010; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014; Meltzoff, 2005). In 
contrast to adults, there is no chance to investigate the effects of expertise in 
infancy. However, in order to investigate the relationship between own 
experience and action understanding in infants researchers draw back on two 
possibilities: (1) correlational studies that relate infants’ own action abilities to 
measures of their action understanding during observation, and (2) 
interventional studies that modify infants’ own action experience, and 
subsequently measure the effect of an intervention on infants’ action 
understanding.  
5.3.1 Evidence from Correlational Studies 
As already mentioned in Section 5.2, there is an apparent connection between 
the development of action capabilities in infancy and the ability to understand 
these actions in others. Crucially, the development of new capabilities 
underlies huge individual variability in infancy, meaning that infants of the 
same age have varying amounts of experience with several actions. This allows 
researchers to either compare infants who have already mastered to perform a 
new action with infants that are not yet able to perform this new action (e.g., 
Loucks & Sommerville, 2012), or to correlate individual action abilities with 
indicators of action understanding (e.g., Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010).  
For instance, Sommerville and Woodward (2005) habituated 10- and 12-
months-old infants to a means-end action. Here, an agent repeatedly pulled one 
of two cloths in order to reach a toy. During test events, the toys were switched 
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and the agent could either pull the new cloth in order to reach the old toy or to 
pull the old cloth in order to reach a new toy. Results indicated that 12-months-
old infants looked longer at old cloth/new toy events, indicating that they 
understood the intention of the agent. Crucially, a positive correlation was 
found between infants’ own ability to perform this means-end task and their 
looking time during old cloth/new toy trials. Interestingly, infants that were not 
able to produce this means-end task looked longer at new cloth/old toy trials, 
indicating that they were not able to represent the final goal of the action but 
rather represented the agent’s action on a lower level, namely, that the agent 
intended to grasp the same cloth. Hence, they were surprised, when the agent 
grasped the new cloth. Thus, the own ability to perform means-end tasks, 
enabled infants to understand these action performed by others. Other studies 
have found further correlations between infants’ own action capabilities and 
indicators of their understanding of others’ actions (Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 
2010; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010; Loucks & 
Sommerville, 2012; van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & Bekkering, 2008). 
For instance, van Elk et al. (2008) investigated 14- to 16-months-old infants’ µ-
rhythm during the observation of videos in which either crawling or walking 
infants were shown. Results revealed a correlation between infants’ own 
crawling experience and the degree of µ-rhythm desynchronization during the 
observation of crawling infants, even when controlling the analyses for age. 
Moreover, in a recent study, the relationship between 4- to 6-months-old 
infants’ manual dexterity skills and their cortical activation during the 
observation of manual actions has been investigated by applying functional 
near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Results indicated that the degree of 
cortical activation during action observation strongly correlated with infants’ 
manual fine motor abilities (Lloyd-Fox, Wu, Richards, Elwell, & Johnson, 
2015). Hence, the impact of own experience affects infants’ brain activity in 
sensorimotor areas during action observation. 
Concerning predictive eye movements, Gredebäck and Kochukhova (2010) 
reported a strong correlation between 25-months-old toddlers’ ability to solve a 
puzzle and their goal-directed predictive eye movements when they observed 
someone else solving a similar puzzle. Crucially, a second age group of 18-
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months-old toddlers was tested, but no significant correlation was found for 
this group. The authors explained this finding due to the observation, that 18-
months-old toddlers were not able to solve the puzzle, hence, they were 
missing crucial own experience in order to understand others’ puzzle actions. A 
similar result was found in a study comparing 10-months-old infants’ and 
adults’ goal-directed eye movements when observing feeding actions and 
combing actions. Although in both actions the effector (hand) and the goal 
(head) were the same, infants were able to only predict the action goal of 
feeding actions, whereas adults predicted the combing actions as well. This 
finding indicates that infants were able to understand the feeding action only 
due to their own experience with this action (Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 
2010). Moreover, it has recently been shown, that infants’ understanding of 
interactions between two individuals is also strongly dependent on their own 
experience with interactive actions (Henderson, Wang, Matz, & Woodward, 
2013; Schmitow & Kochukhova, 2013).  
Taken together, the findings outlined above indicate that the ability to 
understand others’ actions is strongly linked to own action production abilities 
in early childhood. However, although the relationship between own 
experience and action understanding is apparent, it still remains unclear 
whether own experience causes improved action understanding in infants. To 
this end, interventional studies have been conducted, which will be reviewed in 
the next section.  
5.3.2  Evidence from Interventional Studies 
The findings outlined above gave rise to the assumption that active experience 
is the crucial factor for action understanding. In order to shed more light on this 
suggestion, interventional studies that give infants the possibility to perform a 
new action have been conducted. One prominent study in this field was 
conducted by Sommerville, Woodward and Needham (2005). Here, a group of 
3-months-old infants, who were not able to produce goal-directed grasping 
actions yet, were given the opportunity to “grasp” toys by wearing sticky 
mittens. A second group of 3-months-old infants did not receive an active 
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intervention, but observed another person grasping the toys. Subsequently, a 
modified version of the Woodward paradigm (1998) was implemented. Results 
indicated, that infants of the active experience group looked longer to new goal 
events, compared to those infants who merely observed a person acting. 
Moreover, looking times were correlated with infants’ engagement during the 
active experience phase. These results impressively illustrate that experience 
with a completely new action rapidly improves the understanding of 
subsequently observed actions in very young infants. A similar finding was 
obtained within a study investigating 12-months-old infants’ anticipatory gaze 
behavior following the spontaneous engagement in a containment activity. A 
strong correlation between infants’ own actions and their gaze latencies has 
been found (Cannon, Woodward, Gredebäck, von Hofsten, & Turek, 2012). 
Several further studies that were recently conducted found beneficial effects of 
active experience on the ability to perceive others’ actions, indicating that own 
experience enables infants to understand others’ action (Cannon et al., 2012;  
Gerson, Schiavio, Timmers, & Hunnius, 2015). However, most studies 
reported here did not apply a systematic training, but rather gave infants the 
possibility to explore objects on their own for a while in order to gain active 
experience with possible actions. Nevertheless, one study trained 8-month-old 
infants for one week to use a rattle for five minutes per day that produced a 
specific sound. Moreover, infants were also presented with another sound for 
five minutes per day not related to any action. After training, infants were 
presented with the two familiar sounds and a further unfamiliar sound while an 
EEG was recorded. Results showed a stronger µ-rhythm desynchronization 
over motor areas when infants listened to the sound caused by the rattle, 
compared to the other two sounds (Paulus, Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 
2012). This indicates that own experience with an action directly influences the 
perception of action related effects. However, it has to be mentioned, that the 
second sound was merely presented to infants without being related to an 
action. Hence, the results of this study do not discriminate between the impact 
of active and observational experience. To overcome this issue, a further 
training study of this research group investigated the impact of observational 
experience on µ-rhythm desynchronization in 9-months-old infants. To this 
end, infants observed their parents using a rattle for five minutes per day over a 
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week, or listened to the same sound as in the previous study. Results of this 
study revealed that this training also led to a stronger µ-rhythm 
desynchronization when infants listened to the sound of the rattle, compared to 
the sound that was not action related (Paulus, Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2013). 
However, according to these studies it remains unclear, whether advantages in 
action understanding emerge due to motor experience, observational 
experience or an interaction between both. This problem is already known from 
studies investigating adult motor experts (see Section 4.3 for further 
information), and solved by studies that systematically manipulated the types 
of experience provided.  
Recently, researchers from developmental psychology addressed this issue as 
well and intended to disentangle the influence of active motor experience and 
observational experience (Gerson, Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2015; Gerson & 
Woodward, 2013, 2014). For example, Gerson et al. (2015) applied both an 
active training and an observational training with 10-months-old infants. 
Infants were trained for one week to perform a means-end task on one toy, and 
moreover observed their parents performing a means-end task on another toy. 
Crucially, both actions led to two distinct sounds and were unfamiliar to the 
infants. After the completion of training sessions, infants’ EEG was recorded 
while listening to both sounds. The results of this study revealed a greater 
desynchronization of infants’ µ-rhythm when listening to the sound of that 
action that was actively trained, compared to listening to the sound of the 
observed action. Moreover, the degree of µ-rhythm desynchronization was 
directly related to infants’ performance during the training sessions. Hence, this 
study provides evidence for an advantage of motor experience over 
observational experience. 
Taken together, the studies outlined above demonstrated that active motor 
experience with an action has a superior effect on infants’ ability to understand 
others’ actions, whereas the role of observational experience remains somehow 
ambiguous. Nevertheless, own experience with an action definitely has a 
beneficial effect on action understanding in infants. Moreover, it has been 
shown – even for infants – that short-term experience with the own production 
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of actions led to an increased ability to understand the same actions in others. 
This notion is of particular relevance for the present work, since we intend to 
investigate the influence of short-term experience in preschoolers and older 
children. However, to our knowledge, no studies with children older than three 
years exist that investigated the influence of experience on action 
understanding measured via gaze behavior. This gap needs to be filled because 
we do not know yet, whether the processes underlying action understanding 
develop continuously throughout childhood or whether these processes are 
fully developed and comparable to those of adults at a special age. Only a few 
studies shed some light on the development of anticipatory skills during 
adolescence, and one of them reported no differences between 11-13 year old 
teenagers and 14-16 year old teenagers, but differences between teenagers and 
adults (e.g., Barlaam, Fortin, Vaugoyeau, Schmitz, & Assaiante, 2012). Hence, 
there is some evidence that the ability to understand others’ actions develops 
throughout childhood and adolescence and is object of maturation and 
refinement processes. Within our study, we aim to fill this gap by investigating 
the influence of task-specific short-term experience on action understanding in 
preschoolers and school children in order to disentangle whether 
developmental changes occur between different age groups. 
6 Outline of the Project 
The aim of the present thesis is to investigate the influence of short-term 
experience on action understanding, precisely on anticipatory eye movements 
and pupil dilation. Moreover, we aim to disentangle whether the ability to 
understand others’ actions gradually develops throughout childhood or whether 
it is fully established already in preschool children.  
According to the previous sections it can be summarized that four essential 
aspects can be taken as the basis for the present work: First, in accordance with 
modern theoretical accounts (e.g., direct matching account) and recent research 
findings (see Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007 for a review), action execution 
and action understanding are supposed to be tightly linked. Second, 
anticipatory eye movements and pupil size changes have been demonstrated to 
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be indicators of action understanding during action observation (e.g., Flanagan 
& Johansson, 2003). Third, own motor experience with an action shapes action 
understanding during the observation of another person performing the same 
action (e.g., Mulligan & Hodges, 2013) and fourth, the aforementioned three 
points are true for adults as well as children.  
Based on these four premises, the present work addresses three main research 
questions: 
(1) Does short-term experience with an action have an impact on anticipatory 
eye movements during the observation of the same action?  
To date, little is known about the impact of a relatively short amount of own 
experience with an action on gaze behavior during action observation. To our 
knowledge, only one study shed some light on this question by showing an 
influence of varying amounts of experience in playing tennis on predictive 
gaze behavior (Taya et al., 2013). However, although the aforementioned study 
delivers some valuable evidence for this thesis, research still lacks to answer 
the question whether even a brief period of experience affects anticipatory gaze 
behavior during action observation. Nevertheless, this is an important question 
which needs to be answered to further describe the functions of direct matching 
processes underlying action understanding. Hence, we intent to investigate 
whether a short amount of own experience would activate task-specific action 
plans that modulate anticipatory eye movements during action observation in 
such ways that participants would direct their gaze significantly earlier towards 
the action goals of the observed action.  
Moreover, we aimed to disentangle how task-specific this effect would occur. 
We questioned whether experience with one specific action would also 
enhance action understanding of a similar action which shared several features 
with the trained action, or if this effect would only enhance action 
understanding for the trained action. Previous research has shown on the one 
hand that own experience with an action specifically enhances the 
understanding of the same action (e.g., Casile & Giese, 2006), but on the other 
hand, that experience in one domain can enable successful transfer to a related 
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domain (Causer & Ford, 2014; Rosalie & Müller, 2014), depending on the 
similarity between both domains (Barnett & Ceci, 2002) and the level of 
expertise – with a higher level of expertise leading to a more successful 
transfer (Rosalie & Müller, 2012). According to these findings, it still remains 
unclear, whether short-term experience with one action only enhances action 
understanding of exactly the same action due to a task-specific activation of 
action plans, or whether transfer to other tasks occurs in spite of the short 
period of training, and therefore, a relatively low level of expertise.  
In order to answer these questions, we employed a block stacking task, similar 
to that used in the study by Flanagan and Johansson (2003), in a pre-post eye 
tracking design. Between two blocks of action observation, participants either 
performed the block stacking task, puzzles, or a pursuit rotor task in order to 
gain own active experience. We assumed that brief manual experience with a 
block stacking task should activate task-specific action plans supporting a 
direct matching process during the observation of the same action. Further, 
puzzles were applied as a first control task with the purpose to activate similar 
action plans comparable to those of the block stacking task, as both tasks share 
several features. By contrast, the pursuit rotor task (which required participants 
to follow a moving red dot on a circular track with their index finger) was 
employed as a second control task and was considered to activate action plans 
different from those activated by the block stacking task and puzzles. We 
hypothesized that experience with the block stacking task and puzzles but not 
the pursuit rotor task would lead to shorter gaze latencies during observation of 
post-test trials. 
The corresponding study will be described in further detail in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation (Möller, Zimmer, & Aschersleben, 2015). 
(2) Does short-term experience with an action have an impact on pupil size 
changes during the observation of the same action with an unexpected 
action outcome?  
The second aim of the present work was to investigate whether short-term 
experience would have a task-specific impact on pupil size changes during the 
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observation of actions with an unexpected outcome. Typically, pupil size 
changes provide information about the individuals’ expectations in a certain 
situation, specifically when expectations are violated. Several recent findings 
demonstrated that the violation of existing expectations leads to a state of 
surprise in an individual which is measurable via pupil dilation (e.g., 
Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Morita et al., 2012). For the present work this 
implies that the observation of unexpected action outcomes should lead to an 
increase in pupil diameter in the observer. However, the influence of own 
experience with an action on pupillary responses in association with 
unexpected action outcomes during action observation is still unknown. To our 
knowledge, only one study sheds a little light on the question whether own 
experience has an influence on pupil dilation during observation: Morita et al. 
(2012) showed that adults’ pupil size changed when observing impossible 
human body movements, whereas infants’ pupil size did not indicate any 
change. This might be interpreted as first evidence that a higher amount of own 
experience with human body movements leads to a stronger surprise in the 
observer when expectations about possible body movements are violated.  
According to these findings, in the second study of this thesis we questioned 
whether pupil size changes during the observation of unexpected action 
outcomes would vary as a function of own experience. To this end, we 
measured participants’ pupil size changes during the observation of successful 
and unsuccessful block stacking task trials within the same design as applied in 
the first study. Crucially, trials in which the block stacking task was performed 
in an unsuccessful manner were considered to violate participants’ expectations 
about the final state of the block stacking task, and should therefore result in 
pupil size changes. Moreover, participants received a short period of own 
action experience with the above mentioned three distinct manual tasks. In the 
case that own experience would have a task-specific influence on pupil size 
changes, a greater change in pupil size should occur when participants were 
trained to perform the block stacking task, compared the control tasks. The 
corresponding study will be described in further detail in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis.  
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(3) How does the influence of own action experience on action understanding 
change during childhood? 
The third main question of this thesis was to disentangle how the influence of 
own short-term experience on anticipatory eye movements would change 
during childhood. Although previous studies have shown, that own action 
experience modulates the latency of goal-directed anticipatory saccades in 
infants and toddlers (Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Kochukhova & 
Gredebäck, 2010), nothing is known so far about the developmental course of 
this effect. Moreover, the aforementioned studies considered actions with 
which infants or toddlers have a rather high amount of experience, like feeding 
actions or solving puzzles, respectively. Hence, it is still unclear whether even 
short-term experience with a specific task would also modulate anticipatory 
gaze shifts during action observation in children. This question is of particular 
relevance, because to date it is still unknown how direct matching processes 
develop during childhood. Whereas some studies argue that a functional mirror 
neuron system exists even in newborns (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983, Meltzoff & 
Decety, 2003), other studies suggest that own experience modifies this mirror 
neuron system and modulate its functioning throughout childhood (Shimada & 
Hiraki, 2006; van Elk et al., 2008). Moreover, it is under debate how much 
experience is necessary to activate direct matching processes (see Lepage & 
Théoret, 2007 for a discussion). 
Accordingly, we intended to investigate whether short-term experience would 
affect anticipatory eye movements during childhood and moreover, whether 
this effect would change during development. To this end, we investigated 
children of three age groups (4-6 years, 8-10, years, 11-14 years) with a child-
oriented version of the aforementioned pre-post design which was applied in 
the study with adults.  
We assumed that when a direct matching process was already fully functional 
in preschoolers they should direct their gaze significantly faster to action goals 
of the block stacking task after a task-specific short-term training, and no 
differences between the three age groups should occur. This study is described 
in further detail in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 2: Effects of short-term experience on 
anticipatory eye movements during action 
observation
1 Research Questions & Hypotheses 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the influence of short-term 
experience on predictive eye movements during action observation. Since 
anticipatory eye movements have been demonstrated to be indicators of a 
direct matching process (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003), we assumed that task-
specific short-term experience with an action would activate underlying action 
plans and as a consequence should lead to shorter gaze latencies during the 
subsequent observation of the same task. Furthermore, we planned to 
disentangle whether only task-specific short-term experience would lead to 
shorter gaze latencies or whether experience with tasks similar to the observed 
action would also facilitate a direct matching process. 
We employed a block stacking task, similar to that used in the study by 
Flanagan and Johansson (2003), in a pre-post eye tracking design. During pre- 
and posttest, participants watched short video clips showing an actor 
performing the block stacking task. Simultaneously, their eye movements were 
recorded by means of a Tobii T60 eye tracker. Intermediately, participants 
either performed the block stacking task, puzzles, or a pursuit rotor task. We 
assumed that brief manual experience with the block stacking task should 
activate task-specific action plans supporting a direct matching process during 
observation of post-test trials. Further, puzzles were applied as a first control 
task with the purpose to activate similar action plans comparable to those of the 
block stacking task, as both the block stacking task and puzzles were grasping 
tasks with four wooden objects which were moved from a fixed starting 
location to a fixed goal position. By contrast, the pursuit rotor task was 
employed as a second control task, which required participants to follow a 
moving red dot on a circular track with their index finger. We assumed that 
experience with the pursuit rotor task would activate action plans different 
from those activated by the block stacking task and puzzles. Therefore, we 
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hypothesized that experience with the block stacking task and puzzles but not 
the pursuit rotor task would lead to shorter gaze latencies during observation of 
post-test trials. Additionally, participants were trained in two ways: with 
anatomical congruency (performing exactly the same action with the same 
hand) and with spatial congruency (performing the action with the same hand, 
but spatially congruent with the observed action). Hence, subjects either 
performed a backhand or a forehand movement during the training. By 
manipulating the spatial congruency between performing and observing the 
block stacking task but keeping the effector (i.e. the actor’s and observer’s 
hand) constant, we intended to find out whether different congruency 
conditions would affect anticipatory eye movements.  
2 Methods 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 150 right-handed university students participated in the present 
study. All participants were recruited and tested at Saarland University and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Each participant was assigned to one of 
five experimental groups (1. Block Stacking Task_Forehand, N = 30, 15 males, 
Mage = 25.07 years, SD = 3.65 years; 2. Block Stacking Task_Backhand, N = 
30, 15 males, Mage = 23.97 years, SD = 2.47 years; 3. Puzzle_Forehand, N = 30, 
15 males, Mage = 22.58 years, SD = 2.72 years; 4. Puzzle_Backhand, N = 30, 15 
males, Mage = 24.49 years, SD = 2.34 years; 5. Pursuit Rotor Task, N = 30, 15 
males, Mage = 23.10 years, SD = 3.48 years). An additional N = 24 participants 
were excluded from analyses due to insufficient gaze recordings (N = 18), 
technical errors (N = 2), or experimenter errors (N = 4). Participants were paid 
for participation and gave their informed consent prior to taking part. The study 
was conducted in accordance with the standards specified in the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki. 
STUDY I: EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE ON ANTICIPATORY GAZE     75 
2.2 Materials & Stimuli 
Participants’ eye movements were recorded by means of a Tobii T60 eye 
tracker (17” TFT Monitor, sampling rate 60 Hz, accuracy 0.4°, Tobii, Sweden, 
Stockholm) while they were observing the experimental videos. All stimuli 
were short video clips (AVI format, 25 Hz, 1280 x 1024 pixels, duration 
between 8 – 11 s) showing a male hand performing a block stacking task , 
which consisted of four single grasping movements (Grasping Movement 1 – 
Grasping Movement 4, see Figure 3 b-e).  Hereby, the male actor was video-
recorded (Canon Legria FS200) from a frontal, third-person perspective at a 
distance of 60 cm. Four wooden blocks of different length (L = 2.5 cm / 3.5 cm 
/ 4.5 cm / 5.5 cm), but with identical width (W = 2.5 cm) and height (H = 2.5 
cm) were placed on a wooden work surface (L = 42 cm, W = 8 cm, H = 8 cm) 
lying on a table. The actor sat beside the table and grasped the wooden blocks 
with his right hand from above to stack the blocks (from the widest to the 
narrowest) away from him (backhand movement) to the other end of the work 
surface. From the participants’ view, the four blocks were aligned side by side 
at the right edge of the surface in the beginning, and then stacked to the left end 
of the work surface. The background of the scene, the table, the work surface 
and the agent were covered with black velvet so that only the four wooden 
blocks and the hand and forearm of the actor were visible on the recordings 
(see Figure 3). A metronome (Korg Ma-30; 50 bpm) was used to induce a 
steady speed of the single grasping movements.  
Four different video-clips were recorded. The first one showed a completely 
performed block stacking task (test trial, see Figure 3 a-e) and three further 
clips showed modified versions of the block stacking task (non-completion 
trials). Hereby, the agent put one, two or three wooden blocks on top of each 
other, but put the last, second last, or third last block in the wrong direction to 
the start-edge, respectively (see Figure 3 f). After this movement, the video 
clip ended immediately so that the building of a complete tower failed. The 
non-completion trials were excluded from analysis as they only served the 
purpose to keep the participants alert during the experiment.  
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Figure 3. Video stimuli showing actor performing a block stacking task. a. Starting position 
(White rectangle shows AOI position. AOI was not visible for participants.), b. Goal position 
of grasping movement 1, c. Goal position of grasping movement 2, d. Goal position of 
grasping movement 3, e. Goal position of grasping movement 4, f. Goal position of grasping 
movement 3 in non-completion trial. 
 
The four video recordings were digitally edited such that a central fixation 
point was added for 2,000 ms, followed by a still frame for 2,000 ms at the 
beginning of each video. At the end of each video-clip another still frame 
occurred for 2,000 ms, showing either the completely built-up tower or one of 
the three modified situations. Furthermore, the original sounds of the 
recordings were discarded. However, an artificial sound (‘blopp’, 200 ms) was 
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added to the lifting movement of each wooden block and an action effect 
(‘success sound’ 1,600 ms) was added to the frames where the correctly built-
up tower was visible. No action effect sound was inserted for non-completion 
trials. Six animal pictures (faces of mammals) with durations of 5,000 ms, and 
subsequent 4 beep-tones with durations of 5 ms accompanied by a black screen 
alternating with the original animal picture every 5 ms served as further 
attention grabbers2. The presentation of all stimuli and gaze recordings were 
controlled by Tobii Studio ™, Version 2.3.2.0.  
Material for subject-performed tasks consisted of four wooden blocks (same as 
used for stimuli recordings) in order to perform the block stacking task. 
Furthermore, three simple puzzles (SIMM toys) were applied for the puzzles 
intervention. Puzzles consisted of four single wooden pieces, consistently 
recolored in blue, showing three animals (ladybug, elefant, and dolphin), and a 
wooden inlay form (L = 14.5 cm, W = 18 cm, H = 2.5 cm) in which the pieces 
should be placed (see Attachment C). Although puzzle pieces differed in 
shape from the wooden blocks of the block stacking task, they were of 
comparable size and weight. To realize the pursuit rotor task, a 17”-TFT 
monitor was positioned flatly on the desk in front of the participant showing a 
digital version of a pursuit rotor task (AVI format, 25 Hz, 800 x 600 pixels). A 
red dot (diameter = 2 cm) moved with a velocity of 5 sec/circuit ten times 
around a white circular track (diameter = 22.5 cm) on a black background. 
2.3 Experimental Procedure 
Each participant was tested during a single experimental session lasting 
approximately 30 minutes. Participants were seated at a desk 60 cm in front of 
the Tobii T60 eye tracker. The session started with the Manual Skills Scale of 
the M-ABC-2 (Petermann, 2011)3. Subsequently, the experiment proceeded 
                                                 
2
 The attention grabbers and additional sounds were included in this design, as the same stimuli 
have been applied in a further study with preschoolers. 
3
 Manual fine motor skills were measured by the Manual Skills Scale of the Movement 
Assessment Battery for Children (M-ABC-2; Petermann, 2011). These data are not considered 
further and are only mentioned for the sake of completeness.  
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with the first eye tracking phase in which participants should passively observe 
eight experimental trials (6 test trials, 2 catch trials) in a randomized order. 
After each second trial an attention grabber (mammal face) was shown, leading 
to three attention grabbers in the pre-test. Participants were instructed to pay 
full attention to the videos and to keep their hands still, while observing how 
the tower was built up. After completing the pre-test, participants were asked to 
perform one of three manual tasks in order to activate different action plans. 
Participants either performed a block stacking task in a backhand or forehand 
movement, puzzles in a backhand or forehand movement or a pursuit rotor task 
with their right hand. The block stacking task entailed stacking four wooden 
blocks (same as used for stimuli recordings) on top of each other in order to 
build up a tower. Hereby, the four wooden blocks were lined up either at a 
right or left location 20 cm in front of the participants. Locations were 
determined by two blue dots with a distance of 40 cm in-between. In the 
starting position, the widest block was placed on one of the two blue dots and 
the shorter ones were lined up pointing to the space between the two dots. 
Participants were asked to build a tower on either the left or right dot 
(depending on the starting position) with their right hand (see  
Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Illustration of participant performing a block stacking task in a forehand movement. 
Black dots indicate starting and goal positions. 
Therefore, they either performed a forehand stacking movement or a backhand 
stacking movement. The Puzzle intervention involved three simple wooden 
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puzzles. The setup for puzzles was similar to that applied to the block stacking 
task with puzzle pieces lining up either at the right or left blue dot pointing to 
the space between the two dots. The only difference between puzzles and the 
block stacking task was that the order of Puzzle pieces was randomized for 
every trial and participant. Therefore, compared to the block stacking task, the 
puzzles have not been completed in a fixed sequence, but instead with a new 
sequence in each repetition. Both the block stacking task and the puzzles were 
performed twelve times. Hereby, both tasks should be performed four times as 
accurately as possible, four times as fast as possible and four times as fast and 
accurately as possible in a blocked manner. During the Puzzle task, a different 
Puzzle was applied for each of the aforementioned instructions. The pursuit 
rotor task required participants to follow a red dot moving on a circular track 
with the index finger of their right hand for ten times. Participants were 
instructed to follow the moving dot as accurately as possible. They repeated the 
pursuit rotor task three times with a short break after each completion. 
Following the subject-performed task, the second eye-tracking phase took 
place, in which participants would again passively observe eight experimental 
trials (6 test trials, 2 catch trials) in a randomized order, with an attention 
grabber after each second trial. Participants were again instructed to pay full 
attention to the videos and to keep their hands still, while observing how the 
tower was built up. 
2.4 Data Analyses 
Gaze recordings of the six test trials were analyzed by using purpose-written 
software. Each test trial consisted of four single grasping movements. 
Therefore, we calculated gaze latencies for each grasping movement in each 
test trial. Latencies were calculated as the difference of the first fixation time 
on the area of interest (AOI, see Figure 3 a) and the placement time of the 
wooden block at the goal position. Negative values indicate that participants’ 
gaze arrived prior to the hand; positive values indicate that gaze arrived at the 
goal AOI after the block was placed there. For each grasping movement a 
maximum of six data points could be reached (one per trial). If a participant 
had less than three data points (e.g., because of insufficient gaze recording, 
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blinks or no AOI-directed gaze behavior) in more than two grasping 
movements, the participant was completely discarded from analyses (N = 10).  
Since the first grasping movement  (the movement of the first block) showed a 
high number of missing values (19.4 % during pre-test, 19.8 % during post-
test) and a high number of saccades with latencies higher than 100 ms (24.4 % 
during pre-test, 11.3 % during post-test), it was entirely discarded from 
analyses. This finding is in line with Flanagan and Johansson (2003), who 
demonstrated that participants’ gaze shifts were delayed during the first 
grasping movement when observing another person performing a block 
stacking task. We assume that a certain time was required until participants 
fully directed their attention towards the ongoing action, hence, missing values 
and reactive saccades occurred to a higher degree.  
Furthermore, we excluded remaining grasping movements having less than 
three data points from analyses (0.22 % during pre-test, 0.00 % during post-
test). Reactive saccades with latencies higher than 100 ms (1.93 % of pre-test 
trials and in 1.26 % of post-test trials) were discarded from analysis, as our 
purpose was to investigate the impact of manual experience on anticipatory eye 
movements only. We assumed that saccades with latencies up to 100 ms are 
planned and elicited already during the on-going grasping movement (Land, 
2009; Smit & Van Gisbergen, 1989) and therefore originated from an 
underlying anticipatory process (Mehta & Schaal, 2002; Wells & Barnes, 
1998).  
We then calculated means for grasping movements over trials, resulting in 
three mean values for the pre-test and three mean values for the post-test. 
Those values were further averaged into one score for pre-test and one score 
for post-test for each subject. Additionally, we calculated a difference score 
(Diff_Score = Post_Score - Pre_Score).  
Statistics were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics (version 20.0). The level 
for significance was sat at α = 0.05 and effect sizes were calculated using 
Cohen´s d for independent-samples t-tests and partial eta-squared (ηP²) values 
for ANOVAs. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Latencies 
On average, participants anticipated the action goal in 90.2% of trials during 
pre-test and in 93.9 % of trials during post-test. An Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) with the between-subject factor Group (5) was calculated to 
compare mean latencies for pre-test trials. No significant main effect of Group 
for mean latencies of pre-test trials was obtained (F(4,145) = 0.51, p  = .73, ηP² 
= .014). On average, participants’ gaze preceded the action goal with a latency 
of M = -322.20 ms, SD = 82.20 ms during pre-test trials (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Summary of means and standard deviations for gaze latencies 
 
 
Pre 
 
Post 
Group   M  SD   M SD 
BST a GM2 -301.96   85.2 
 
-361.79   84.4 
 
GM3 -309.98   92.6 
 
-379.77   79.4 
 
GM4 
-388.97 111.5 
 
-430.38 112.9 
 
      Puzzle a GM2 -274.16   90.4 
 
-306.83   78.2 
 
GM3 -295.21 100.3 
 
-322.35   93.0 
 
GM4 
-371.73 133.1 
 
-386.02 118.5 
       PR b GM2 -293.21   76.4 
 
-323.58   87.3 
 
GM3 -293.73   65.3 
 
-311.05 104.8 
 
GM4 
-366.26   93.6 
 
-362.12 110.5 
Note. BST = Block Stacking Task; PR = Pursuit Rotor; GM = Grasping Movement; M = 
Mean (in ms); SD = Standard Deviation (in ms). 
aN = 60; bN =30. 
3.2 Congruency Conditions 
Two independent-samples t-tests (2-tailed) on the pre-post difference 
(Diff_Score) were applied in order to test any differences for the backhand and 
forehand conditions in the block stacking task groups and puzzle groups. Pre-
post differences (Diff_Score) did not significantly differ for anatomically and 
spatially congruent conditions in both block stacking task groups (t(58) = .36, p 
= .72 , d = .07; Forehand: M = -53.9 ms, SD = 70.7 ms; Backhand: M = -60.8 
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ms, SD = 77.6 ms) and puzzle groups (t(58) = -.476, p = .64 , d = .12; 
Forehand: M = -28.4 ms, SD = 56.6 ms; Backhand: M = -21.0 ms, SD =  64.5 
ms). Therefore, both block stacking task groups and both puzzle groups were 
combined for further analyses.  
3.3 Impact of  Experience 
A 2 (Pre/Post) x 3 (Grasping Movement) x 3 (Group) repeated measures 
MANOVA with the first two factors as within-subject factors and the third one 
as a between-subject factor was applied on mean gaze latencies to test whether 
the subject-performed tasks led to group differences in the ability to anticipate 
the action goal during the post-test. Results revealed a significant main effect 
of Grasping Movement (Wilks’ Ʌ = .53, F(2,144) = 63.06, p < .001, ηP² = .47). 
Participants’ gaze latencies became significantly shorter over grasping 
movements. Furthermore, a significant main effect of Pre/Post could be found 
(Wilks’ Ʌ = .83, F(1,145) = 30.79, p < .001, ηP² = .18). Participants showed 
significantly shorter gaze latencies during post-test trials compared to pre-test 
trials. Of particular relevance to our hypotheses was a significant interaction 
between the factors Pre/Post and Group (Wilks’ Ʌ = .93, F(2,145) = 5.10, p = 
.007, ηP² = .07).  
Planned comparisons revealed that the block stacking task group showed a 
significantly larger pre-post difference than the puzzle group (t(147) = -2.69, p 
= .008, d = 0.49) and the pursuit rotor task group (t(147) = -2.84, p = .005, d = 
0.87), whereas the puzzle group and the pursuit rotor task group did not 
significantly differ from each other (t(147) = -.64, p = .52, d = 0.15, see Figure 
5). All other main effects and interactions were non-significant (all Wilks’ Ʌ > 
.96,  F ≤ 2.78, p ≥ .07). 
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Figure 5. Pre-post differences of mean gaze latencies averaged over grasping movements 
(except grasping movement 1) for each experimental condition. BST = Block Stacking Task, 
PR = Pursuit Rotor Task. Vertical bars indicate standard errors. **p < 0.01. 
4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether short-term experience with 
manually performed tasks would activate task-specific action plans and 
therefore would lead to shorter gaze latencies during observation of the same or 
a similar task. To this end, we applied a pre-post design using eye tracking. 
First, participants observed short video clips of an actor performing a block 
stacking task. Subsequently, they either performed the block stacking task, 
puzzles or a pursuit rotor task. The block stacking task and puzzles were 
performed in two different congruency conditions (anatomically congruent / 
spatially congruent). Finally, participants again observed the same video clips 
shown during the pre-test. No significant effect of congruency could be found 
between both block stacking task groups and both puzzle groups, indicating 
that the performance of a congruent or incongruent anatomical movement 
(backhand vs. forehand) does not affect the latency of anticipatory fixations. 
This finding stands in line with studies showing sparse influence of postural 
congruency between the observer and the agent on behavioral results (Alaerts, 
Heremans, et al., 2009; Alaerts, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2009; Urgesi et al., 
2006). Furthermore, Sartori et al. (Sartori, Begliomini, & Castiello, 2013) have 
recently shown that motor resonance occurred in the observer’s dominant hand, 
regardless of the hand preference being observed. This suggests that a direct 
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mapping mechanism is able to convert others’ movement features into the 
observer’s optimal motor commands.  
The most salient finding of our study was that participants who performed the 
block stacking task directed their gaze significantly faster to action goals 
during post-test trials, compared to participants who performed puzzles or the 
pursuit rotor task. We assume that this effect cannot be explained due to visual 
repetition, since studies investigating the influence of motor and visual 
experience on anticipatory skills during action observation have demonstrated 
that an improvement of anticipatory skills occurred independent of visual 
experience (Casile & Giese, 2006; Mulligan & Hodges, 2013). For example, 
Mulligan and Hodges (2013) manipulated the amount of visual experience in a 
training study, in which participants were trained to throw darts towards 
specific areas of a dartboard. Before and after the training, participants should 
predict landing positions of dart throws on temporally-occluded video stimuli. 
Participants were either trained to throw darts with or without vision. 
Furthermore, two control groups (observation-only, no practice) did not receive 
a motor training. Results have shown that both the vision and the no-vision 
group significantly improved to predict the landing position of dart throws 
during the post-test with no difference between them, whereas control groups 
did not improve at all, indicating that visual experience had no impact on the 
ability the predict action goals. In accordance with this finding, Calvo-Merino 
et al. (2006) conducted an fMRI study investigating expert dancers’ perception 
of gender-specific movements. Results have shown that activation of the mirror 
neuron system is higher when observing dance movements of the own motor 
repertoire (performed by a dancer of the same gender) compared to observing 
visually familiar movements (performed by a dancer of the opposite gender). 
These results indicate that observed actions are understood in terms of their 
activated motor representations independent of visual knowledge about the 
actions. 
Therefore, our finding suggests that short-term experience enhances the 
activation of task-specific action plans which enable the observer to predict the 
action goals of the same action faster. At this point it is assumed that 
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anticipatory eye movements are strongly related to task-specific action plans in 
the observer.  
 
86 
 
Chapter 3: Pupil size changes during the 
observation of unexpected actions - The role of 
experience. 
1 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Within the first experiment, we were able to show that short-term experience 
with a specific task led to shorter gaze latencies during the observation of the 
same task. Importantly, this effect was highly task-specific, and did not occur 
when experience with rather distinct tasks was given. 
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate whether short-term 
experience with an action has a task-specific impact on pupil size changes 
during the observation of unexpected action outcomes. In a pre-post design, we 
presented participants video stimuli of an agent performing a block stacking 
task. In contrast to the first experiment, trials showing an actor performing 
incomplete versions of the block stacking task were of particular interest in this 
study. In these trials, the agent started to perform the block stacking task but 
placed either the second, third or fourth block to the wrong edge. Hence, the 
tower was not built up completely. We assumed that these trials would violate 
the expectations of the observer. Since the violation of expectations is 
measurable via pupil dilation (e.g., Preuschoff, 2011), we expected 
participants’ pupil size to increase during the observation of trials in which the 
actor failed to build up the tower completely. 
Importantly, in between the presentation of pre- and posttest trials participants 
either performed a block stacking task, puzzles or a pursuit rotor task. We 
questioned whether own short-term experience with a specific action would 
lead to a stronger prediction error during the observation of the same action in 
posttest trials. According to the results of the first experiment, we assumed that 
the prediction error (indicated by pupil dilation) during the observation of 
posttest trials should be strongest for participants that had performed the block 
stacking task. 
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Moreover, in order to disentangle the relationship between anticipatory eye 
movements and pupil dilation as measures of action understanding, we 
intended to investigate the correlation between both measures.  
2 Methods 
2.1 Participants 
Ninety-eight university students who had participated within the first study of 
this thesis were considered for statistical analyses in the present experiment. 
An additional N = 54 participants were excluded from analyses due to not 
reaching analyses criteria for the present study. For this study, participants 
were grouped into three experimental groups (1. Block Stacking Task, N = 40, 
17 males, Mage = 24.1 years, SD = 3.20 years; 2. Puzzles, N = 40, 24 males, 
Mage = 23.3 years, SD = 2.59 years; 3. Pursuit Rotor Task, N = 18, 8 males, 
Mage = 22.5 years, SD = 1.91 years). Participants were paid for participation 
and gave their informed consent prior to taking part. The study was conducted 
in accordance with the standards specified in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
2.2 Materials & Stimuli 
This study is a further analysis of the data collected within the first study of 
this thesis. All materials, stimuli and the experimental procedure are described 
within the first study of this thesis (Chapter 2). In contrast to the first study, all 
stimuli, including three non-completion trials, were considered for analyses. 
Non-completion trials (NC) differed from test trials (TT) in such ways that the 
agent put one, two or three wooden blocks on top of each other, but put the 
last, second last, or third last block in the wrong direction to the start-edge, 
respectively. After this movement, the video clip ended immediately so that the 
building of a complete tower failed. Non-completion trials are referred to as 
non-completion trial 2 – 4 (NC2, NC3, NC4), according to the incorrectly 
placed block that caused the unexpected outcome of the block stacking task. 
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2.3 Data Analyses 
Pupil data of test trials and non-completion trials were analyzed by using Brain 
Vision Analyzer (version 2.0) and purpose written software (Python®). 
Initially, pupil data of both eyes was preprocessed in order to identify missing 
values in the data stream (typically caused by blinks). Missing values which 
affected up to 30 consecutive samples in the data stream (≈ 498 ms) were 
replaced by linearly interpolated values. Trials containing missing values after 
the interpolation procedure were discarded from analyses. Due to the relatively 
small number of trials (six test trials and two non-completion trials) per 
participant in pre- and posttest, participants with missing values in at least one 
test trial or one non-completion trial in either the pre- or posttest were 
completely discarded from further analyses (N = 54).  
In order to define an appropriate time window in which the pupil size changed 
in response to unexpected (NC) compared to expected (TT) action outcomes, 
we first visually explored the complete data stream of test trials and non-
completion trials. For this purpose, we calculated a baseline by averaging pupil 
size values during a period of 1000 ms preceding the onset of the block 
stacking task for each condition. Pupil dilation during the action period was 
calculated by subtracting the baseline value from each data point. Visual 
exploration revealed that pupil size values increased about 100 ms after offset 
of the unexpected grasping movement, and that this effect lasted for about 700 
ms (see Figure 7). This latency is in accordance with previous research 
indicating that pupillary responses typically occur within 100-200 ms after the 
critical event (unexpected event, response toward a stimulus) and lasts for up to 
two seconds (Kloosterman et al., 2015; Scheepers et al., 2013). 
Preliminary analyses revealed variations in pupil size prior to the grasping 
offsets between non-completion trials and test trials (see Fehler! Verweisquelle 
konnte nicht gefunden werden.). Hence, we calculated new baselines with 
durations of 500 ms directly preceding the offsets of the unexpected grasping 
movements (see Figure 6). Importantly, for each non-completion trial a 
different grasping offset was of interest, since the unexpected event occurred 
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within different grasping movements (e.g., for NC2 the offset of the second 
grasping movement was of interest). 
 
  
Figure 6. Grasping offsets and baseline values for each condition. Time 0 represents onset of 
the block stacking task. Vertical bars indicate grasping offsets of interest. Grey-scaled areas 
indicate baseline time periods (500 ms) for each condition. NC = non-completion trial; TT = 
test trial; GM = grasping movement.  
In order to compare the pupil size changes of non-completion trials with that of 
test trials, three grasping offsets according to those of the non-completion trials 
were determined to calculate the baseline values in test trials (see Figure 6, 
lower row). Again, pupil dilation was calculated by subtracting the baseline 
value from every data point during the aforementioned 100-800 ms interval 
after grasping offset. Pupil data of the six test trials were averaged into one 
value, whereas pupil data of non-completion trials were analyzed seperately. 
Data of both eyes were merged.  
Statistics were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics (version 20.0). The level 
for significance was sat at α = 0.05 and effect sizes were calculated using 
Cohen´s d for t-tests and partial eta-squared (ηP²) values for ANOVAs.  
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3 Results 
3.1 Pupil Dilation over Time 
Mean pupil dilation over time during the observation of each condition is 
shown in Figure 7 for pre- and posttest averaged over all participants (N = 98). 
 
Figure 7 .Baseline-corrected dilation-by-time plot for non-completion trials and test trials 
during pre- and posttest (Baseline = 1000 ms interval prior to stimulus onset). Time 0 
represents stimulus onset. Vertical bars indicate grasping offsets of interest of non-completion 
trials. Black lines indicate pupil dilation over time in test trials; red line indicates pupil dilation 
over time in non-completion trial 2; blue lines indicate pupil dilation over time in non-
completion trial 3; green line indicates pupil dilation over time in non-completion trial 4. TT = 
test trial, NC = non-completion trial, N = 98. 
The pupil started to slightly dilate after the onset (at 2000 ms) of the block 
stacking task following a similar pattern in all conditions. Mean pupil size of 
test trials continuously increased mainly in a steady pattern. In contrast, in 
NC2-4 trials the pupil strongly dilated approximately 100 ms following the 
unexpected grasping offsets. Moreover, the dilation curves in response to the 
unexpected grasping movements in NC2 and NC3 showed a bimodal shape, 
whereas the dilation curve of NC4 showed a unimodal curve. We assumed that 
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the first peak might reflect the prediction error caused by the unexpected 
placement of the blocks, whereas the second peak might reflect the unexpected 
abrupt termination of the action. This assumption is supported by the finding 
that NC4 trials only showed a unimodal curve, most likely reflecting 
participants’ violated expectation caused by the wrong placement of the last 
block, whereas participants were not surprised that the action ended as usual 
after the manipulation of the fourth block. Hence, for the following analyses, 
we decided to concentrate on a time window comprising the first peak of NC2-
4 trials. Accordingly, we considered the 100-800 ms response interval 
following unexpected grasping offsets.  
3.2 Prediction Error 
From Figure 7 it becomes clear that pupil dilation is directly related to 
different stimulus conditions, particularly to the unexpected events occurring 
within non-completion trials. In order to investigate whether pupil dilation 
values in response to non-completion trials statistically differed from pupil 
dilation values in test trials, we conducted two repeated-measures ANOVAs 
with the two within-subject factors Grasping Offset (2) and Condition (2) for 
pre- and posttest trials on the baseline-corrected mean pupil dilation values in 
the 100-800 ms response interval after grasping offsets. For pretest trials, the 
analyses revealed a significant main effect of Grasping Offset (F(1,97) = 5.16, 
p = .025, ηP² = .05) with significantly higher pupil dilation values for NC3 and 
the according time interval in test trials (TT_NC3) compared to NC2 and the 
according time interval in test trials (TT_NC2). Moreover, a significant main 
effect of Condition (F(1,97) = 179.8, p < .001, ηP² = .65), with higher pupil 
dilation values for non-completion trials (NC2: M = .12 mm, SD = .08 mm; 
NC3: M = .13 mm, SD = .09 mm) compared to test trials (TT_NC2: M = .03 
mm, SD = .04 mm; TT_NC3: M = .04 mm, SD = .05 mm) was obtained. No 
significant interaction of Grasping Offset x Condition could be found (F(1,97) 
= .07, p = .787, ηP² = .001). Pupil dilation values of non-completion trials and 
test trials during pretest are illustrated within Figure 8 a. 
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For posttest trials, the analyses revealed no significant main effect of Grasping 
Offset (F(1,97) = 2.09, p = .151, ηP² = .02) but a significant main effect of 
Condition (F(1,97) = 107.3, p < .001, ηP² = .53), with higher pupil dilation 
values for non-completion trials (NC3: M = .11 mm, SD = .08 mm; NC4: M = 
.12 mm, SD = .09 mm) compared to test trials (TT_NC3: M = .04 mm, SD = 
.05 mm; TT_NC4: M = .01 mm, SD = .05 mm).  
 
Figure 8. Mean pupil dilation values of test trials and non-completion trials for pretest and 
posttest. TT = Test trial, NC = Non-completion trial. Vertical bars indicate standard errors. 
***p < .001. 
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Moreover, a significant interaction of Grasping Offset x Condition was 
obtained (F(1,97) = 9.11, p = .003, ηP² = .09) with a greater difference of pupil 
dilation values between NC4 and the according time period in test trials 
(TT_NC4) compared to pupil dilation values of NC3 and the according time 
period in test trials (TT_NC3). Pupil dilation values of non-completion trials 
and test trials during posttest are illustrated within Figure 8 b. 
Taken together, these results indicate that participants’ pupils dilated 
significantly stronger following the presentation of non-completion trials 
compared to test trials during both pretest and posttest (see also Figure 9). 
Moreover, during pretest trials the extent of the prediction error was 
comparable for both non-completion trials, whereas it was greater for NC4 
compared to NC3 during the posttest.  
3.3 Impact of Experience 
Before testing the influence of own manual experience on pupil dilation, we 
analyzed whether the three experimental groups differed in their pupil dilation 
values during pretest. To this end we again calculated a repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the mean pupil dilation values of pretest trials with the two within-
subject factors Grasping Offset (2) and Condition (2), but included the between 
subject factor Group (3) for this analysis.  
As previously reported in Section 3.2, a significant main effect of Grasping 
Offset (F(1,95) = 5.32, p = .023, ηP² = .05) was obtained with significantly 
higher pupil dilation values for NC3 and the according time interval in test 
trials (TT_NC3) compared to NC2 and the according time interval in test trials 
(TT_NC2). Moreover, analyses revealed a significant main effect for Condition 
(F(1,95) = 181.77, p < .001, ηP² = .66), indicating that mean pupil dilation 
values were significantly higher for non-completion trials compared to test 
trials. Of particular relevance for our further analyses was, whether there were 
group differences in mean pupil dilation values during the pretest. Results 
indicated no significant main effect of Group (F(2,95) = .85, p = .431, ηP² = 
.02), but a marginally significant interaction of Group x Condition (F(2,95) = 
2.93, p = .058, ηP² = .06). All other interactions remained non-significant (all 
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Fs ≤ .29, all ps ≥ .753). In order to further investigate the marginal Group x 
Condition interaction effect, we calculated post-hoc comparisons (independent-
sample t-tests) on the difference scores between non-completion trials and test 
trials of mean pupil dilation values during pretest. Results revealed no 
significant differences between groups for the difference score related to NC2 
(all t ≤ -1.25, all p ≥ .215) and no significant differences between groups for the 
difference score related to NC3 (all t ≤ -1.12, all p ≥ .269). Hence, all three 
experimental groups showed equally strong prediction errors as a result of the 
observation of unexpected actions during the pretest (see Figure 9 a).  
Pupil dilation values of the two non-completion trials presented within the 
pretest were considered separately for analyses for the following reasons: On 
the one hand, the two non-completion trials presented during the pretest differ 
from those two non-completion trials presented during the posttest – during the 
pretest, NC2 and NC3 were presented, whereas during the posttest NC3 and 
NC4 were presented. Hence, only one non-completion trial (NC3) was 
repeatedly shown in both subtests. The other two non-completion trials (NC2 
and NC4) strongly differ in their content, since the unexpected action occurs at 
completely different time points within these trials. This might be reflected in 
variations of participants’ pupil response towards the presentation of the 
specific non-completion trials. This apprehension finds support in the analyses 
reported in Section 3.2, indicating that participants showed a stronger 
prediction error for NC4 trials compared to NC3 trials. In contrast, during 
pretest participants showed an equally strong pupil response towards both non-
completion trials.  
Moreover, we investigated the influence of short-term experience on pupil 
dilation in NC3 only, since this trial allows the most proper analysis due to its 
identical repetition in pre- and posttest. Descriptive statistics for pupil dilation 
values of NC3 during pre- and posttest are illustrated for each group in Table 
2. 
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Figure 9. a) Mean pupil dilation values of test trials and non-completion trials during pretest 
separately for each experimental group. b) Mean pupil dilation values of test trials and non-
completion trials during posttest separately for each experimental group. TT = Test trial, NC = 
Non-completion trial, GM = Grasping Movement, BST = Block Stacking Task, PR = Pursuit 
Rotor Task. Grey areas indicate time interval of interest. 
 
 
 
96     STUDY II: EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE ON PUPIL DILATION  
 
Table 2. Summary of means and standard deviations of pupil dilation values for NC3 
  
Pre 
 
Post 
Group   M  SD   M SD 
BST a NC3 .11 .07 
 
.10 .08 
 
TT_NC3 .05 .06  .04 .05 
 
      Puzzle a NC3 .13 .10  .11 .07 
 
TT_NC3 .04 .04  .05 .05 
       PR b NC3 .16 .09  .11 .08 
 
TT_NC3 .04 .03  .03 .04 
 
 
  
 
  
Total c  NC3 .13 .09  .11 .08 
 TT_NC3 .04 .05  .04 .05 
  
  
 
  
Note. BST = Block Stacking Task; PR = Pursuit Rotor; NC3 = Non-completion trial 3; TT = 
Test trial; M = Mean (in mm); SD = Standard Deviation (in mm). 
aN = 40; bN =18; cN =98. 
In order to investigate whether task-specific short-term experience would have 
an influence on the degree of participants’ pupil dilation during the observation 
of NC3, we calculated a 2 (Pre/Post) x 2 (Condition) x 3 (Group) repeated 
measures ANOVA with the first two factors as within-subject factors and the 
third one as a between-subject factor on mean pupil dilation values of NC3 and 
TT_NC3. Results revealed a significant main effect of Pre/Post (F(1,95) = 
5.72, p = .019, ηP² = .06). Mean pupil dilation values of NC3 and the 
according time interval in test trials were significantly lower during posttest 
(NC3: M = .11 mm, SD = .08 mm; TT_NC3: M = .04 mm, SD = .05 mm) 
compared to pretest (NC3: M = .13 mm, SD = .09 mm; TT_NC3: M = .04 mm, 
SD = .05 mm). Moreover, again a significant main effect of Condition was 
obtained (F(1,95) = 116.3, p < .001, ηP² = .55), indicating that pupil dilation 
values of NC3 were significantly higher than mean pupil dilation values of the 
according time interval in test trials. Further, a marginally significant 
interaction effect of Pre/Post x Condition was obtained (F(1,95) = 3.15, p = 
.079, ηP² = .03), indicating that the difference between NC3 and test trials 
during the pretest was larger than during the posttest. Post-hoc comparisons 
(dependent-sample t-tests) revealed that mean pupil dilation values of NC3 
significantly decreased during the posttest (t(97) = 2.03, p = .045, d = .24), 
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whereas mean pupil dilation values remained constant for the according time 
interval during test trials (TT_NC3) during both pretest and posttest (t(97) = 
.49, p = .62, d = .00).  
Of particular relevance to our hypotheses was the impact of the task-specific 
training on pupil dilation values between the three experimental groups. 
However, no significant main effect of Group (F(2,95) = .33, p = .722, ηP² = 
.01), neither a significant interaction effect of Group x Pre/Post (F(2,95) = 
1.23, p = .284, ηP² = .03) was obtained, indicating no differences in mean pupil 
dilation values between the three experimental groups. Thus, no impact of task-
specific short-term experience on pupil dilation could be found. All other 
interactions remained non-significant (all Fs ≤ 2.12, all ps ≥ .126).  
3.4 Correlation between Anticipatory Gaze and Pupil Dilation 
Here, we intended to investigate whether the latencies of anticipatory eye 
movements are related to the extent of pupil size changes during the 
observation of unexpected actions. To this end, we calculated bivariate 
correlations between the mean latency of anticipatory eye movements during 
pretest trials and the difference scores of pupil dilation values during pretest 
trials. Results indicate neither a significant correlation between the mean gaze 
latency of pretest trials and the difference score related to NC2 (r(95) = -.03, p 
= .754) nor the difference score related to NC3 (r(95) = -.07, p = .524) during 
pretest. Hence, the ability to anticipate action goals is not related to the extent 
of the prediction error during the observation of unsuccessful actions.  
4 Discussion 
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate whether task-specific 
short-term experience has an impact on pupil dilation during the observation of 
unsuccessfully performed actions. To this end, we assessed participants’ pupil 
size in a pre-post design in which participants observed short video clips of an 
actor performing a block stacking task in either a successful or in an 
unsuccessful way. In between, they either performed the block stacking task, 
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puzzles or a pursuit rotor task. Finally, participants again observed the same 
video clips shown during the pre-test.  
Overall, our results demonstrate that participants were surprised when 
observing unexpected action sequences compared to successfully performed 
actions, indicated by higher pupil dilation values following the occurrence of 
the unexpected event. This finding is in line with a number of studies reporting 
pupil dilation as a result of surprise or an expectation error (e.g., Kloosterman 
et al., 2015; Lavín, San Martín, & Rosales Jubal, 2014). Moreover, we found 
that participants did not seem to be merely surprised by the unexpected 
grasping event, but rather that participants did not expect the action to be 
terminated abruptly after the unexpected grasping movement which was 
indicated by a second peak in pupil dilation during trials in which further 
grasping movements would have been possible. This observation demonstrates 
that pupil dilation is closely related to a variety of expectation errors which is 
supported by previous studies reporting pupillary responses as a consequence 
of violations of expectations in gambling tasks (Preuschoff, 2011), in the 
perception of body movements (Morita et al., 2012), or in the perception of 
social interactions (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). However, to our knowledge 
no study has investigated so far, whether own experience with an action might 
influence the extent of the pupillary response in relation to unexpected events. 
Although, we could not find an influence of task-specific experience on pupil 
dilation, we were able to show that the pupillary response decreases when an 
unexpected event is presented for a second time. This might be the case 
because of the visual experience the participants obtained throughout the 
experiment. We know that people are very proficient in using subtle cues to 
predict other people’s actions (e.g., Ambrosini et al., 2015), and moreover, that 
the prediction process is continuously updated throughout the course of the 
observed action (Kilner et al., 2007). Hence, it is possible that our participants 
integrated the specific kinematic cues of unsuccessful actions in their 
prediction process for further trials. Since one of our non-completion trials was 
presented twice it is likely that the updated cue information helped participants 
to predict the outcome of the unsuccessful action and as a result caused a 
slightly less pronounced prediction error. Crucially, our finding can neither be 
STUDY II: EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE ON PUPIL DILATION     99 
explained by a mere habituation of the pupil response towards the continuous 
repetition of stimuli (e.g., Lowenstein & Loewenfeld, 1952), nor by upcoming 
fatigue during the experiment (e.g., Hess, 1972), since the pupillary responses 
remained stable for test trials between the pre- and posttest. Rather, our result 
might reflect that visual experience with specific unexpected events caused 
participants to be aware of these types of actions and integrate them as possible 
outcomes in their prediction process.  
However, manual experience with specific tasks did not cause any task-specific 
changes in pupil responses, whereas we could find clear effects of manual 
short-term experience on anticipatory eye movements. One possible 
explanation for these findings might lie in the underlying neurophysiological 
substrates of anticipatory eye movements and pupil dilation. As already 
outlined above, anticipatory eye movements are assumed to belong to a neural 
network involved in action planning and action monitoring. Neuroimaging 
studies have supported this view by showing that anticipatory eye movements 
are delayed during the observation of manual actions when according brain 
areas are inhibited by applying TMS pulses (Elsner et al., 2013). In contrast, 
pupillary responses in relation to unexpected events are known to be directly 
linked to a brain structure referred to as locus coeruleus (e.g., Koss, 1986; 
Rajkowski et al., 1993), which is the main cortical structure associated with the 
regulation of the neuro-transmitter norepinephrine (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 
2005). Hence, it is very likely that motor experience influences anticipatory 
eye movements and pupillary responses to a different degree. Since eye 
movements are part of an action plan, it is intuitively clear that motor 
experience activates specific action plans in a person which in return improve 
the perception of the same action. In contrast, pupillary responses are not 
directly innervated by motor information, therefore, task-specific motor 
experience might not have influenced participants’ pupil dilation. However, at 
this point we also need to mention that our analyses of pupil responses were 
only based on one trial per pre- and posttest, hence, our data might not be 
robust enough to uncover effects of experience. Nevertheless, it has been 
discussed in earlier studies that pupil responses most likely reflect a different 
aspect of a person’s expectation than other measures of action understanding 
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(Daum et al., 2012). Our studies support this view by showing that anticipatory 
eye movements reflect an individual’s expectation of upcoming events, 
whereas pupil dilation reflects the violation of an individual’s expectation 
following an unexpected outcome of an action.  
Taken together, this study supports previous findings that pupil responses 
reflect the violation of expectations in an individual and that the extent of this 
response is independent of own task-specific experience with the observed 
action.
     101 
Chapter 4: The role of experience on action 
understanding in children aged 4 – 14 years
1 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In our first study (Chapter 2: Effects of short-term experience on anticipatory 
eye movements during action observation) we were able to show that task-
specific short-term experience with an action leads to shorter gaze latencies 
during the subsequent observation of the same task in adults. The aim of the 
present study was to investigate the influence of short-term experience on 
predictive eye movements during action observation in children. To this end, 
we again employed a block stacking task in a pre-post eye tracking design 
similar to that used in the study with adults. During pre- and posttest, children 
watched short video clips showing an agent performing the block stacking task. 
Simultaneously, their eye movements were recorded by means of a Tobii T60 
eye tracker. Intermediately, children either performed the block stacking task 
or puzzles. Puzzles were applied as a control task and have previously been 
shown to cause a pre-post effect in adults but to a significantly smaller degree 
than the block stacking task. Therefore, we hypothesized that experience with 
the block stacking task should lead to significantly shorter gaze latencies 
during observation of posttest trials than experience with puzzles.  
As previous studies have discussed the existence of a mirror neuron system 
already from birth on and its development throughout childhood (Kilner & 
Blakemore, 2007; Lepage & Théoret, 2007), one main question of this study 
was whether the impact of short-term experience on action understanding 
would change during development. Some studies argue in favor of a functional 
mirror neuron system even in newborns (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983) whereas 
other studies suggest that in spite of an existing rudimentary mirror neuron 
system already present in infancy own experience modifies this mirror neuron 
system and modulates its functioning throughout childhood (Shimada & 
Hiraki, 2006; van Elk et al., 2008). To this end, we investigated children of 
three age groups (Experiment 1: 4-6 years, Experiment 2: 8-10, years, 
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Experiment 3: 11-14 years) in order to disentangle the influence of task-
specific short-term experience with an action on predictive eye movements.  
2 Experiment 1: Preschoolers (4-6 years) 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants 
Eighty-four preschoolers aged four to six years (Mage = 5.63 years, SD = 0.81 
years, Range: 4.00 – 6.92 years) and N = 1 preschooler with an age of 3.92 
years were considered for analyses in the present experiment. Preschoolers 
were recruited and tested at their day nursery or were invited to our lab at 
Saarland University. All preschoolers were right-handed, had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were assigned to one of four experimental 
groups (1. Block Stacking Task_Forehand, N = 22, 11 males, Mage = 5.70 
years, SD = 0.67 years; 2. Block Stacking Task_Backhand, N = 23, 11 males, 
Mage = 5.46 years, SD = 0.98 years; 3. Puzzle_Forehand, N = 20, 9 males, Mage 
= 5.74 years, SD = 0.75 years; 4. Puzzle_Backhand, N = 20, 12 males, Mage = 
5.63 years, SD = 0.82 years) Additional N = 36 preschoolers were excluded 
from analyses due to insufficient gaze recordings (because of interruptions in 
the kindergarten; looking away from the eye tracker; fatigue). Moreover, ten 
preschoolers were discarded from analyses due to turning out to be left-handed 
during the experiment (N = 7), and technical errors (N = 3). All parents were 
paid 7.50 Euro for participation and gave their informed consent prior to taking 
part. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the standards specified 
in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
2.1.2 Materials & Stimuli 
The identical stimuli (video clips, AVI format, 25 Hz, 1280 x 1024 pixels, 
duration between 8 – 11 s) as in the first study (section 2.3.2) were used, except 
for two further video clips showing two more non-completion conditions of the 
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block stacking task. These two further non-completions trials were added in 
order to capture preschoolers’ attention. Hereby, the agent put two or three 
wooden blocks on top of each other, but when the second last or last block 
arrived at its goal position the block beyond it unexpectedly disappeared (see 
Figure 10). After that, the agent transported the block back to its starting 
position and subsequently, the video clip ended.  
 
Figure 10. Video stimuli showing agent performing a block stacking task in new non-
completion trials. a. Starting position of grasping movement 4, b. Goal position of grasping 
movement 4; block 3 disappeared, c. Starting position of grasping movement 3, d. Goal 
position of grasping movement 3; block 2 disappeared. 
These two further video clips were again digitally edited such that a central 
fixation point was added for 2,000 ms, followed by a still frame for 2,000 ms at 
the beginning of each video. At the end of each video-clip, while the agent 
transports the block back to the starting position, a fade-out effect was added 
for 1,000 ms with the scene becoming increasingly darker until a completely 
black screen was visible. Furthermore, the original sounds of the recordings 
were again discarded. However, an artificial sound (‘blopp’, 200 ms) was 
added to the lifting movement of each wooden block and a further artificial 
sound (‘blopp’, 300 ms) was added when the block disappeared. All non-
completion trials were excluded from analysis as they only served the purpose 
to keep the preschoolers alert during the experiment. An image (.jpg format, 
1280 x 1024 pixels) showing a huge yellow smiley in front of a black 
background with a duration of 5,000 ms served as a further attention grabber. 
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Eye movements were recorded by means of a Tobii T60 eye tracker (17” TFT 
Monitor, sampling rate 60 Hz, accuracy 0.4°, Tobii, Sweden, Stockholm) 
during the observation of the experimental videos. The presentation of all 
stimuli and gaze recordings were controlled by Tobii Studio™ (Version 
2.3.2.0).  
Material for subject-performed tasks was also identical to that used in the first 
study. It consisted of four wooden blocks with different lengths (L = 2.5 cm / 
3.5 cm / 4.5 cm / 5.5 cm) but same height (H = 2.5 cm) and width (W = 2.5 
cm) in order to perform the block stacking task. Furthermore, three simple 
puzzles (SIMM toys) were applied for the puzzles intervention. Puzzles 
consisted of four single wooden pieces, consistently recolored in blue, showing 
three animals (ladybug, elephant, and dolphin), and a wooden inlay form (L = 
14.5 cm, W = 18 cm, H = 2.5 cm) in which the pieces should be placed (see 
Attachment C). Although puzzle pieces differed in shape from the wooden 
blocks of the block stacking task, they were of comparable size and weight. 
Manual dexterity was assessed by the Manual Dexterity Scale for 3-6 year old 
children of the Movement Assessment Battery for Children (M-ABC-
2(Petermann, 2011), which consists of three manual tasks (Posting Coins, 
Threading Beads, Bicycle Trail I).  
2.1.3 Experimental Procedure 
Preschoolers were either tested at their day nursery or were invited to the lab at 
the Developmental Psychology Unit at Saarland University and tested during 
an individual experimental session lasting approximately 45 minutes. 
Preschoolers were seated at a desk 60 cm in front of the Tobii T60 eye tracker 
and the entire session was video-recorded. The session started with the 
experimenter narrating a cover story (see Attachment A & B) in order to catch 
the preschoolers’ attention, to introduce the block stacking task and to explain 
the task concerning the incompletion-trials: preschoolers were asked to sound a 
horn as fast as possible whenever they saw one of the incompletion-trials occur 
during the presentation of the experimental stimuli. This task was implemented 
in order to keep the preschoolers attentive during the presentation of the 
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stimuli. Afterwards, four practice trials (2 test trials, 2 non-completion trials) 
were presented in order to familiarize the preschoolers with the task. Unless 
preschoolers were able to correctly detect the non-completion trials and 
consequently sound the horn, the four practice trials were repeated once and 
preschoolers were given feedback about when to sound the horn correctly. 
Preschoolers were instructed to pay full attention to the upcoming videos and 
to keep their hands still during the presentation of the stimuli. Subsequently, 
the experiment proceeded with the first eye tracking phase in which the 
preschoolers should passively observe ten experimental stimuli (6 test trials, 4 
non-completion trials) in a randomized order. After five stimuli an attention 
grabber (smiley image) occurred for five seconds during which the preschooler 
was verbally praised, reminded to be attentive and encouraged that already half 
of the task was accomplished.  
After completing the pretest, preschoolers were asked to perform either the 
block stacking task in a backhand or forehand movement or puzzles in a 
backhand or forehand movement. The block stacking task entailed stacking 
four wooden blocks on top of each other in order to build up a tower. Hereby, 
the four wooden blocks were lined up either at a right or left location 10 cm in 
front of the preschoolers. Locations were determined by two red dots with a 
distance of 30 cm in-between. In the starting position, the widest block was 
placed on one of the two red dots and the shorter ones were lined up pointing to 
the space between the two dots. Preschoolers were asked to build a tower on 
either the left or right dot (depending on the starting position) with their right 
hand only. Therefore, they either performed a forehand stacking movement or 
a backhand stacking movement. The puzzle intervention involved three simple 
wooden puzzles. The setup for puzzles was similar to that applied to the block 
stacking task with puzzle pieces lining up either at the right or left red dot 
pointing to the space between the two dots. The only difference between 
puzzles and the block stacking task was that the order of Puzzle pieces was 
randomized for every trial and child. Therefore, compared to the block stacking 
task, the puzzles have not been completed in a fixed sequence, but instead with 
a new sequence in each repetition. Both the block stacking task and the puzzles 
were performed ten times. Hereby, both tasks should be performed five times 
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as accurately as possible and five times as fast and accurately as possible in a 
blocked manner. During the puzzle task, one of the three puzzles was randomly 
applied for each of the aforementioned instructions.  
Following the intervention phase, the second eye-tracking phase took place, in 
which preschoolers again passively observed ten experimental trials (6 test 
trials, 4 non-completion trials) in a randomized order, with the attention 
grabber (smiley image) occurring after the fifth stimulus. Preschoolers were 
again instructed to pay full attention to the videos, to keep their hands still, 
while observing how the tower was built up and to sound the horn whenever a 
non-completion trial occurred.  
After completing the second eye tracking phase, the Manual Dexterity Scale of 
the Movement Assessment Battery for Children (M-ABC-2; Petermann, 2011) 
was applied. First, preschoolers were asked to perform the Bicycle Trail I task, 
in which they should trace a narrow outline with a red pen without crossing the 
black border lines. For the case that the preschoolers made errors during the 
first trail (crossing the black border) a second attempt was carried out. The 
attempt with the least errors was considered for analyses, with errors of that 
attempt summed up into one score. Second, preschoolers performed the 
Posting Coins task in which they should insert game coins into a bank box with 
both hands successively, beginning with their dominant hand. Importantly, 3- 
and 4-year-old children had to insert six coins into the bank box with both 
hands successively, whereas 5- and 6-year-old children had to insert twelve 
coins into the bank box with both hands successively. Completion time was 
measured by using a stopwatch. Third, preschoolers performed the Threading 
Beads task, in which they should thread cubic beads on a string. Beads were 
initially lined up in front of the preschooler and had to be threaded one-by-one 
on the string. Again, 3- and 4-year-old children had to thread six beads on the 
string, whereas 5- and 6-year-old children had to thread twelve beads on the 
string. Completion time was measured by using a stopwatch. 
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2.1.4 Data Analyses 
Gaze recordings of the six test trials were analyzed in the same way as in our 
first study by using purpose-written software (Python™). Each test trial 
consisted of four single grasping movements. We therefore calculated gaze 
latencies for each grasping movement in each test trial. Latencies were 
calculated as the difference of the first fixation time on the area of interest 
(AOI) and the placement time of the wooden block at the goal position. 
Negative values indicate that preschoolers’ gaze arrived prior to the hand; 
positive values indicate that gaze arrived at the goal AOI after the block was 
placed there.  
For each grasping movement a maximum of six data points could be reached 
(one per trial). Preschoolers’ data was completely discarded when having less 
than three data points (because of insufficient gaze recordings due to no AOI-
directed gaze behavior, or looking away from the eye tracker) in more than two 
grasping movements (N = 36). Further, the first grasping movement (the 
movement of the first block) showed a high number of missing values (57.3 % 
during pretest, 66.5 % during posttest) and a high number of reactive saccades 
with latencies higher than 100 ms (25.1 % during pretest, 18.4 % during 
posttest), thus, it was entirely discarded from analyses. This finding is in line 
with our first study and Flanagan and Johansson (2003) demonstrating that 
participants’ gaze shifts were delayed during the first grasping movement when 
observing another person performing a block stacking task. 
Moreover, reactive gaze with latencies higher than 100 ms (6.33 % of pretest 
trials and in 6.67 % of posttest trials) was discarded from analysis in the 
remaining grasping movements, as our purpose was to investigate the impact of 
manual experience on anticipatory eye movements only. This procedure was 
already applied within the first study of this thesis. We assumed that saccades 
with latencies up to 100 ms are planned and elicited already during the on-
going grasping movement (Land, 2009; Smit & Van Gisbergen, 1989) and 
therefore originated from an underlying anticipatory process (Mehta & Schaal, 
2002; Wells & Barnes, 1998), as already discussed in the first study. 
108     STUDY III: EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE IN DEVELOPMENT  
 
Finally, comparable to our first study, we again excluded remaining grasping 
movements having less than three data points after the exclusion of latencies > 
100 ms from analyses (5.49 % during pretest, 1.11 % during posttest). 
Following this procedure, N = 49 preschoolers remained having sufficient (at 
least three data points) data for all three grasping movements in pre- and 
posttest and N = 27 preschoolers having sufficient data in two of three grasping 
movements in pre- and posttest. Therefore, N = 76 preschoolers could be 
considered for statistical analyses. However, N = 9 preschoolers had to be 
discarded from statistical analyses due to having insufficient (less than three 
data points) data in more than two grasping movements in pre- or posttest trials 
after the exclusion of reactive saccades (with latencies > 100 ms).  
For statistical analyses, we calculated mean gaze latencies for grasping 
movements over trials, resulting in three mean gaze latency values for the 
pretest and three mean gaze latency values for the posttest. Those values were 
further averaged into one score for pretest and one score for posttest for each 
preschooler. Moreover, we calculated mean percentage scores of anticipatory 
eye movements for each grasping movement over trials, resulting in three mean 
percentage values for pretest and posttest. 
Raw scores of the Manual Dexterity Scale of the Movement Assessment 
Battery for Children (M-ABC-2; Petermann, 2011) were converted into three 
standard scores (M = 10, SD = 3). 
Statistics were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics (version 20.0). The level 
for significance was sat at α = 0.05 and effect sizes were calculated using 
Cohen´s d for independent-samples t-tests and partial eta-squared (ηP²) values 
for ANOVAs.  
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Latencies 
On average, preschoolers’ gaze preceded the subgoals of the block stacking 
task with a latency of M = -277.2 ms, SD = 110.3 ms and M = -282.1 ms, SD = 
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90.3 ms during pretest trials and posttest trials, respectively (see Table 3). An 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with the between-subject factor Group (4) was 
calculated to compare mean gaze latencies for pretest trials between the four 
experimental groups. No significant main effect of Group for mean latencies of 
pretest trials was obtained (F(3,72) = 2.47, p  = .07, ηP² = .09), indicating that 
all groups  had comparable mean gaze latencies during pretest trials.  
Table 3. Summary of means and standard deviations for gaze latencies 
 
 
 
aBST_F 
M 
 (SD) 
bBST_B 
M  
(SD) 
bPuzzle_F 
M  
(SD) 
cPuzzle_B 
M  
(SD) 
Pre -226.2 
(106.3) 
-309.1  
(95.0) 
-271.8 
(92.6) 
-305.2 
(131.9) 
 
Post 
 
 
-252.3 
(106.0) 
 
-293.4 
(88.9) 
 
-287.6 
(76.9) 
 
-297.5 
(85.6) 
Note. BST = Block Stacking Task; F = forehand; B = backhand M = Mean (in ms); SD = 
Standard Deviation (in ms). 
aN = 20; bN = 19; cN = 18 
Preschoolers anticipated (latencies up to 100 ms) the subgoals of the block 
stacking task in 76.4 % of trials during pretest and 75.4 % of trials during 
posttest. A 3 (Grasping Movement) x 2 (Pre/Post) repeated measures 
MANOVA with both factors as within-subject factors was calculated to 
compare mean percentage values of anticipatory saccades over grasping 
movements during pre- and posttest. A significant main effect of Grasping 
Movement for mean percentage of anticipatory saccades was revealed (Wilks’ 
Ʌ = .45, F(2,83) = 50.5, p < .001, ηP² = .55), whereas no significant main for 
effect for Pre/Post (Wilks’ Ʌ = 1.0, F(1,84) = 0.32, p = .57, ηP² = .00), and no 
significant interaction between both factors was obtained (Wilks’ Ʌ = .96, F = 
1.97, p = .15, ηP² = .05). The percentage of preschoolers’ anticipatory saccades 
increased over grasping movements comparably in pre- and posttest (see Table 
4).  
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Table 4. Mean percentage of anticipatory saccades during pre- and posttest 
 GM2 
M (SD) 
GM3 
M (SD) 
GM4 
M (SD) 
Pre 64.3 (26.5) 75.7 (24.6) 89.2 (18.5) 
Post 59.2 (28.7) 75.3 (21.9) 91.6 (12.8) 
Note. GM = Grasping Movement; M = Mean (percentage); SD = Standard Deviation 
(percentage).  
2.2.2 Congruency Conditions 
Two independent-samples t-tests (two-tailed) on the pre-post difference 
(Diff_Score) were applied in order to test any differences for the backhand and 
forehand conditions in the block stacking task groups and puzzle groups. Pre-
post differences (Diff_Score) did not significantly differ for anatomically and 
spatially congruent conditions in both block stacking task groups (t(37) = 1.43, 
p = .16 , d = .46, Forehand: M = -25.6 ms, SD = 73.5 ms; Backhand: M = 15.7 
ms, SD = 105.1 ms) and puzzle groups (t(35) = .72, p = .47 , d = .24, 
Forehand: M = -15.7 ms, SD = 70.9 ms; Backhand: M = 7.72 ms, SD = 121.1 
ms). Therefore, both block stacking task groups and both puzzle groups were 
combined for further analyses. 
2.2.3 Manual Experience 
A 2 (Pre/Post) x 3 (Grasping Movement) x 2 (Group) repeated measures 
MANOVA with the first two factors as within-subject factors and the third one 
as a between-subject factor was applied on mean gaze latencies to test whether 
the subject-performed tasks led to group differences in the ability to anticipate 
the action goal during the posttest. Results revealed a significant main effect 
for Grasping Movement (Wilks´Ʌ = .30, F(2,45) = 51.7, p < .001, ηP² = .70), 
but no significant main effect for Pre/Post (Wilks’ Ʌ = 1.0, F(1,46) = .01, p = 
.92, ηP² = .00) or Group (F(1,46) = 2.14, p = .15, ηP² = .05), indicating that 
preschoolers’ gaze latencies became significantly shorter over grasping 
movements but did not differ between pre- and posttest trials or groups. The 
predicted interaction between the factors Group and Pre/Post was not 
significant (Wilks’ Ʌ = .98, F(1,46) = .90, p = .35, ηP² = .02), indicating that 
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pre-post differences of mean gaze latencies were comparable for both groups. 
All other interactions were non-significant (all Wilks’ Ʌ > .98, F < .69, p > .51, 
ηP² < .03). Due to missing values in several grasping movements, N = 27 
preschoolers could not be considered for the aforementioned analysis. Hence, a 
further 2 (Pre/Post) x 2 (Group) repeated measures MANOVA was calculated 
on averaged mean gaze latency values over grasping movements for pre- and 
posttest. Results again revealed no significant main effect of Pre/Post (Wilks’ 
Ʌ = 1.0, F(1,74) = .21, p = .65, ηP² = .003) or Group (F(1,74) = 1.0, p = .32, 
ηP² = .01). Furthermore, the predicted interaction between the factors Pre/Post 
and Group remained non-significant (Wilks’ Ʌ = 1.0, F(1,74) = .003, p = .96, 
ηP² = .00), again indicating that pre-post differences of mean gaze latencies 
were comparable for both groups. 
2.2.4 Age 
In order to investigate whether preschoolers’ ability to anticipate the action 
goals of the block stacking task improves with increasing age, a bivariate 
correlation (one-tailed) between mean gaze latencies of pretest trials and 
preschoolers’ age was calculated. Results revealed no significant correlation 
(Pearson’s r(76) = .05, p = .34), indicating that the ability to anticipate the 
action goals of the block stacking task during observation does not improve 
with increasing age between four and six years.  
We further investigated the relationship between preschoolers’ age and the pre-
post difference of mean gaze latencies by calculating a bivariate correlation 
(one-tailed). Results revealed no significant correlation, Pearson’s r(76) = -.01, 
p = .48., indicating that preschoolers between four to six years did not show a 
larger pre-post difference with increasing age.   
2.2.5 Manual Dexterity 
On average, preschoolers made less than two mistakes in the Bicycle Trail I 
task (M = 1.78, SD = 2.27). Completing the Posting Coins task with the 
dominant hand and the non-dominant hand took M = 18.56 sec, SD = 5.15 sec 
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and M = 21.56 sec, SD = 6.01 sec, respectively. On average, preschoolers 
completed the Threading Beads task in M = 50.02 sec, SD = 14.74 sec.  
The relationship between manual dexterity and anticipatory eye movements 
was analyzed by calculating correlations (Pearson’s r) between latencies of 
pretest trials and standard scores of the Manual Skills Scale (M-ABC-2). On 
average, preschoolers reached a mean of M = 8.09 points, SD = 3.27 points 
(range: 1 - 14 points) in the Posting Coins task with the dominant hand and M 
= 7.16 points, SD = 3.71 points (range: 1 – 14 points) with the non-dominant 
hand. Further, preschoolers achieved M = 8.22 points, SD = 2.98 points (range: 
1 – 14 points) in the Threading Beads task and M = 8.42 points, SD = 3.88 
points (range: 1 – 13 points) in the Bicycle Trail I task. Results revealed no 
significant correlations between the standard scores of the Manual Dexterity 
Scale and mean gaze latencies of pretest trials, all r(76) ≤ .18, p ≥ .13. 
2.3 Discussion  
The aim of the first experiment was to investigate the influence of short-term 
experience on predictive eye movements during action observation in 
preschoolers aged four to six years. Results showed that preschoolers in this 
age group are able to anticipate the action goals during the observation of a 
manually performed grasping action. Moreover, we found that the percentage 
of anticipatory saccades increased over grasping movements, meaning that 
preschoolers seemed to be able to make predictions more easily when the 
action is approaching its final goal. However, in contrast to our study with 
adults, we were not able to show an influence of short-term experience on 
predictive eye movements within this age group, neither for experience with 
the block stacking task nor for experience with puzzles. Furthermore, we could 
not find a relationship between age or manual dexterity and the ability to 
anticipate action goals or the influence of short-term experience on anticipatory 
eye movements, respectively. This indicates that the ability to predict action 
goals seems to remain stable from four to six years of age, and moreover, it 
seems that fine motor skills do not have an influence on the ability to predict 
action goals during observation. This finding is in line with our first study, 
STUDY III: EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE IN DEVELOPMENT     113 
showing that adults’ manual dexterity did not relate to their ability to predict 
the action goals during observation.  
In the second experiment, we investigated whether short-term experience had 
an influence on predictive eye movements during action observation in school 
children aged eight to ten years. 
3 Experiment 2: Children (8-10 years) 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
Eighteen (N = 9 males) school children aged eight to ten years (Mage = 9.48 
years, SD = 0.77 years, Range: 8.00 – 10.42 years) were considered for 
analyses in the present experiment. All children were right-handed and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were tested at Saarland University. 
All children were assigned to the block stacking task forehand condition. 
Additional four children were excluded from analyses due to not reaching 
analyses criteria (N = 2), turning out to be left-handed during the experiment 
(N = 1), or experimenter errors (N = 1). All parents were paid 7.50 Euro for 
participation and gave their informed consent prior to taking part. The 
experiment was conducted in accordance with the standards specified in the 
1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
3.1.2 Materials & Stimuli 
The identical stimuli as in the previous experiment were used. Eye movements 
were again recorded by means of a Tobii T60 eye tracker (17” TFT Monitor, 
sampling rate 60 Hz, accuracy 0.4°, Tobii, Sweden, Stockholm) during the 
observation of the experimental videos. The presentation of all stimuli and gaze 
recordings were controlled by Tobii Studio™ (Version 2.3.2.0). 
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Manual dexterity was assessed by the Manual Dexterity Scale for 7-10 year old 
children of the Movement Assessment Battery for Children (M-ABC-2, 
Petermann, 2011), which consists of three manual tasks (Placing Pegs, 
Threading Lace, Bicycle Trail II).  
3.1.3 Experimental Procedure 
The experimental procedure was the same as in the previous experiment with 
the exception of the tasks performed within the Manual Dexterity Scale of the 
Movement Assessment Battery for Children (M-ABC-2; Petermann, 2011). 
Children were asked to perform the Bicycle Trail II task, a drawing task in 
which children should trace a narrow outline with a red pen without crossing 
the black border lines. For the case that the children made errors during the 
first trail (crossing the black border) a second attempt was carried out. The 
attempt with the least errors was considered for analyses, with errors of that 
attempt summed up into one score. Second, children should place pegs onto a 
plug board with both hands successively, beginning with their dominant hand. 
Completion time was measured by using a stopwatch. Third, children should 
thread a lace into a perforated plate. The plate contained eight holes and the 
child's task was to thread the rope alternately from above or beyond the plate 
through the holes. Completion time was measured by using a stopwatch. 
3.1.4 Data Analyses 
Gaze recordings of the six test trials were analyzed in the same way as in the 
first experiment by using purpose-written software (Python™). Again, 
children’s data was completely discarded when having less than three data 
points in more than two grasping movements (N = 2). Further, the first 
grasping movement (the movement of the first block) showed again a high 
number of missing values (46.3 % during pretest, 47.2 % during posttest) and a 
high number of reactive saccades with latencies higher than 100 ms (16.7 % 
during pretest, 13.0 % during posttest), thus, it was entirely discarded from 
analyses. 
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Moreover, reactive saccades with latencies higher than 100 ms (3.70 % of 
pretest trials and in 1.85 % of posttest trials) were discarded from analysis in 
the remaining grasping movements as well, for the same reasons already 
discussed in the first experiment. Finally, we excluded remaining grasping 
movements having less than three data points after the exclusion of latencies > 
100 ms from analyses (0.03 % during pretest, 0.00 % during posttest). 
Following this procedure, N = 15 children remained having sufficient (at least 
three data points) data for all three grasping movements in pre- and posttest 
and N = 3 preschoolers having sufficient data in two of three grasping 
movements in pre- and posttest. Therefore, N = 18 children could be 
considered for statistical analyses. 
For statistical analyses, we again calculated mean gaze latencies for grasping 
movements over trials, resulting in three mean gaze latency values for the 
pretest and three mean values for the posttest. Those values were further 
averaged into one score for pretest and one score for posttest for each child. 
Additionally, we calculated mean percentage scores of anticipatory eye 
movements for each grasping movement over trials, resulting in three mean 
percentage values for pretest and posttest. 
Raw scores of the Manual Dexterity Scale of the Movement Assessment 
Battery for Children (M-ABC-2; Petermann, 2011) were converted into three 
standard scores (M = 10, SD = 3). 
Statistics were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics (version 20.0). The level 
for significance was sat at α = 0.05 and effect sizes were calculated using 
Cohen´s d for independent-samples t-tests and partial eta-squared (ηP²) values 
for ANOVAs.  
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Latencies 
On average, children’s gaze preceded the subgoals of the block stacking task 
with a mean latency of M = -341.3 ms, SD = 74.7 ms and M = -347.2 ms, SD = 
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88.2 ms during pretest trials and posttest trials, respectively. Children 
anticipated (with latencies up to 100 ms) the subgoals of the block stacking 
task in 88.2 % of trials during pretest and 86.4 % of trials during posttest. A 3 
(Grasping Movement) x 2 (Pre/Post) repeated measures MANOVA with both 
factors as within-subject factors was calculated to compare mean percentage 
values of anticipatory saccades over grasping movements during pre- and 
posttest. No significant main effect of Grasping Movement for mean 
percentage of anticipatory saccades (Wilks’ Ʌ = .78, F(2,16) = 2.29, p = .13, 
ηP² = .22), no significant main effect of Pre/Post (Wilks’ Ʌ = .99, F(1,17) = 
0.14, p = .72, ηP² = .01), and no significant interaction between both factors 
were obtained (Wilks’ Ʌ = .93, F(2,16) = 0.58, p = .57, ηP² = .07). The 
percentage of children’s of anticipatory saccades did not increase over grasping 
movements and were comparable in pre- and posttest (see Table 5).  
Table 5. Mean percentage of anticipatory saccades during pre- and posttest 
 GM2 
M (SD) 
GM3 
M (SD) 
GM4 
M (SD) 
Pre 80.5 (21.6) 90.7 (20.0) 93.5 (11.6) 
Post 82.4 (21.0) 88.9 (18.1) 88.0 (23.4) 
Note. GM = Grasping Movement; M = Mean (in percentage); SD = Standard Deviation. 
3.2.2 Manual Experience 
A 2 (Pre/Post) x 3 (Grasping Movement) repeated measures MANOVA with 
both factors as within-subject factors was applied on mean gaze latencies to 
test whether experience with the block stacking task led to differences in the 
ability to anticipate the action goal during the posttest. Results revealed a 
significant main effect for Grasping Movement (Wilks´ Ʌ = .41, F(2,12) = 
8.53, p = .005, ηP² = .59), but no significant main effect for Pre/Post (Wilks’ Ʌ 
= 1.0, F(1,13) = .003, p = .96, ηP² = .00), indicating that children’s gaze 
latencies became significantly shorter over grasping movements but did not 
differ between pre- and posttest trials. An interaction between the factors 
Grasping Movement and Pre/Post was non-significant (Wilks’ Ʌ = .68, F = 
2.8, p = .10, ηP² = .32).  
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3.2.3 Manual Dexterity 
On average, children made less than two mistakes in the Bicycle Trail II task 
(M = 1.11, SD = 1.23). Completing the Placing Pegs task with the dominant 
hand and the non-dominant hand took M = 28.06 sec, SD = 3.81 sec and M = 
31.61 sec, SD = 6.09 sec, respectively. On average, children completed the 
Threading Lace task in M = 22.11 sec, SD = 4.31 sec.  
The relationship between manual dexterity and anticipatory eye movements 
was analyzed by calculating correlations (Pearson’s r) between latencies of 
pretest trials and standard scores of the Manual Skills Scale (M-ABC-2). On 
average, children reached a mean of M = 7.22 points, SD = 3.34 points (range: 
1 - 11 points) in the Bicycle Trail II task. Further, children achieved a standard 
mean of M = 8.33 points, SD = 2.57 points (range: 3 - 13 points) in the Placing 
Pegs task with the dominant hand and M = 9.06 points, SD = 2.92 points 
(range: 4 – 14 points) with the non-dominant hand. In the Threading Lace task, 
children achieved M = 10.72 points, SD = 2.54 points (range: 6 – 14 points). 
Results revealed no significant correlations between the standard scores of the 
Manual Dexterity Scale and latencies of pretest trials, all  r(18) ≤ .34, p ≥ .17. 
3.3 Discussion 
The aim of the second experiment was to investigate the influence of short-
term experience on predictive eye movements during action observation in 
school children aged eight to ten years. Results showed that children in this age 
group are able to anticipate the action goals during the observation of a 
manually performed grasping action. However, we were again not able to show 
an influence of short-term experience with a block stacking task on predictive 
eye movements within this age group. Furthermore, we could not find a 
relationship between manual dexterity and the ability to anticipate action goals 
or the influence of short-term experience on anticipatory eye movements, 
respectively. This again indicates that manual fine motor skills do not have an 
influence on the ability to predict action goals during observation.   
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In the third experiment, we investigated whether short-term experience had an 
influence on predictive eye movements during action observation in teenagers 
aged 11 to 14 years. 
4 Experiment 3: Teenagers (11-14 years) 
4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-eight teenagers aged 11-14 years (Mage = 13.08 years, SD = 1.15 years, 
Range: 11.33 – 14.92 years) were considered for statistical analyses in the 
present experiment. All teenagers were right-handed and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were tested at Saarland University. Each 
teenager was assigned to one of two experimental conditions (1. Block 
Stacking Task_forehand, N = 19, 5 males, Mage = 13.01 years, SD = 1.13 years; 
2. Puzzle_forehand, N = 19, 8 males, Mage = 13.15 years, SD = 1.19 years). 
Additional N = 13 teenagers were excluded from analyses due to insufficient 
gaze recordings (N = 7), turning out to be left-handed during the experiment (N 
= 3), experimenter errors (N = 1) or other reasons (N = 2). All parents were 
paid 7.50 Euro for participation and gave their informed consent prior to taking 
part. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the standards specified 
in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
4.1.2 Materials & Stimuli 
The identical stimuli as in the first two experiments were used. Eye movements 
were again recorded by means of a Tobii T60 eye tracker (17” TFT Monitor, 
sampling rate 60 Hz, accuracy 0.4°, Tobii, Sweden, Stockholm) during the 
observation of the experimental videos. The presentation of all stimuli and gaze 
recordings were controlled by Tobii Studio™ (Version 2.3.2.0). 
Manual dexterity was assessed by the Manual Dexterity Scale for 11-16 year 
old children of the Movement Assessment Battery for Children (M-ABC-2; 
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Petermann, 2011), which consists of three manual tasks (Turning Pegs, 
Triangle with Nuts and Bolts, Bicycle Trail III).  
4.1.3 Experimental Procedure 
The experimental procedure was the same to that in the previous two 
experiments with the exception, that the cover story was omitted. However, 
teenagers were also asked to sound the horn, whenever they saw a non-
completion trial. 
Moreover, teenagers performed the Manual Dexterity Scale of the Movement 
Assessment Battery for Children (M-ABC-2; Petermann, 2011) for 11-16 year 
old teenagers. Teenagers were asked to perform the Bicycle Trail III task, a 
drawing task in which they should trace a narrow outline with a red pen 
without crossing the black border lines. For the case that the teenagers made 
errors during the first trail (crossing the black border) a second attempt was 
carried out. The attempt with the least errors was considered for analyses, with 
errors of that attempt summed up into one score. Second, teenagers should turn 
pegs which were sticking in a plug board with both hands successively, 
beginning with their dominant hand. Completion time was measured by using a 
stopwatch. Third, teenagers should build a triangle from given material (three 
side parts, three bolts and three nuts) with both hands. Completion time was 
measured by using a stopwatch. 
4.1.4 Data Analyses 
Gaze recordings of the six test trials were analyzed in the same way as in the 
previous two experiments by using purpose-written software (Python™).  
Again, teenagers’ data was completely discarded when having less than three 
data points in more than two grasping movements (N = 2). Further, the first 
grasping movement (the movement of the first block) showed again a high 
number of missing values (22.4 % during pretest, 26.3 % during posttest) and a 
high number of reactive saccades with latencies higher than 100 ms (16.2 % 
during pretest, 17.1 % during posttest), thus, it was entirely discarded from 
analyses. 
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Moreover, reactive saccades with latencies higher than 100 ms (0.15 % of 
pretest trials and in 1.32 % of posttest trials) were discarded from analysis in 
the remaining grasping movements as well, for the same reasons discussed 
before. No grasping movements occurred having less than three data points 
after the exclusion of latencies > 100 ms from analyses; therefore, no further 
data had to be excluded. Following this procedure, N = 38 teenagers remained 
having sufficient (at least three data points) data for all three grasping 
movements in pre- and posttest and could be considered for statistical analyses. 
For statistical analyses, we again calculated mean gaze latencies for grasping 
movements over trials, resulting in three mean gaze latency values for the 
pretest and three mean values for the posttest. Those values were further 
averaged into one score for pretest and one score for posttest for each child. 
Additionally, we calculated mean percentage scores of anticipatory eye 
movements for each grasping movement over trials, resulting in three mean 
percentage values for pretest and posttest.  
Raw scores of the Manual Dexterity Scale of the Movement Assessment 
Battery for Children (M-ABC-2; Petermann, 2011) were converted into three 
standard scores (M = 10, SD = 3). 
Statistics were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics (version 20.0). The level 
for significance was sat at α = 0.05 and effect sizes were calculated using 
Cohen´s d for independent-samples t-tests and partial eta-squared (ηP²) values 
for ANOVAs.  
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Latencies 
On average, teenagers’ gaze preceded the subgoals of the block stacking task 
with a mean latency of M = -385.3 ms, SD = 68.2 ms and M = -392.6 ms, SD = 
64.4 ms during pretest trials and posttest trials, respectively (see Table 6). 
Teenagers anticipated (with latencies up to 100 ms)
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stacking task in 95.3 % of trials during pretest and 93.3 % of trials during 
posttest. 
Table 6. Summary of means and standard deviations for gaze latencies 
 
 
 
aBST_F 
 
M (SD) 
 
bPuzzle_F 
 
M (SD) 
Pre -387.9 (47.1)  -382.2 (85.6) 
 
Post 
 
 
-417.1 (49.5) 
 
 
 
-368.2 (69.2) 
Note. BST = Block Stacking Task; F = forehand;  M = Mean (in ms); SD = Standard Deviation 
(in ms). 
aN = 19; bN = 19 
A 3 (Grasping Movement) x 2 (Pre/Post) repeated measures MANOVA with 
both factors as within-subject factors was calculated to compare mean 
percentage values of anticipatory saccades over grasping movements during 
pre- and posttest. A significant main effect of Grasping Movement for mean 
percentage of anticipatory saccades (Wilks’ Ʌ = .84, F(2,36) = 3.47, p = .04, 
ηP² = .16) was revealed, whereas no significant main effect for Pre/Post was 
obtained (Wilks’ Ʌ = .96, F(1,37) = 1.72, p = .20, ηP² = .04). However, a 
significant interaction between the factors Grasping Movement and Pre/Post 
was revealed (Wilks’ Ʌ = .80, F(2,36)  = 4.49, p = .02, ηP² = .20). Post-hoc 
comparisons showed that mean percentage values of pre- and posttest differed 
significantly for the second grasping movement (t(37) = 2.49, p = .02, d = .44), 
whereas mean percentage values did not differ between pretest and posttest for 
the third (t(37) = -.62, p = .54, d = .06) and forth (t(37) = .00, p = 1.0, d = .00) 
grasping movement (see Table 7).  
Table 7. Mean percentage of anticipatory saccades during pre and posttest 
 GM2 
M (SD) 
GM3 
M (SD) 
GM4 
M (SD) 
Pre 95.6 (8.39) 96.1 (7.18) 94.3 (10.5) 
Post 89.9 (16.2) 95.6 (10.0) 94.3 (11.8) 
Note. GM = Grasping Movement; M = Mean (in percentage); SD = Standard Deviation. 
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4.2.2 Manual Experience 
A 2 (Pre/Post) x 3 (Grasping Movement) x 2 (Group) repeated measures 
MANOVA with the first both factors as within-subject factors and the third one 
as a between-subject factor was applied on mean gaze latencies to test whether 
task-specific experience with the block stacking task led to differences in the 
ability to anticipate the action goals of the block stacking task during the 
observation of posttest trials. Results revealed a significant main effect for 
Grasping Movement (Wilks’ Ʌ = .70, F(2,35) = 7.45, p = .002, ηP² = .30), but 
no significant main effect for Pre/Post (Wilks’ Ʌ = .99, F(1,36) = .54, p = .47, 
ηP² = .02), or Group (F(1,36) = 2.20, p = .15, ηP² = .06), indicating that 
teenagers’ gaze latencies became significantly shorter over grasping 
movements but did not differ between pre- and posttest trials and groups. 
However, the predicted interaction between the factors Pre/Post and Group 
was significant (Wilks’ Ʌ = .89, F(1,36)= 4.51, p = .041, ηP² = .11). Planned 
comparisons revealed that the block stacking task group showed significantly 
shorter mean gaze latencies in posttest trials (t(18) = 2.51, p = .02, d = .60), 
whereas mean gaze values of the puzzle group did not differ between pre- and 
posttest (t(18) = -.83, p = .42, d = .29, see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. Mean gaze latencies for pre- and posttest averaged over grasping movements 
(except grasping movement 1) for both experimental conditions. BST = Block Stacking Task. 
Vertical bars indicate standard errors. *p < 0.05. n.s. = p > .05. 
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4.2.3 Manual Dexterity 
On average, teenagers made less than two mistakes in the bicycle trail III task, 
M = 1.76, SD = 2.52. Completing the turning pegs task with the dominant hand 
and the non-dominant hand took M = 23.3 sec, SD = 4.59 sec and M = 24.6 sec, 
SD = 4.84 sec, respectively. On average, teenagers completed the Triangle task 
in M = 51.1 sec, SD = 16.0 sec.  
The relationship between manual dexterity and anticipatory eye movements 
was analyzed by calculating correlations (Pearson’s r) between latencies of 
pretest trials and standard scores of the Manual Skills Scale (M-ABC-2). On 
average, teenagers reached a mean of M = 9.13 points, SD = 3.17 points (range: 
1 - 13 points) in the Bicycle trail III task. Further, teenagers achieved a 
standard mean of M = 6.50 points, SD = 3.49 points (range: 1 - 16 points) in 
the Turning Pegs task with the dominant hand and M = 8.05 points, SD = 2.85 
points (range: 1 – 15 points) with the non-dominant hand. In the Triangle task, 
teenagers achieved M = 6.71 points, SD = 2.82 points (range: 1 – 12 points). 
Results revealed no significant correlations between the standard scores of the 
Manual Dexterity Scale and latencies of pretest trials, all  r(38) ≤ .26, p ≥ .116. 
4.3 Discussion 
The aim of the third experiment was to investigate the influence of short-term 
experience on predictive eye movements during action observation in teenagers 
aged 11 to 14 years. The most salient finding of this experiment was that 
teenagers who performed the block stacking task directed their gaze 
significantly faster to action goals during post-test trials, compared to teenagers 
who performed puzzles, indicating the influence of task-specific short-term 
experience on anticipatory eye movements. In accordance with the previous 
two experiments and the study with adults, we could not find a relationship 
between manual dexterity and the ability to anticipate action goals or the 
influence of short-term experience on anticipatory eye movements, 
respectively. This again indicates that manual fine motor skills do not have an 
influence on the ability to predict action goals during observation.   
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5 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the influence of task-specific 
short-term experience on the ability to predict action goals of the same or a 
similar action during observation in children. Moreover, we aimed to 
disentangle whether the impact of short-term experience on action 
understanding would change during childhood. To this end, we investigated 
three age groups of children (4-6 years, 8-10 years, and 11-14 years) with a 
pre-post design using eye tracking. First, children observed short video clips of 
an actor performing a block stacking task. Subsequently, they either performed 
the same block stacking task or puzzles. For preschoolers, the block stacking 
task and puzzles were performed in two different congruency conditions 
(anatomically congruent / spatially congruent). For the other two age groups, 
only the spatially congruent condition was performed. Finally, children again 
observed the same video clips shown during the pre-test. No significant effect 
of spatial or anatomical congruency could be found between both block 
stacking task groups and both puzzle groups in preschoolers, indicating that the 
execution of a congruent or incongruent anatomical movement (backhand vs. 
forehand) did not affect the ability to predict action goals. This finding is in 
line with our first study indicating that the different congruency conditions did 
not influence the ability to predict action goals. As already discussed in the 
study with adults, this finding is in correspondence with studies showing sparse 
influence of postural congruency between the observer and the agent on 
behavioral results (Alaerts, Heremans, et al., 2009; Alaerts, Swinnen, et al., 
2009; Urgesi et al., 2006) and on motor resonance (Sartori et al., 2013). This 
illustrates that a direct matching mechanism flexibly transforms others’ 
movement features into the observer’s optimal motor commands.  
Concerning action understanding, we were able to show that children from four 
years up to 14 years of age are able to understand others’ grasping actions 
indicated by goal-directed predictive eye movements during observation of the 
block stacking task. This finding is in accordance with several other studies 
showing that even infants are able to anticipate the action goals of others’ 
actions (e.g., Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010). 
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However, our data suggests that although preschoolers are able to anticipate the 
subgoals of a block stacking task, the percentage of anticipated subgoals 
increases with the course of the ongoing action, indicating that preschoolers are 
more likely able to predict later action steps compared to earlier action steps. 
This finding is in line with the predictive coding account (Kilner et al., 2007) 
which suggests that information about the ongoing action is continuously 
updated and integrated in the prediction process of ongoing actions. Hence, 
later action steps benefit from available information about prior action steps. 
However, in our studies, adults and children older than eight years were able to 
anticipate early action steps of the block stacking task to the same extent as 
later action steps. This might indicate that the prediction process of older 
children and adults is more proficient, whereas preschoolers seem to have more 
difficulties to represent the final action goal at early stages of the ongoing 
action. This interpretation makes sense in such ways that several studies have 
shown that the mirror neuron system adapts in relation to prior experience 
(e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that higher 
age is associated with a number of different experiences that modulate the 
functioning of the mirror neuron system which allows older children and adults 
to make more precise predictions at earlier steps of ongoing actions.  
The most important finding of this study was that short-term experience 
influenced anticipatory eye movements in teenagers between 11 and 14 years, 
but not in younger children. Teenagers who had performed the block stacking 
task showed shorter gaze latencies during post-test trials compared to teenagers 
who had performed puzzles. This finding is in line with our first study showing 
that short-term experience enables adult observers to predict the action goals of 
the same action faster. Moreover, the influence of experience on the ability to 
predict action goals has recently been reported in several studies for adults 
(e.g., Mulligan & Hodges, 2013) as well as infants (e.g., Sommerville et al., 
2005). In accordance with these studies, we assume that short-term experience 
enhances the activation of task-specific action programs which enable the 
observer to predict the action goals of the same action faster. Interestingly, only 
the oldest age group of the present study showed this effect, although even 
infants have been demonstrated to show an improved ability to understand 
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others’ actions after a period of own experience. This finding might be directly 
linked to the fact that the brain undergoes a fast and remarkable development 
within the first months of life. Hence, it might be the case that a short amount 
of experience is enough to modulate infants’ action-observation matching 
system, whereas the brain of preschoolers and young school children might be 
less sensitive to a brief period of training with grasping actions. Some authors 
suggest that the mirror neuron system – the neuronal substrate underlying 
action understanding – develops from infancy up to adolescence through 
pruning processes and through the influence of experience on the developing 
brain (Kilner & Blakemore, 2007). Thus, our data might reflect that the 
pruning of the mirror neuron system at the age of 11 years is proceeded so far, 
that it allows young teenagers to benefit even from a brief period of training 
during the observation of the same action. Another possible explanation could 
be that due to developmental changes of saccadic eye movements only the 
older age group was able to benefit from a short-term training. A study, 
investigating the development of saccadic eye movements in 6- to 15-year-old 
children with several paradigms reported that children’s latencies of saccadic 
eye movements became shorter with increasing age up until 12 years (Bucci & 
Seassau, 2012). In our study, the oldest age group comprised teenagers 
between 11 and 14 years, hence, the latencies of saccadic eye movements of 
this group were developed further than those of the other two age groups. It 
might be possible that the effect of task-specific experience only occurred in 
the oldest age group because their control of saccadic eye movements allowed 
them to produce faster saccades than during pretest trials, whereas preschoolers 
or young school children already reached their limit and could not produce 
faster eye movements. A third possible explanation might be that the amount of 
training was not sufficient enough for children between four to ten years to 
impact predictive eye movements during action observation. In order to verify 
or falsify this assumption further studies with varying amounts of training 
periods are necessary.  
In sum, the present study was able to show that children between four and 14 
years are able to predict action goals of observed actions, although 
developmental changes in the percentage of anticipated action goals became 
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apparent. Moreover, only teenagers between 11 to 14 years showed an effect of 
short-term experience in their ability to anticipate the action goals of the block 
stacking task. This might be due to developmental changes in the mirror 
neuron system, in the control of saccadic eye movements or due to a too short 
training period for the younger age groups. Further studies are necessary to 
investigate these possible explanations in a systematical manner. However, our 
study provides evidence that a direct matching process is already present in 
childhood and that anticipatory eye movements are strongly related to task-
specific action plans at least from the age of 11 years onwards.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion
The present dissertation aimed to investigate whether a relatively short amount 
of manual experience with an action would improve action understanding 
during the subsequent observation of the same action in adults and children.  
To this end, we conducted three studies in which we employed a block stacking 
task similar to that used in the prominent study by Flanagan and Johansson 
(2003) in a pre-post eye tracking design. During pre- and posttest, adults as 
well as children watched short video clips showing an actor performing the 
block stacking task. Intermediately, participants either performed the same 
block stacking task or one of two control tasks (puzzles or pursuit rotor task). 
We assumed that short-term experience with the block stacking task should 
activate task-specific action plans supporting a direct matching process during 
the observation of posttest trials. Further, puzzles were applied as a first control 
task with the purpose to activate similar action plans comparable to those of the 
block stacking task, as both the block stacking task and puzzles shared several 
features. In the study with adults, a second control task – a pursuit rotor task – 
was employed, which required participants to follow a moving red dot on a 
circular track with their index finger. We assumed that experience with the 
pursuit rotor task would activate action plans different from those activated by 
the block stacking task and puzzles, hence, not having an influence on action 
understanding during the observation of posttest trials.  
In the first two studies reported within this thesis, we aimed to investigate the 
impact of task-specific short-term experience on different measures of action 
understanding in adults. Specifically, we investigated whether a brief period of 
experience would affect anticipatory eye movements or pupil dilation during 
observation of the same action. In the third study, we took a closer look at the 
developmental course of action understanding by investigating whether the 
impact of short-term experience on anticipatory eye movements would change 
from early childhood to adolescence. 
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5.1 The Impact of Short-term Experience on Anticipatory Eye 
Movements 
Within the first and the third study of the present dissertation, we investigated 
the impact of task-specific short-term experience on anticipatory eye 
movements. The results of these two studies indicated that adults as well as 
children between four and 14 years showed anticipatory eye movements during 
the observation of someone else performing a block stacking task. This finding 
is in line with previous research which has shown that anticipatory eye 
movements occur during both action execution and action observation (Falck-
Ytter et al., 2006; Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Gesierich et al., 2008). Within 
these studies, anticipatory eye movements have been interpreted as indicators 
of activated action plans in the observer, or in other words, that anticipatory 
eye movements reflect a direct matching process. A recent study using 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and eye tracking confirmed this 
interpretation by showing that anticipatory eye movements during observation 
are indeed directly linked to the observer’s corresponding action plans (Elsner 
et al., 2013). These results provide strong evidence that the ability to predict 
observed actions is realized by a direct matching process located in the mirror 
neuron system of the observer which is measurable via anticipatory gaze 
behavior.   
5.1.1 The Impact of Short-term Experience 
According to the findings described above, we questioned whether a brief 
amount of experience with the block stacking task would activate task-specific 
action plans, which in return would enhance action understanding during 
observation of the same block stacking task. We were indeed able to show that 
short-term experience with a block stacking task enhanced participants’ action 
understanding during the subsequent observation of the same block stacking 
task in such ways that participants directed their gaze significantly faster to the 
action goals of the block stacking task. In contrast, participants who had 
performed a pursuit rotor task or puzzles did not show this effect at all or to a 
lesser extent, respectively. This finding indicates that short-term experience 
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with an action activates task-specific action plans which enable a person to 
perceive the action goals of the same action faster when observing someone 
else performing this action. This finding is in line with previous studies 
demonstrating that short-term action experience has an influence on the ability 
to recognize and predict actions during observation (Casile & Giese, 2006; 
Marshall et al., 2009; Quandt et al., 2011). However, whereas previous studies 
could find this effect for behavioral or neurophysiological measures, evidence 
for an impact of short-term experience on gaze behavior is sparse. To our 
knowledge, only one other study shed some light on this issue by showing that 
participants with a higher amount of experience were able to predict action 
outcomes faster and more precise (Taya et al., 2013). However, although the 
aforementioned study delivered some valuable evidence for this thesis, it did 
not systematically investigate whether short-term experience would affect 
participants’ gaze behavior. Hence, with our study we were able to fill this gap 
by showing that even a brief amount of experience is sufficient enough to 
activate task-specific action plans that enable an observer to predict the action 
goals of others’ actions faster.  
5.1.2 Congruency 
Within our studies adults and children between four and six years were trained 
in two ways: (1) with anatomical congruency which means that participants 
performed the action exactly like they had observed it – with exactly the same 
anatomical movement (backhand movement). On the other hand, participants 
were trained (2) with spatial congruency which means that they performed the 
block stacking task spatially congruent with the observed video stimuli. This 
resulted in a forehand movement in contrast to the movement seen in the video 
clips. By varying the anatomical congruency between the performed and 
observed action, we intended to investigate whether the specific kinematics of 
an action would have an impact on the ability to anticipate the action goals of 
the same action after the training.  
No significant effect of congruency could be found in both adults and children 
in our studies, indicating that the performance of a congruent or incongruent 
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anatomical movement (backhand vs. forehand) does not affect participants’ 
latency of anticipatory fixations. This finding stands in line with studies 
showing sparse influence of postural congruency between the observer and the 
agent on behavioral results (Alaerts, Heremans, et al., 2009; Alaerts, Swinnen, 
et al., 2009; Springer et al., 2011; Urgesi et al., 2006). Furthermore, Sartori et 
al. (2013) have recently shown that motor resonance occurred in the observer’s 
dominant hand, regardless of the hand preference being observed. This 
suggests that a direct mapping mechanism is able to convert others’ movement 
features into the observer’s optimal motor commands. 
5.1.3 Visual Experience vs.  Motor Experience 
Another aspect which needs to be discussed is whether the effect of short-term 
experience on anticipatory eye movements occurred due to visual or motor 
experience. We argue that this is not caused by visual experience, since studies 
investigating the influence of motor and visual experience on anticipatory skills 
during action observation have demonstrated that an improvement of 
anticipatory skills occurred relatively independent of visual experience (Casile 
& Giese, 2006; Mulligan & Hodges, 2013). For example, in a training study 
conducted by Mulligan and Hodges (2013) the amount of visual experience 
was systematically manipulated. Specifically, two groups of participants were 
trained to throw darts towards specific areas of a dartboard whereas two other 
groups did not receive a motor training. The two motor training groups differed 
in such ways that one group was trained blindfolded, and thus, only gained 
motor experience, whereas participants of the other group were allowed to 
view their own actions. The two control groups differed in such ways that one 
group was allowed to observe other participants throwing darts at the board, 
whereas the other group was neither allowed to observe dart throws nor to 
perform dart throws. Before and after the training, all participants were asked 
to predict landing positions of dart throws on temporally-occluded video 
stimuli. The results of this study have shown that both the vision and the no-
vision motor training group significantly improved to predict the landing 
position of dart throws during the post-test with no difference between them, 
whereas control groups did not improve at all, indicating that visual experience 
132     GENERAL DISCUSSION  
 
had no impact on the ability the predict action goals. This finding finds support 
in other studies showing a superior effect of motor experience over visual 
experience on the ability to understand others’ actions (Calvo-Merino et al., 
2006; Casile & Giese, 2006). The results of these studies indicate that observed 
actions are understood in terms of their activated motor representations 
independent of visual knowledge about the actions.  
Although visual and motor experience are confounded in our study, our results 
still contain some evidence that visual repetition did not cause an improved 
action understanding during the observation of posttest trials: Participants who 
received a training with the pursuit rotor task did not show shorter gaze 
latencies during posttest trials. This finding indirectly provides evidence, that 
visual experience with the block stacking task did not cause an improved action 
understanding in posttest trials. Hence, according to the studies reported above 
and our finding that the pursuit rotor group did not show any effect of visual 
experience, we assume that the motor training was the crucial aspect to activate 
underlying action plans.  
5.1.4 Transfer 
Moreover, the finding that participants directed their gaze significantly faster to 
action goals of a block stacking task after they received a brief amount of 
training with this action can also be interpreted in the light of transfer between 
related domains. According to Thorndike’s (1906, 1914) identical elements 
theory, transfer is most likely to occur between tasks with identical elements. 
This assumption is in line with our findings that the most successful transfer 
occurred between experience with the block stacking task and the observation 
of post-test trials. In contrast, experience with puzzles, which can be 
considered as a similar, but not identical task, led to some degree to transfer, 
although to a significantly lesser extent than the block stacking task. The 
pursuit rotor task as a rather distinct task did not lead to successful transfer at 
all during the observation of the block stacking task. Further, Barnett and Ceci 
(2002) proposed a taxonomy of transfer with the purpose to classify contextual 
and content dimensions along which transfer could occur. In the context of this 
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taxonomy, our results can be discussed as near transfer effects. Whereas 
experience with the block stacking task led to clear near (same content, same 
context) transfer effects during the perception of the block stacking task, 
experience with puzzles was transferred to a lesser extent during the 
observation of the block stacking task. This can be explained by a larger 
distance between both tasks in the content dimension (similar content, same 
context). Experience with the pursuit rotor task did not show successful 
transfer, again explained by a farther distance between the tasks (different 
content, same context). The occurrence of transfer has further been discussed 
to be dependent on experience. A recent model (Rosalie & Müller, 2012) 
considers the degree of expertise on successful transfer, assuming that a higher 
level of expertise is characterized by an increase in experience and as a 
consequence, leads to a higher extent of successful transfer. Studies 
investigating the influence of experience on successful transfer between tasks 
have shown, that experience in one domain will enable successful transfer in a 
related domain (Causer & Ford, 2014; Rosalie & Müller, 2014). Concerning 
our results, this implies that even a small amount of experience with the block 
stacking task facilitates the perception of the same task, whereas experience 
with different tasks does not allow successful transfer. Again, puzzles can be 
considered as a similar task to the block stacking task and therefore, leading to 
a less pronounced transfer.  
5.1.5 Task-Specificity 
Within our studies, we were able to show that the effect of short-term 
experience occurred in a highly task-specific manner. This finding is supported 
by the fact that we were not able to find any correlation between the ability to 
predict action goals and manual dexterity. Hence, participants who had higher 
manual dexterity scores did not automatically show a better ability to anticipate 
grasping actions. This means, that the ability to anticipate action goals is 
strongly dependent on the task – specifically, how much experience an 
individual possesses with a task in order to activate action programs which 
enable action understanding. This interpretation is in line with studies showing 
that experience with one action usually leads to an improved understanding of 
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exactly this action, indicated by e.g., higher recognition rates, more precise 
prediction of action outcomes, stronger neurophysiological responses, or better 
imitation abilities (Casile & Giese, 2006; Marshall et al., 2009; Quandt et al., 
2011).  In our study, we were able to show that even a brief period of own 
experience causes a task-specific improvement in action understanding, 
indicated by shorter gaze latencies of goal-directed saccades.  
5.1.6 Interim Conclusion 
To sum up, in accordance with the direct matching hypothesis short-term 
experience with the same task led to task-specific changes in the latency of 
anticipatory eye movements during observation. These changes cannot be 
explained due to visual experience, but rather by active motor experience with 
an action. Moreover, differences in the spatial and anatomical congruency 
between an observed action and the trained action did not have an impact on 
the ability to anticipate action goals of the same action. Taken together, our 
studies provide evidence that anticipatory eye movements can be taken as 
indicators of activated task-specific action knowledge, and thus, supporting the 
assumption that action execution and action perception are intrinsically linked. 
5.2 The Impact of Short-term Experience on Pupil Dilation 
Within the second study we investigated whether task-specific short-term 
experience has an impact on pupil dilation during the observation of 
unsuccessfully performed actions. Pupil size changes have previously been 
reported to be one possibility to assess action understanding in an observer 
(Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010) in such ways that participants’ pupils dilated 
whenever an unexpected action outcome was observed. This result is explained 
by the assumption that the prediction error reflects individuals’ expectations 
about the action outcome – that participants understood where the action 
should have led to – but that the evaluation of the observed action outcome 
resulted in a mismatch between what was expected and what actually 
happened. As a consequence, a state of surprise occurred in the observer which 
could be measured via pupil dilation. 
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5.2.1 Prediction Error 
In our study, participants observed successfully and unsuccessfully performed 
versions of the block stacking task. The results indicated higher pupil dilation 
values when participants observed the unexpected action outcomes compared 
to successfully performed actions. This finding is in line with several recent 
studies reporting pupil dilation as a result of surprise or a violation of 
expectations (e.g., Kloosterman et al., 2015; Lavín, San Martín, & Rosales 
Jubal, 2014). Hence, participants were able to understand the correct action 
goal of the block stacking task, and were surprised by the violation of their 
expectation about how the action should be completed. Moreover, participants 
were surprised by the unexpected abrupt termination of the action, which 
demonstrates that pupil dilation is a measure that is related to a broad variety of 
expectation violations – rather than merely reflecting the violation of expected 
action outcomes. This finds support in several studies reporting pupillary 
responses as a consequence of violations of expectations in gambling tasks 
(Preuschoff, 2011), in the perception of body movements (Morita et al., 2012), 
or in the perception of social interactions (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). With 
our study, we were able to demonstrate that an unexpected event within a 
simple grasping action results in pupil dilation as well.  
5.2.2 The Impact of Short-term Experience 
Since we were able to show that anticipatory eye movements can be influenced 
by own short-term experience, we questioned whether a different measure of 
action understanding – pupil dilation – would also be impacted by own 
experience. Although, we could not find an influence of task-specific motor 
experience on pupil dilation, we were able to show that the pupillary response 
decreases when an unexpected event is presented visually for a second time. It 
is possible, that this finding can be explained due to the fact that participants 
used the visual experience to discriminate kinematic cues of the unsuccessful 
actions earlier when observing them a second time. Some recent studies have 
shown that people are very proficient in perceiving and using subtle kinematic 
cues in order to understand others’ actions (Ambrosini et al., 2015). It is very 
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likely that participants perceived minimal kinematic differences between the 
successful and unsuccessful action sequences so that they were able to use this 
information for their prediction process. In line with this, it is important to note 
that the prediction process is characterized by a continuous updating and 
integrating of new information (Kilner et al., 2007). Hence, when gaining new 
information about unsuccessful actions, this information is directly fed in the 
prediction processing system and can be used for future predictions. Moreover, 
the moment the first unsuccessful action occurred might have prompted the 
participants’ preparedness of these trials, which might have inhibited the extent 
of surprise when they observed an error for the second time. However, 
although it has been previously reported that the pupillary response decreased 
when stimuli have been repeatedly presented (e.g., Lowenstein & Loewenfeld, 
1952) or by upcoming fatigue during the experiment (e.g., Hess, 1972), it is 
unlikely that the effect found in our study was caused by these reasons. On the 
one hand, the unsuccessful trials were only presented once per test block with 
several successful trials and attention grabbers in between. Hence, no 
habituation towards these trials could have happened. On the other hand, our 
study was relatively short, so that it is unlikely that participants experienced 
some upcoming fatigue during the experiment. Moreover, pupillary responses 
remained stable for test trials, although the number of test trials was three times 
higher for both pre- and posttest. Hence, an effect of habituation or tiredness 
would have been more likely for those trials. As such, we argue that our result 
reflects that visual experience with specific unexpected events caused 
participants to be aware of these types of actions and integrate them as possible 
outcomes in their prediction process.  
5.2.3 Dissociation between Measures of Action Understanding 
Within this thesis, we investigated two measures of action understanding – 
anticipatory eye movements and pupil dilation. One of our main research 
questions was, whether these two measures are related to each other to some 
degree. A recent study reported that higher pupil sizes indicated the preparation 
of saccadic eye movements in an anti-saccade paradigm (Wang, Brien, & 
Munoz, 2015). However, this design differed in many aspects from our study, 
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especially in the fact that we applied pupil dilation as a post-hoc measure, 
whereas the authors of the aforementioned study measured pupil dilation 
online. Moreover, our stimuli were rather complex compared to an anti-saccade 
paradigm, and even more important, contained a perceivable action outcome. 
Thus, pupil dilation in our study indicated an evaluation process after the 
observation of an action outcome, rather than a preparatory process to elicit or 
inhibit a saccade. Nevertheless, the aforementioned study suggested that pupil 
dilation is modulated by neural structures, namely the superior colliculus and 
the frontal eye field, that are responsible for the preparation of saccades in an 
anti-saccade paradigm.  
However, we were not able to show any relation between anticipatory eye 
movements and pupil dilation within our studies. This might be due to several 
reasons: One possible explanation for these findings might lie in the brain 
structures underlying anticipatory eye movements and pupil dilation during 
action understanding. As described in previous sections, anticipatory eye 
movements are supposed to be part of the motor system in the brain which is 
activated in a somatotopically manner during action observation and action 
execution. Neuroimaging studies have supported this assumption by showing 
that anticipatory eye movements are delayed during the observation of manual 
actions when according brain areas are inhibited by applying TMS pulses 
(Elsner et al., 2013). In contrast, pupil responses that reflect prediction errors or 
surprise have been reported to be linked to the locus coeruleus (Koss, 1986; 
Rajkowski et al., 1993), which is the main cortical structure associated with the 
regulation of the neuro-transmitter norepinephrine (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 
2005). Due to these different underlying neural substrates, it is very likely that 
motor experience only affects anticipatory eye movements, whereas pupil 
dilation remains unaffected. This makes sense, when considering that eye 
movements are part of a motor program that can be activated by experience, 
whereas pupillary responses are driven by a brain structure responsible for 
arousal and focusing attention.  
Another possible explanation for the missing relationship between anticipatory 
eye movements and pupil dilation is the fact that we applied anticipatory eye 
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movements as an online measure, whereas we applied pupil dilation as a post-
hoc measure of action understanding. A dissociation between online and post-
hoc measures has previously reported for predictive gaze and looking time in 
infants (Daum et al., 2012). Although both measures were integrated by the age 
of three years, it is still evident that post-hoc measures indicate a different type 
of expectation than online measures. For the results of our thesis, we argue, 
that anticipatory eye movements reflect expectations about upcoming action 
steps, whereas pupil dilation reflects the evaluation of the action outcome after 
the action was completed. Although both measures clearly indicate action 
understanding, they reflect different aspects of it.  
5.2.4 Interim Conclusion 
Taken together, the second study oh this thesis supports previous findings that 
pupil responses reflect the violation of expectations in an individual. Hence, 
pupil responses are suited to measure action understanding in an observer. 
However, in contrast to anticipatory eye movements, the extent of this response 
was independent of own task-specific experience with the observed action. 
Nevertheless, it can be assumed that visual experience had an influence on the 
strength of the prediction error. 
5.3 Development of Action Understanding 
One aim of this thesis was to disentangle whether developmental changes in 
the ability to understand others’ actions would occur during childhood, and 
whether the impact of experience would affect action understanding indicated 
by anticipatory eye movements.  
The results of the third study of the present thesis indicate that children from 
four years up to 14 years of age are able to understand others’ grasping actions 
indicated by goal-directed anticipatory eye movements during observation of a 
block stacking task. This finding is in accordance with several other studies 
showing that even infants are able to anticipate the action goals of others’ 
actions (e.g., Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010).  
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Moreover, our results indicate a developmental change in action understanding 
reflected by an increase in the percentage of anticipated subgoals of the 
observed block stacking task. Whereas school children and teenagers are able 
to reliably anticipate every subgoal of the block stacking task, preschoolers 
were more likely to anticipate later action steps compared to earlier action 
steps. We explain this finding in such ways that preschoolers need more 
information about an action to generate a precise prediction of the action goal 
compared to older children and adults. The predictive coding account (Kilner et 
al., 2007) suggests that information about the ongoing action is continuously 
updated and integrated in the prediction process of ongoing actions, and that 
top-down processes are integrated in the prediction process. Hence, in order to 
reliably generate predictions, an individual needs to possess prior knowledge 
about kinematics and their possible outcome, about contexts in which actions 
occur, and moreover, a functional direct matching system. Our results can be 
explained by both – that preschoolers lack specific action knowledge that 
would have allowed them to produce faster predictions – or, that the direct 
matching process of preschoolers is not yet fully developed. Both 
interpretations make sense in such ways that several studies have shown that 
the mirror neuron system adapts in relation to prior experience (e.g., Calvo-
Merino et al., 2005), and moreover, that the mirror neuron system underlies 
developmental changes due to pruning processes of the brain (e.g., Kilner & 
Blakemore, 2007). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that higher age is 
associated with a number of different experiences that modulate the 
functioning of the mirror neuron system which allows making more precise 
predictions at earlier steps of ongoing actions. This assumption is also 
supported by two recent studies showing a developmental trend in the ability to 
plan actions (Barlaam et al., 2012; Jongbloed-Pereboom, Nijhuis-van der 
Sanden, Saraber-Schiphorst, Crajé, & Steenbergen, 2013). Jongbloed-
Pereboom and colleagues (2013) reported an increased anticipatory action 
planning in children ranging from three to 10 years. Moreover, Barlaam et al. 
(2012) was able to show that teenagers between 11 and 16 years differed from 
adults in their anticipatory abilities to control their body postures in a lifting 
task, indicating that anticipatory abilities underlie developmental processes 
from childhood throughout adolescence up to adulthood.  
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The most important finding of this study was that short-term experience 
influenced anticipatory eye movements in teenagers between 11 and 14 years, 
but not in younger children. We explain our findings in such ways that our data 
might reflect that the mirror neuron system is developed so far at the age of 11 
years that it allows young teenagers to benefit even from a brief period of 
training during the observation of the same action, whereas younger children 
might need more experience in order to benefit from it to the same extent. This 
interpretation is in line with studies discussing that own experience modifies 
this mirror neuron system and modulates its functioning throughout childhood 
(Shimada & Hiraki, 2006; van Elk et al., 2008). 
Another possible explanation is the occurrence of developmental changes of 
saccadic eye movements during childhood. A study, investigating the 
development of saccadic eye movements in 6- to 15-year-old children with 
several paradigms reported that children’s latencies of saccadic eye movements 
became shorter with increasing age up until 12 years (Bucci & Seassau, 2012). 
In our study, the oldest age group comprised teenagers between 11 and 14 
years, hence, the latencies of saccadic eye movements of this group were 
developed further than those of the other two age groups, which might have 
resulted in the finding that only the older age group was able to benefit from a 
short-term training.  
5.3.1 Interim Conlusion 
In sum, the present study was able to show that children between four and 14 
years are able to predict action goals of observed actions, although 
developmental changes became apparent. Moreover, only teenagers between 
11 to 14 years showed an effect of short-term experience in their ability to 
anticipate the action goals of the block stacking task, which might be explained 
due to developmental changes in the mirror neuron system, or in the control of 
saccadic eye movements. However, our study provides evidence that a direct 
matching process is already present in childhood and that anticipatory eye 
movements are strongly related to task-specific action plans. 
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5.4 Limitations & Implications for Future Research 
Our studies provide valuable evidence for the interface between action and 
perception and the impact of short-term experience on this relationship. 
However, some limitations need to be discussed in the following sections. 
5.4.1 Study 1 
In the first study, we were able to show a task-specific influence of short-term 
experience on anticipatory eye movements. However, we were not entirely able 
to show whether this effect occurred due to visual or motor experience, or a 
combination of both. Although our results indicate some evidence for the 
impact of motor experience, further studies are necessary to disentangle the 
specific influence of visual and motor experience on the ability to anticipate 
action goals.  
Moreover, although to a lesser extent, experience with puzzles also led to 
shorter gaze latencies during the observation of the block stacking task. Further 
research is necessary to investigate the influence of task-specific experience in 
order to determine which aspects are crucial to activate task-specific action 
plans. In our study, one aspect that might have made a difference between 
puzzles and the block stacking task is the sequential or non-sequential way of 
training: Whereas the block stacking task was repeatedly performed in a fixed 
sequence, the puzzle pieces were placed in into the goal position in a random 
sequence. It might be possible that participants were able to predict the action 
goals of the block stacking task faster due to this sequential structure. This 
assumption is in line with studies showing that people easily learn sequential 
order – even when they are not conscious about them (Nissen & Bullemer, 
1987; Weiermann, Cock, & Meier, 2010). Hence, future studies could 
investigate whether the sequential structure of an action improves the 
activation of underlying task-specific action plans, and therefore, improves 
action understanding in a subsequent observation of the same action. 
Moreover, the amount of training was fairly small and to this point, it remains 
unclear whether a longer period of training would have yielded a more 
successful transfer effect in the puzzle group. 
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Furthermore, our study provided indirect evidence for a direct matching 
process in adults, and that action plans can be activated by own experience. In 
order to investigate the activation of task-specific action plans further, future 
studies could implement different types of training – for instance, motor 
imagery in which no open behavior is required. Several previous studies 
suggest that action plans can be activated by own action, observation, or even 
by the mere imagination of an action (Filimon, Nelson, Hagler, & Sereno, 
2007; Jeannerod, 2001), and that eye movements are comparable during action 
execution, action observation and action imagery (Causer et al., 2013). Hence, 
it would be of interest whether an imagined short-term experience with an 
action would also result in shorter gaze latencies during the observation of an 
action.  
5.4.2 Study 2 
Within the second study, we intended to investigate the impact of short-term 
experience on prediction errors measured via pupil dilation. Moreover, we 
intended to disentangle the relationship between anticipatory eye movements 
and pupil dilation. However, since this study was a further analysis of already 
collected data, it contains some weaknesses. First, we were only able to 
analyze pupil dilation in relation to unexpected action outcomes for one trial, 
which makes our results less reliable. Moreover, we compared anticipatory eye 
movements of test trials with pupil dilation values of unsuccessful action trials. 
Hence, it is not clear, whether both measures are really independent of each 
other or whether this independence occurred because of the different stimulus 
material. Further studies are necessary to systematically investigate the 
dissociation between online and post-hoc measures of action understanding. A 
first attempt in that direction was realized by Daum and colleagues (2012) who 
reported a dissociation between predictive gaze and looking time in infancy 
and early childhood. Concerning predictive gaze and pupil dilation during 
action observation, Gredebäck & Melinder, (2010) argued for a dual process 
account in which predictive saccades reflect the prediction of upcoming action 
goals, whereas pupil dilation reflects the evaluation of action outcomes.  
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However, the relationship between anticipatory eye movements and pupil 
dilation requires further studies that systematically investigate both measures in 
action sequences with an expected and unexpected action outcome. Moreover, 
it is important to compare pupil dilation as an online and as a post-hoc 
measure. Some recent studies provide evidence, that pupil dilation as an online 
measure is directly related to the preparation of goal-directed saccades (Mathôt 
et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015), indicating that both measures relate to each 
other when applied online.  
5.4.3 Study 3 
Within the third study, we intended to investigate the impact of short-term 
experience on anticipatory eye movement in children, and whether there are 
some developmental changes between four to 14 years. We cannot clearly 
answer the question why preschoolers did not show an effect of short-term 
experience on anticipatory eye movements. One reason might be that the 
training duration was too short for preschoolers to activate task-specific action 
plans. This issue is supported by the observation that only preschoolers had 
difficulties in the beginning to perform the block stacking task themselves. 
Whereas older children and adults were able to perform the block stacking task 
immediately, many preschoolers needed some guidance in the first trials. This 
might reflect that preschoolers did not have a representation about the final 
action goal of the block stacking task in the beginning. Further studies are 
necessary to investigate whether more training trials would bring up the same 
effect as in teenagers or adults.  
Another limitation of our third study is that we assessed many preschoolers in 
their kindergartens, whereas older children were tested in our lab. It is possible 
that the data of preschoolers suffered from influences due to the different 
testing situation (e.g., noise in the kindergarten; disruptions because of people 
entering the room; different light conditions). This problem is reflected in the 
high number of dropouts, which had to be discarded from analyses mainly 
because of insufficient gaze data. In order to make clear statements about the 
144     GENERAL DISCUSSION  
 
influence of short-term experience on gaze behavior in preschoolers, it is 
necessary to conduct further studies in which these problems are controlled. 
Moreover, we used the same stimuli for adults as well as children. It might be 
possible that the velocity of the single grasping actions was too high for 
younger children. Since saccadic eye movements develop throughout 
childhood up to adolescence (Bucci & Seassau, 2012) it might be possible that 
young children reached their limit in the velocity of their saccadic eye 
movements already during the pretest. Here, it would be necessary to produce 
stimuli with a lower velocity to investigate whether the high velocity masked 
the influence of short-term experience.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion & Outlook
The present thesis provides evidence for a relationship between action and 
perception. By demonstrating that adults as well as children are able to 
anticipate the action goals of a manually-guided action, we indirectly showed 
that action execution as well as action perception draw on the same 
representations. Moreover, we were able to show that a short amount of 
experience with an action is sufficient enough to activate task-specific action 
knowledge in adults and teenagers. Although preschoolers and school children 
did not benefit from a short-term training, we were able to show a 
developmental course in the prediction of action goals in these age groups. 
Future studies should aim to further investigate the impact of short-term 
experience on anticipatory gaze. One possibility would be to investigate 
whether short-term motor imagery training would also lead to comparable 
effects. Corresponding results would support the idea of shared representations 
of action execution, action observation and action imagery. Moreover, 
neurophysiological methods should be applied to identify neural substrates 
underlying action understanding. A further important research question is, 
whether different measures of action understanding (e.g., predictive gaze, µ-
rhythm, pupil dilation) relate to each other, or whether they reflect completely 
different aspects of action understanding. It is important for future research to 
distinguish these measures in terms of their specific function and which type of 
information they provide.  
Moreover, it is important to consider children older than two years in future 
studies. To date, most studies are conducted with infants, but less in known 
about the developmental course during childhood or adolescence. Future 
research needs to fill this gap – eventually by conducting longitudinal studies – 
in order to describe the developmental course of action understanding. 
In conclusion, this thesis provides evidence that anticipatory eye movements 
can be taken as indicators of active task-specific action knowledge during 
action observation, and that pupil dilation reflects the violation of expected 
action outcomes. Moreover, action understanding has been demonstrated to 
underlie developmental processes throughout childhood.  
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Appendix A. Cover Story (German) for Study 3: Experiment 1 (4-6 
year-old preschoolers) and Experiment 2 (8-10 year-old children) 
 
Part I: Pretest 
„Schau mal – das ist der Max. Weißt du, was Max für ein Tier ist?“  
(Antwort Kind)  
„Richtig, das ist ein Frosch. Aber Max ist ein ganz besonderer Frosch – Max ist 
ein Wetterfrosch. Weißt du, was ein Wetterfrosch macht?“ 
(Antwort Kind) 
„Nun, ein Wetterfrosch kann dir sagen, wie das Wetter morgen wird – ob es 
regnet oder ob die Sonne scheint. Und dann weißt du, was du anziehen musst. 
Max ist der Wetterfrosch von einem Freund von mir – vom Olli. Und Olli ist 
ein Gärtner und muss immer draußen arbeiten. Es ist wichtig für ihn, dass er 
weiß, wie das Wetter wird. Aber schau mal, Max ist sehr klein und manchmal 
kann er den Himmel nicht richtig sehen und kann nicht genau sagen, wie das 
Wetter wird. Deshalb baut Olli ihm eine Treppe – schau.“ 
(Turm vor dem Kind aufbauen) 
„Guck, nun kann der Max diese Treppe hochklettern und wenn er ganz oben 
ist, sieht er den Himmel viel besser. Manchmal ist Olli aber ein bisschen 
vergesslich oder ungeschickt und dann passieren ihm Fehler beim Bau der 
Treppe. Schau.“ 
(Fehlerversionen vorzeigen) 
„Weißt du was? Es wäre toll, wenn du Olli helfen könntest, dass er die Treppe 
immer richtig aufbaut. Olli baut die Treppe gleich am Bildschirm und immer, 
wenn er einen Fehler macht, musst du ganz laut auf diese Tröte drücken. Dann 
weiß Olli, dass er etwas falsch gemacht hat. Willst du Olli helfen?“ 
(Antwort Kind) 
„Super, dann lass uns mal schauen, wie der Olli den Turm baut.“ 
(Eye-Tracking Pretest) 
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Part II: Intervention + Posttest 
„So, super, dass du dem Olli so toll gezeigt hast, wann er Fehler macht. Er hat 
ganz schön viele Fehler gemacht, nicht wahr? Ich glaube, wir müssen Olli 
zeigen, wie er die Treppe richtig bauen kann. Kannst du ihm nochmal helfen?“ 
(Antwort Kind) 
„Super, am besten baust du die Treppe jetzt mal und zeigst dem Olli, wie das 
richtig geht. Bau die Treppe mal so genau wie möglich.“ (Wiederholung 5 x) 
(Kind baut 5 x so genau wie möglich) 
„Super, ich glaube, Olli hat es langsam verstanden und du kannst jetzt schneller 
bauen. Bau die Treppe mal so schnell du kannst.“ (Wiederholung 5 x) 
(Kind baut 5 x so schnell wie möglich) 
„Super! Wollen wir jetzt nochmal schauen, ob der Olli was gelernt hat?“ 
(Antwort Kind) 
„Ok! Aber falls der Olli noch Fehler macht, musst du wieder ganz laut auf die 
Tröte drücken, ja?“ 
(Antwort Kind) 
„Super! Dann schau nochmal, wie Olli die Treppe baut und drücke auf die 
Tröte, wenn er einen Fehler macht.“ 
(Eye-Tracking Posttest) 
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Appendix B. “Max” – Frog for Cover Story 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C. Puzzles for Puzzle Intervention. 
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